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ABSTRACT 
Pay-for-performance (PFP) is a compensation system that has been one of the most 
widespread compensation tools for motivating employees. Compensation researchers have long 
discussed the mixed results regarding the effectiveness of PFP plans. This dissertation focuses on 
the two major factors of why PFP research has yielded mixed evidence regarding the 
effectiveness of PFP plans – (1) individual feelings of various aspects of PFPs have not been 
fully captured, and (2) the complexity of the current PFP environments has not been clearly 
recognized. This dissertation has developed and validated a multi-dimensional measure of 
individual PFP perceptions in complex pay system environments. Using individual attitudinal 
data from diverse organizations through an on-line survey, this dissertation identifies three 
dimensions associated with PFP plans, and develops a measure of PFP perceptions (PFP 
Perceptions Questionnaire: PPQ) using items in multiple dimensions. It investigates individual 
feelings and reactions to individuals’ multiple PFPs. The results show that individuals form 
complex conceptualizations of each PFP when they are covered by multiple PFP plans. The 
validation tests support the distinct perceptions of instrumentality, expectancy, and valence as 
being critical dimensions of the individuals’ PFP perceptions, with evidence of construct 
validity, convergent validity, discriminant validity, and criterion-related validity.
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Pay-for-performance (PFP) plans have long been discussed as being powerful drivers of 
employee job performance and other positive outcomes. Such discussions have been based on 
the key assumption that tying financial rewards to employee performance improves employee 
motivation (Evans, 1970; Gerhart, Rynes, & Fulmer, 2009; Heneman, 1984; Park & Sturman, 
2012; Schaubroeck, Shaw, Duffy, & Mitra, 2008). Yet while there is a vast literature on PFP (for 
reviews, see Gerhart et al., 2009; Guthrie, 2007; Rynes, Gerhart, & Parks, 2005), the majority of 
work in this area has considered or examined only one PFP plan at a time. While a few studies 
have considered multiple PFP plans simultaneously (i.e., Kahn & Sherer, 1990; Nyberg, Pieper, 
& Trevor, in press; Park & Sturman, 2012, 2013; Salamin & Hom, 2005), these studies have not 
considered the potential complex effects of PFP on employee perceptions and motivation in 
multi-PFP plan environments. Modern pay systems often include a variety of PFP forms, but 
relatively little emphasis has been given to such plans as “holistic entities” (Gerhart et al., 2009, 
p.276). As a result, a critical theoretical gap has opened up - prior PFP research sheds little light 
on how employees perceive and react to their compensation systems with more than one PFP 
plan in place. The purpose of this paper is to extend PFP research to examine employees’ 
attitudinal perceptions toward PFP systems in multifaceted environments, and to determine how 
these perceptions are related to various outcomes such as employee attitudes and behaviors. 
Researchers have acknowledged that an important factor leading to variations in the 
effectiveness of PFP plans is how employees perceive and react to a PFP plan (Gerhart & Rynes, 
2003; Schaubroeck et al., 2008). Prior PFP research has, however, captured the individual 
perceptions toward PFP systems problematically. First, by neglecting to consider an environment 
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of frequently changing pay practices and policies, prior PFP research has considered PFP 
perceptions too generally. That is, such research has, when investigating the effectiveness of any 
type of PFP plan, reflected PFPs from only one type of pay system. For example, the measure of 
PFP perceptions (Perry & Pearce, 1983), which is the most prevalent measure in prior PFP work, 
has only captured employee perceptions of one specific type of PFP plan – the merit pay plan. 
Other studies have just asked generally about “compensation plans” (e.g., Bhattacharya, Gibson, 
& Doty, 2005; Cadsby, Song, & Tapon, 2007), “reward” (e.g., Eisenberger, Rhoades, & 
Cameron, 1999; Kwong & Wong, in press; Morgeson, Johnson, Campion, Medsker, & 
Mumford, 2006), “pay” (e.g., Toh, Morgeson, & Campion, 2008; Wright, Gardner, Moynihan, & 
Allen, 2005) or “incentive pay” (e.g., Banker, Lee, Potter, & Srinivasan, 1996, 2001). Thus, prior 
PFP research has not effectively distinguished between the specific forms and functionalities of 
various forms of PFP plans and therefore failed to capture the relative effects of the different 
types of PFPs (cf., Nyberg et al., in press; Park & Sturman, 2013) or how such plans are 
perceived when offered as parts of a larger compensation system.   
Second, PFP perceptions have been considered with a narrow scope. Compensation 
studies have primarily focused on only one key factor: the perceived connection between pay and 
performance. Thus, various other important aspects involved in multiple types of PFP plans have 
been ignored when measuring the effectiveness of PFP. These include how much and how 
differently individuals value their multiple pay forms and how confidently individuals feel they 
can improve their performance (often based on their previous performance history) with each 
pay form. This lack of consideration of more complex pay systems presents a theoretical gap for 
understanding how PFP systems work for both employers and employees. It also presents a 
practical gap for organizations needing to predict the sort of effects they should expect from their 
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multi-plan environments. Accordingly, this dissertation, by considering specific mechanisms and 
characteristics of PFP plans, will better theoretically and empirically articulate individual 
perceptions of the nature of the multiple PFP plans that are currently and popularly used in 
organizations. 
This dissertation offers several contributions to the existing compensation literature. First, 
its main theoretical contribution is to provide more precise theory testing. Colquitt and Zapata-
Phelan (2007) argued that testing theory is important because “some of the most intuitive 
theories introduced in the management literature wind up being unsupported by empirical 
research” (p. 1282) and therefore rank low in “scientific validity.” The present study refines 
previous views for a more comprehensive picture of current PFP systems by creating and testing 
the measures of individual perceptions of the multiple PFP plans. To correspond to current 
theories and compensation systems, the measures of current multiple PFP plans should be more 
complex than those currently used. Thus, this study will clarify the link between extant 
compensation-related motivation theories and the measures that can be used more accurately. 
Such clarification should advance the current understanding of why PFP research has yielded 
mixed evidence regarding the effectiveness of PFP, and of how we can avoid “sound-bite 
conclusions (e.g., PFP does not exist; PFP does or does not motivate) that have been rarely 
valid” (Gerhart et al., 2009, p.252).   
Second, this dissertation develops and validates a measure of an important construct: 
individual perceptions of PFP systems. Although measuring individual perceptions of PFP is 
critically important to precisely test motivational theories that have been used to explore the 
motivational effects of multiple PFP plans, insufficient attention has been devoted to these 
perceptions. Consequently, in the compensation literature, the employee PFP perceptions 
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construct has received less attention than it deserves. The current study sheds lights on the 
underlying attitudinal perceptions related to PFP plans.  
A third contribution, conceptually and empirically, of this study is to the field of HR and 
OB. The contribution is brought about by using this new valid measure of PFP perceptions (PFP 
perceptions questionnaire; PPQ) to assess the influence of compensation systems on employee 
attitudes and behaviors. The literature on compensation suggests that compensation systems play 
significant roles in employment relationships, including those concerning factors of trust, 
organizational commitment, and organizational culture (e.g., Bloom, 2004); however, these 
relationships have yet to be directly and purposely tested with empirical studies (cf. Deckop, 
Mangel, & Cirka, 1999; Schaubroeck et al., 2008). The criterion-related validity study that this 
dissertation provides opens the door to exploring relationships that have not been investigated. 
Fourth and finally, this study explains how and why multiple PFPs influence employees across 
organizational pay policies and systems, thus providing practical implications for organizations 
on how to design their compensation systems.  
This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of modern PFP 
plans in multi-plan environments. Chapter 3 reviews the traditional and contemporary 
motivational theories that form the basis for PFP plans and PFP perceptions, as well as previous 
empirical research that has predicted the effects of multiple PFP plans. This chapter describes 
theoretical gaps in need of being filled by compensation research. Chapter 4 defines the key 
construct – individual perceptions of PFP plans. This chapter provides a basis for the rationale of 
the construct validation test. Chapter 5 presents a closer look at the individual perceptions of 
multiple PFPs with comparisons within and across PFPs, and Chapter 6 presents criterion-related 
validity for PFP perceptions. The paper then describes the data and methods for testing both 
  5 
 
construct validity and criterion-related validity for PFP perceptions in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 
provides the results. Chapter 9 provides an overall discussion, the limitations, and suggestions 
for future research.   
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CHAPTER II 
AN OVERVIEW OF PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE PLANS 
Construct validation research requires a definition of the focal construct and an 
exploration of its nomological network by looking at relationships between the construct of 
interest and other constructs that should theoretically be associated with it (Cronbach & Meehl, 
1955; Hinkin, 1995; Schwab, 1980, 2005; Sturman & Short, 2000; Westen & Resenthal, 2003).  
In this chapter, before defining the construct of interest (PFP perceptions), I begin with the 
definition of PFP plans and provide an overview of current PFP plans.  
2.1. Overview of Pay-for-Performance (PFP) Plans  
A common component of compensation systems, PFP plans are referred to as “pay that 
varies with some measure of individual or organizational performance” (Milkovich, Newman, & 
Gerhart, 2011, p.661). Evans (1970) explained that, historically, PFP is the outcome of the 
Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The Protestant influence 
constituted the core concept of work and rewards (capitalism), that pay should be associated with 
individual performance. Organizations developed various pay systems for incorporating this 
philosophy into the corporate environment (Evans, 1970).  
Researchers have repeatedly found that pay is a strong motivator that can lead to 
increased individual achievements (Evans, 1970; Gerhart et al., 2009; Heneman, 1984; Lawler, 
1971). The main premise of PFP plans is that performance-based pay has a greater impact on 
employee motivation when pay is more strongly related to either employee or organization 
performance (e.g., Bartol & Locke, 2000; Milkovich et al., 2005). Because PFP plans tie pay to 
employee performance, they can both motivate individuals to achieve or sustain greater 
performance levels (incentive effects) and help organizations attract and retain their high 
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performers (sorting effects) (Gerhart et al., 2009).  
Organizations often use multiple types of PFP plans through a combination of individual-
based rewards (e.g., merit pay, lump-sum bonuses, and individual incentives) and/or group-based 
rewards (gain-sharing, profit sharing) (Gerhart et al., 2009; Milkovich et al., 2011; Park & 
Sturman, 2012). Each reward has specific forms (by definition) and functionalities (certain 
characteristics) (Park & Sturman, 2012, 2013). For example, PFP plans come in a variety of 
forms. Its form can be a permanent reward (merit pay), a one-time payment (lump-sum bonuses), 
or delayed payment (long-term incentives). In other words, merit pay permanently increases 
individuals’ base salaries based on their individual performance. Lump-sum bonuses, which do 
not increase employees’ base salaries, are one-time cash payments based on individual 
performance. Long-term incentives are also one-time payments based on both individual 
performance and/or organizational performance. Because of vesting schedules and other 
restrictions, payments from long-term incentives are usually delayed.  
Previous compensation research has suggested that the most important factor for PFP 
plans is “how closely organizations link employee performance and pay” (Heneman, 1973; Kahn 
& Sherer, 1990; Schwab & Olson, 1990, p. 237S). Yet, the different functionalities of PFP plans 
reflect the strength of the relationship between performance and rewards and reward size that can 
vary within and across plan practices of organizations (Park & Sturman, 2013). Park and 
Sturman (2013) argued that the name of a PFP plan does not include information for the degree 
to which pay and performance are linked and the amount of each reward. The complexity in 
differentiating forms and functionalities of PFP plans explains widely disparate results regarding 
the effectiveness of PFP plans under the same name (e.g., different effects in merit pay, r = .30: 
Trevor, Gerhart, & Boudreau, 1997; r = .05: Salamin & Hom, 2005; different effects in bonuses, 
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r = .42: Salamin & Hom, 2005, r = .15: Mizruchi, Stearns, & Fleischer, 2011).  
PFP plans are now nearly ubiquitous across organizations (Gerhart et al., 2009; Park & 
Sturman, 2012, 2013; Worldatwork salary budget survey, 2013). Given the prevalence and 
impact of multiple PFP plans with the various forms and functionalities, focusing on only a 
single PFP limits the understanding of the effectiveness of current compensation systems. This is 
particularly true when it comes to understanding how individuals perceive their PFP plans when 
in multiple PFPs environments or how those PFP plans motivate individuals. Measuring 
employees’ perceptions of each type of PFP plan and the effectiveness of PFP plans in complex 
environments should be different from and more dynamic than the traditional simplistic 
compensation system.    
2.2. The Use of PFP Plans 
PFP plans continue to grow and spread. A recent compensation survey reported that 
approximately 81% to 91% of eligible US employees received PFP plans in 2012 (Worldatwork 
salary budget survey, 2013). Another recent compensation survey showed that approximately 90 
percent of companies plan to continue offering performance-based rewards to their employees in 
the coming year (Miller, 2012).  
These surveys also projected that the pay differences between high performers and 
middle and poor performers would increase more (e.g., a 152% difference: 4.1% average pay 
increase for high performers, 2.7% for middle performers) in 2014. With fluctuating economic 
conditions, recent trends in compensation show that organizations have focused more on PFP 
systems that recognize and differentiate between high and low performers (Cohen, 2011; 
Hansen, 2011). To keep their salary budget relatively tight and to spend it more wisely, 
organizations are paying more attention to high performers (Worldatwork salary budget survey, 
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2013). The trend of a relatively lower salary increase of 2.5% but increasing various types of 
PFP schemes leads to larger pay differences between high and low performers (TowersWatson, 
2010; Worldatwork salary budget survey, 2011).   
For financial rewards at the individual level, merit pay is the most common type of PFP 
plan (Gerhart et al., 2009; Park & Sturman, 2012; Schwab & Olson, 1990). Annual bonuses 
(lump-sum bonuses) also are commonly used for individual rewards (Gerhart et al., 2009; Kahn 
& Sherer, 1990; Park & Sturman, 2012, 2013). Types of bonuses can be implemented in an 
organization based on the level of the performance metric (e.g., individual, team, division, 
department, or organization). Long-term incentives, including stock grants and stock options, are 
group-level PFP plans that reward employees based on organizational level outcomes (i.e., firm 
stock price performance) (Gerhart et al., 2009). Although stock option plans have previously 
been regarded as financial rewards exclusively for executives, roughly 13 million US employees 
currently participate in employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs), and 9 million own company 
stock options (National Council on Employee Ownership, 2012). As such, recent pay surveys 
continually report that many firms have adopted various types of PFPs and employees are 
covered by the multiple PFPs simultaneously (Park & Sturman, 2013; WorldatWork, 2012). 
These current multiple pay practices warrant attention for the understudied area of the 
effectiveness of PFP in multiple PFP plan environments and the individual perceptions that form 
in multiple PFP environments.  
2.3. Empirical Evidence of PFP Plans  
To date, there have been four main streams of empirical research on PFP plans. The first 
has explored the effectiveness of PFP plans on individual job performance by comparing 
employee job performance before and after implementing PFP plans (e.g., Banker et al., 1996, 
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2001; Lazear, 2000; Pearce, Stevenson & Perry, 1985). This was done mostly in the 1980s and 
1990s when a variety of forms of PFP plans emerged. The second stream explored the actual link 
between employees’ pay and performance from an economic perspective. Such studies have 
measured, through methodological means (e.g., Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1989), whether or not 
organizations accurately reflect “the economic value contributed to the firm by a worker” 
(Bloom, 2004, p.149). The third stream has explored the effectiveness of PFP plans on intrinsic 
versus extrinsic motivation (e.g., Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996; Eisenberger et al., 1999; 
Jenkins, Mitra, Gupta, & Shaw, 1998). Finally, the fourth explored organizational outcomes 
associated with PFP perceptions, such as pay satisfaction, job satisfaction, OCB, and turnover 
intentions (e.g., Deckop et al., 1999; Gupta, 1980; Heneman, Greenberger, & Strasser, 1988; 
Miceli, Jung, Near, & Greenberger, 1991; Schaubroeck et al., 2008). Hence, a number of 
previous empirical studies on compensation have focused on determining whether (1) PFP plans 
are more effective concerning organizational/individual performance than previous pay systems 
(e.g., seniority-based pay systems) when an organization changes its pay practices (e.g., Banker 
et al., 1996, 2001; Pearce et al., 1985; Sturman, Trevor, Boudreau, & Gerhart, 2003), (2) 
organizations implemented their PFP correctly and clearly (e.g., Bloom, 2004; Gomez-Mejia & 
Balkin, 1989), (3) PFP positively or negatively influences intrinsic task interest, creativity or 
self-determination (e.g., Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996; Eisenberger et al., 1999), (4) a single 
PFP plan (such as merit pay or a bonus plan) increases outcomes (e.g., pay satisfaction) 
indirectly through pay reactions (e.g., Brown & Huber, 1992; Miceli et al., 1991; Schaubroeck et 
al., 2008). Individual perceptions related to PFP have been used to assess employees’ attitudinal 
reactions such as pay satisfaction, pay raise satisfaction, and turnover intentions (e.g., Gupta, 
1980; Schaubroeck et al., 2008). Each stream has made important contributions to improving our 
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understanding of PFP plans and to filling gaps between compensation research and practice.  
Many studies on PFP have focused on the effectiveness of PFP plans by comparing 
outcomes before and after the new PFP plans have been implemented. These studies showed that 
PFP plans had a positive relationship with employee job performance when the PFP pay system 
was compared to the prior pay systems (e.g., seniority pay system, hourly wage) (Banker et al., 
1996, 2001; Jenkins et al., 1998; Lazear, 2000; Pekkarinen & Riddell, 2008; Peterson & Luthans, 
2006). Some studies also indicated that in addition to having incentive effects (i.e., an influence 
on employee motivation), PFP plans also have sorting effects (i.e., an influence on employee 
voluntary turnover) (e.g., Cadsby et al., 2007; Lazear, 2000; Park & Sturman, 2013). For 
example, Lazear (2000) found that a switch from hourly wages to a piece-rate pay system led 
one company to a 44 percent increase in productivity. He showed that both incentive effects 
(which motivated average workers to make extra efforts) and sorting effects (which attract more 
talented and ambitious workers in the hiring process and induce less productive workers to quit) 
lead to gains in productivity.  
There have been some studies that show negative effects of PFP plans on outcomes. Beer 
and Cannon (2004) conducted a case study that looked at the costs and benefits of the 
implementation of PFP plans. The study was conducted in the early 1990s on-site at Hewlett-
Packard, at which point the company attempted to implement 1) a merit pay based on individual 
performance, 2) a profit-sharing system for all employees, 3) a bonus system for employees but 
not executives, 4) stock options for all levels of employees, and 5) sales incentives based on 
individual and team performance. At Hewlett-Packard, managers played a significant role in 
determining and maintaining a clear link between pay and performance. The company 
implemented different types of PFP plans, including cash incentives, skill-based pay, team 
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bonuses, and gain sharing at five sites in different locations. The findings showed that the pay 
systems were not effective at motivating their employees. In fact, the systems caused a lot of 
unexpected outcomes such as distrust, lower commitment, and lower performance. The authors 
argued that the rewards system ruined the “high-commitment cultures that typically do not rely 
on individual and group PFP systems to motivate instrumentally, though they use money to 
recognize performance” (Beer & Cannon, 2004; p.16). As a result, the company accepted their 
managers’ decision that the PFP plans that had been implemented should be discontinued 
because the costs outweighed the benefits. The authors concluded that the PFP systems that the 
company had implemented were “unrealistically optimistic about what can be accomplished…” 
(p.15). The study showed an important example of how PFP plans can have unintended 
consequences within a company. Although the case at first seemed to indicate that PFP plans 
were ineffective, those results actually provided strong evidence that PFP plans should be 
implemented in the right way. That is, PFP plans should have a strong link between pay and 
performance and should be based on accurate performance ratings. In HP’s case, the company 
admitted that it was not very clear on whether the outcomes of employee performance came from 
the PFP rewards or some external factors. A study by Pearce et al. (1985) showed a similar result 
to that described by Beer and Cannon (2004). In the organization studied by Pearce and 
colleagues (1985), managers did not trust the newly implemented PFP program. The managers 
believed that the company would not pay them based on their performance but rather use the pay 
system for a political purpose. As a result, managerial performance did not improve after the 
merit pay system was implemented.  
 A review of the literature on employee motivation and PFP plans reveals that 
compensation researchers have made conflicting arguments. While proponents of PFP plans 
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argued that such plans increased employees’ extrinsic motivation (e.g., Eisenberger et al., 1999; 
Jenkins et al., 1998), opponents of PFP plans argued that such plans decreases employees’ 
intrinsic motivation (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1985; Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996; Pfeffer, 1988). 
They claimed that financial incentives hindered employees’ intrinsic motivation, which comes 
from internal sources. That is, in the external environment, employees are more likely to perform 
to meet external demands, reduce self-determination, and intrinsic motivation. Consequently, 
these may cause unintended outcomes including individuals’ impaired performance, a limit on 
creativity and innovation, the encouraging of unethical behavior, and short-term thinking (Deci 
& Ryan, 1985; Jenkins et al., 1998). 
In sum, the debate over the effectiveness of PFP plans has been vigorous and frequent. In 
general, previous empirical evidence of PFP suggests that it has a positive impact on one’s 
motivation to exert more efforts, leading to better outcomes (e.g., Eisenberger & Cameron, 1996; 
Eisenberger et al., 1999), but it has certainly variability (Gerhart et al., 2009) and can have 
unanticipated consequences (e.g., Kerr, 1975). Differences in forms and functionalities of 
multiple PFP plans and thus how individuals perceive those different plans, help explain this 
variability.  
2.4. The Need for a More Precise Measure of PFP Perceptions 
Over 40 years ago, Lawler noted that “By measuring only costs and not the returns on 
money spent for pay, organizations are falling into the trap of measuring those things which are 
easily measured and ignoring important factors which are more difficult to measure. Without 
accurate assessment of what a pay system buys, it is impossible to talk intelligently about which 
system is best” (1971, p.12). Although he clearly articulated a need for improved measurement 
of the effectiveness of pay systems that can capture important and various aspects, such as 
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individual perceptions of pay systems, we still do not have a well-developed tool with which to 
study and understand it.  
Recently, Nyberg (2010) stated that the link between pay and performance may not be 
perfectly aligned with the link between pay and performance that employees perceive. In other 
words, the perceived link between pay and performance actually leads to their performance, 
behaviors, and attitudes. This is the case even though the strong link between pay and 
performance that organizations intend to build has always been one of the most important factors 
to lead employees. Weathington and Weathington (2011) reviewed the motivational theoretical 
and practical framework that earlier compensation practices used based on traditional 
motivational theories. The authors concluded that employee perceptions of PFP plans are much 
more important than organizational intentions. PFP plans fail in organizations where employees 
perceive that they are not receiving their fair share of financial rewards regardless of whether an 
organization actually connects pay with performance. Thus, they argued that if a company is to 
have an efficient and valuable financial reward system, it is critical to pay close attention to 
individual perceptions of PFP plans.  
Indeed, for many years, there has been plenty of evidence that “many organizations do 
not do a very good job of tying pay to performance” although those organizations claim that their 
pay systems are based on employee performance (Baker, Jensen & Murphy, 1988, p.595; 
O’Byrne & Young, 2006). Without correctly connecting the actual link and the perceived link of 
PFP plans, it would be very difficult for organizations to accurately measure the true 
effectiveness of PFP plans and expect significant returns on their investment. From an 
organizational perspective, given that employee compensation is often the largest single cost 
(Gerhart et al., 2009), it is important to learn not only whether an organization actually links 
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financial rewards to employee performance but also how employees actually perceive and react 
to their PFP systems (both overall and to its elements). Indeed, it is this perception that 
influences employees’ performance and productivity.   
The difference between PFP plans and other prior pay systems (e.g., seniority-based pay) 
is based on the idea that “the probability of performance leading to a money outcome is greater 
than zero” (Perry & Pearce, 1983, p. 231). In other words, based on the motivational theoretical 
framework that previous compensation research has built, organizations expect higher employee 
performance by motivating individuals and investing money into various types of PFP plans. 
Several empirical studies have been performed examining the link between employee 
perceptions on PFP plans and various outcomes (e.g., pay satisfaction, reactions to pay, pay 
system fairness) by using previous measures of PFP perceptions (Heneman et al., 1988; Miceli et 
al., 1991; Perry & Pearce, 1983). This research, however, has often failed to accurately measure 
the effect of PFP plans because of an insufficient definition of “PFP perceptions.” This is 
because either they measured PFP perceptions by using a single-item measure or they did not 
differentiate between PFP plans.  
Over 20 years ago, Heneman et al. (1988) indicated that “empirical studies have relied 
upon a one-item measure of pay for performance and consequently, the reliability of PFP 
measures is uncertain” (p. 747). In addition to potential unreliability, a single item measure 
cannot possibly capture the sort of complex multifaceted cognitions that motivation theory 
suggests that are present in PFP environments. As such, until recently, compensation research 
has regularly cited the Perry and Pearce’s (1983) measure of PFP perceptions. Most studies, 
however, adapted some survey questions from only one dimension from the Perry and Pearce‘s 
(1983) measure even though their measure is a multi-dimensional and multi-item measure. Note 
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that the Perry and Pearce (1983) study never defined the PFP perceptions construct. Furthermore, 
compounding all of these issues, those studies did not match their own definition of the construct 
and the Perry and Pearce’s (1983) measure. This is problematic because research without 
assessing proper construct validation can result in “dysfunctional consequences” (Schwab, 1980, 
p.4). Researchers continually emphasize the need for construct validation to facilitate the 
development and testing of a theory (e.g., Hinkin, 1995). Compensation research, however, has 
lagged in improving valid measurements of this important construct. The lack of a valid and 
reliable instrument to measure PFP perceptions may have hindered both theoretical and empirical 
investigations.  
Even though a number of forms PFP plans emerged in the 1980s, the focus of attention in 
compensation research has bypassed measures of employee perceptions of the different pay 
plans. As a result, employees’ perceptions of multiple types of PFP plans (cf. Sturman & Short, 
2000) elude current measures of PFP perceptions (e.g., Heneman et al., 1988; Lawler, 1981; 
Perry & Pearce, 1983) and other related measures, such as the Pay Satisfaction Questionnaire 
PSQ: Heneman & Schwab, 1985), which was established for early pay systems. Prior research 
on compensation has only considered one or two types of performance-based pay plans at a time 
(cf., Kahn & Sherer, 1990; Schwab & Olson, 1990).  
More recently, Park and Sturman (2012, 2013) stated that the most important factor that 
we have failed to capture is not the types of different PFP plans per se, but the specific 
characteristics of the various pay plans. Most organizations have simultaneously implemented 
various types of PFP plans that have different characteristics. These organizations are often faced 
with the tough question of how employees will react to such plans. To help answer that question, 
researchers should consider the simultaneous motivational effects of different PFP plans. When 
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individuals form their perceptions of multiple PFPs, they may consider their subjective 
perceptions based on not only the link made between pay and performance by organizations and 
the objective amount of rewards, but also subjective values of rewards and the possibility that 
they would actually receive the rewards among multiple PFPs. A single dimension–the link 
between pay and performance–cannot capture the perceived link between pay and performance 
in multiple PFP environments. 
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CHAPTER III 
AN OVERVIEW OF MOTIVATIONAL THEORIES AND RELEVANT EMPIRICAL 
STUDIES OF MULTIPLE PFP PLANS FOR UNDERSTANDING CURRENT PFP 
PLANS 
3.1. Traditional Motivation Theories 
A number of motivational theories have been suggested to support the underlying 
mechanisms of PFP plans. Expectancy theory and reinforcement theory have been the basis of 
early conceptual models for PFP plans (Evan, 1970; Heneman, 1984) and remain an important 
theoretical perspective today (Bartol & Locke, 2000; Cadsby et al., 2007; Fong & Tosi, 2007; 
Part & Sturman, 2012, 2013). Expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) suggests that the motivational 
force in an individual is created by the interaction of three factors: expectancy, instrumentality, 
and valence. That is, individuals are motivated when they believe that their (extended) efforts 
will lead to a certain level of performance (expectancy), and that the performance will lead to a 
specific reward (instrumentality) that they value (valence). This theory has been useful in 
showing how pay plans are capable of encouraging, directing, and controlling employee behavior 
(Gerhart, Minkoff & Olsen, 1995). More importantly, the theory specifically speaks to how 
employees perceive rewards and what employees’ beliefs are regarding effort, performance, and 
outcomes (Ilgen, Nebeker & Pritchard, 1981). Above all, expectancy theory focuses on how 
reward can shape employees’ behaviors (Gerhart et al., 1995). It relies primarily on financial 
rewards as extrinsic motivators to explain causes of behaviors shown in the workplace (Leonard, 
Beauvais & Scholl, 1999). Financial rewards are viewed as inducing motivational states that 
stimulate behaviors (Issac, Zerbe, & Pitt, 2001). In contrast, intrinsic motivators induce 
behaviors that result from internal forces, such as enjoyment of the work itself. The theory 
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emphasizes that financial rewards motivate employees because they increase employees’ valence 
(Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). Financial rewards also increase employees’ expectancy by linking 
effort, performance, and pay (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002). As a result, financial rewards increase 
employees’ effort, and this increased effort is supposed to lead to increases in performance 
(Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Lawler, 1971).                
Reinforcement theory (Skinner, 1953) proposes that pay is a positive reinforcement. That 
is, rewards contingent on desired behaviors can lead to a likelihood of the behaviors being 
repeated (“Thorndike’s Law of Effect”; Gerhart et al., 1995). The main idea of the theory is that 
individuals learn how to behave in desirable ways in an environment over time by repeating 
stimulus-response connections (Bergmann & Scarpello, 2002). Individuals learn to select the 
appropriate responses based on the consequences of previous selections (positive reinforcement). 
The theory posits that financial rewards can be used in an organization as either positive or 
negative reinforcement. It provides the basis for understanding the PFP link. The theory 
demonstrates that organizations can motivate employees for higher performance when they use 
pay plans contingent on performance consistently and in a timely manner. The theory shows how 
pay plans can encourage and control employee behaviors.   
 Other motivational theories that are relevant to PFP plans have also been proposed.  
Agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) explains the agency relationship between a principal who 
delegates work and an agent who performs the work. Because the two parties have different 
interests and goals, they tend to behave in different ways. In addition, the two parties often have 
different preferences toward risk, and therefore, they tend to show different actions when risk-
sharing problems arise. According to the theory, it is hard and expensive for the principal to 
monitor the work of the agent (who is most likely to be risk-averse and self-interested). Agency 
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theory describes how organizations determine pay and design compensation systems to align an 
agent’s interests and goals with a principal’s interests and objectives through types of behavioral 
monitoring or outcome-based rewards (e.g., stock options, profit sharing, gain sharing) (Rynes & 
Bono, 2000). In that way, organizations can have enough information for their employees (to 
monitor what they are actually doing) and employees can receive monetary rewards by aligning 
their interests and goals toward the owners’ interests. 
The main premise of equity theory (Adam, 1965) is that employees compare their work 
outcomes to work inputs to those of referent others. If employees find that they are not rewarded 
enough based on their efforts and performance compared to others, they make less effort to 
perform their work in order to perceive equitability. Equity theory explains how the two 
constructs - pay satisfaction and employees’ perceptions of fairness - are related in the allocation 
of rewards (Bartol & Locke, 2000). Tournament theory (Lazear, 1998) posits that employees are 
motivated to receive sizable rewards by competing with others for promotions (Bartol & Locke, 
2000). The larger the pay dispersion is between levels of positions, the greater the efforts 
employees exert to get a promotion. The assumptions that employees have enough self-efficacy 
and that they have high valence for money underlie this theory, which focuses on high 
performers and promotes a high level of pay dispersion.  
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) proposes that individuals perceive their 
losses of outcomes more negatively than gains in outcomes. This theory has been used to explain 
reactions of employees to the at-risk plans and risk-sharing issues in agency theory (Schaubroeck 
et al., 2008). Because most individuals are risk-averse, employees feel threatened and anxious 
about the possibility of losing their pay when compensation systems change to a PFP system. 
Individuals are motivated more to avoid a loss than to achieve a gain. The results from several 
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studies show that pay-for-performance compensation systems sometimes brought negative 
outcomes (i.e., high voluntary turnover, job dissatisfaction, lack of organizational commitment) 
from employees (see Brown & Huber, 1992). Such results can be explained by prospect theory. 
This theory suggests how organizations can design compensation systems and it helps to predict 
employees’ reactions to rewards (Schaubroeck et al., 2008). 
Recent research has applied prospect theory to explain individual decision-making in 
complex PFP environments (Chen, Ployhart, Thomas, Anderson & Bliese, 2011; Nyberg et al., 
in press). Under uncertainty, individuals make their choices and decisions by seeking either gains 
or losses based on their own frame of reference (“internal standards”) and subjective value 
function (“positive or negative discrepancies with one’s reference point”) (Chen et al., 2011). 
Nyberg et al. (in press) also explained, drawing on prospect theory, why individuals are more 
motivated to work harder for bonuses than for merit pay. They argued that people tend to believe 
that bonuses are “loss” because they must re-earn bonuses the following year. Merit pay, on the 
other hand, is perceived as an “entitlement” because merit pay that an individual earns is 
henceforth perceived continuously, regardless of future performance.       
3.2. Contemporary Theories of Motivation 
 A recent trend in scholarly research is that of researchers providing new insights by 
adapting and combining various theories across literatures (e.g., psychology, sociology and 
economics). These insights shed light on the nature and function of topics of interest that 
previous theory and research have not adequately explained. The primary reason for that is 
because “many traditional paradigms are inadequate for discussing or exploring many realistic 
and complex situations….no single theory can adequately explain the observed phenomena” 
(Steel & Konig, 2006, p. 890). For example, Chen et al. (2011) provided a new theoretical 
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framework to explain job satisfaction change by integrating prospect theory (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984), within-person spirals theory (Hsee & Abelson, 1991; Lindsley, Brass, & 
Thomas, 1995), sense-making theory (Louis, 1980), and conservation of resources theory 
(Hobfoll, 1989). As such, Steel and Konig (2006) offered Temporal Motivational Theory as 
integrating four cross-disciplinary motivational theories of decision making and motivation. In 
addition to considering time as a “critical component of choice or motivated behavior” (p. 890), 
they incorporated picoeconomics (hyperbolic discounting), need theory, in addition to the two 
traditional theories—expectancy theory and prospect theory (CPT: cumulative prospect theory).  
 Picoeconomics (“hyperbolic discounting”) refers to “a theory that helps to account for 
choice of behavior over time” (p. 892). The underlying assumption of this theory is that when 
individuals need to choose some behaviors that lead to rewards they are more likely to value 
immediate but smaller rewards than distant ones; indeed, people tend to undervalue future events. 
But, once time and goals are involved, the behavior patterns of individuals can change. This 
theory predicts the effects of temporal discounting based on a mathematical equation having four 
components: utility (“preference for a course of action”), amount (“the amount of reward that is 
received on payout”), whether or not rewards are immediate or delayed, and individuals’ 
sensitivity to delay. In the equation, the two components of expectancy theory–expectancy and 
valence–are used to explain individuals’ subjective perceptions. In other words, the objective 
amount of rewards can, depending on individual differences, be interpreted as the perceived 
attractiveness of the rewards (valence). In the theory, rate (“the frequency that leads to rewards”) 
can be interpreted as expectancy, which is “the probability of acquiring the expected outcome.” 
The main concept of prospect theory is also incorporated into picoeconomics. That is, 
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individuals estimate gain or loss when they think about the possibility of their future multiple 
outcomes.  
 Finally, need theory (e.g., Dollard & Miller, 1950) is used to explain what motivates 
individuals to take action. According to the theory, need strength (utility) and long-term 
considerations (delayed) are the primary driving force of individual behaviors. The needs for 
achievement, affiliation, and power drive people to take action. With the incorporation of the 
four motivational theories across fields, temporal motivational theory explains that “motivation 
can be understood by the effects of expectancy and value, weakened by delay, with differences 
for rewards and losses” (p. 897). 
 Unlike previous PFP-related motivational theories, temporal motivational theory 
considers individual differences and the effects of time in motivation and decision-making 
processes, particularly in complex situations. Thus, temporal motivational theory is very useful 
in explaining how individuals actually perceive and behave in multi PFP plan environments. In 
such environments, uncertainty exists and choices of motivational behaviors based on decision 
making is required over time. The different forms and characteristics of the different PFP plans 
are also combined in complex PFP environments. 
Temporal motivational theory considers utility, amount, delay, expectancy, valence, and 
time. Thus, temporal motivational theory is a very appropriate theory to fill theoretical gaps to 
which researchers have devoted little attention. This contemporary theory clearly shows that 
there are critical factors such as expectancy and valence that explain individuals’ subjective 
perceptions of PFP plans and that these should be measured when they are provided multiple 
options (i.e., PFP plans).  
3.3. Summary 
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 Multiple traditional motivational theories have established a theoretical framework for 
understanding an overall PFP system in organizations. They have also been used to explain the 
role of the PFP system in motivation. By considering various aspects of individual perceptions of 
pay, these various motivational theories have led us to an understanding of how employee 
behaviors can be energized, directed, and controlled by pay plans (Gerhart et al., 1995). 
However, researchers have failed to consider complete PFP environments and the current 
measure of PFP perceptions has failed to fully capture the entire set of concepts demanded by 
these motivation theories. Such failures leave us not knowing clearly how individuals perceive 
either a single or multiple PFP plan(s), particularly when they face multifaceted environments. 
Researchers, equipped with the more advanced theories, have progressed in unraveling the 
mechanisms of more complex pay practices. Theoretically and practically, contemporary theories 
of motivation provide grounds for a better understanding of how people perceive PFP when in 
multiple PFP environments.  
3.4. Three Relevant Empirical Studies which Consider Multiple PFP Plans 
Based on the compensation-related motivational theories addressed above, compensation 
research has certainly made key advances in the understanding and development of PFP plans. 
To summarize, in the understanding of PFP in organizations the central issues have been (1) 
whether organizations link pay to performance correctly, and therefore, reflect their value well 
enough in their reward systems (Baker et al., 1988; Gerhart et al., 2009; O’Byrne & Young, 
2006), and (2) the psychological aspects of PFP plans in employee motivation–whether 
employees perceive the financial rewards as motivating factors for performance (Jenkins et al., 
1998; Lawler, 1971; Miceli et al, 1991). Until recently, few researchers have explored multiple 
PFP systems or developed frameworks for the construct of PFP perceptions. I have chosen three 
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studies that yielded theoretical and empirical insights about developing a means of understanding 
PFP perceptions. These are particularly apt for the context of multiple PFP environments, where 
a portfolio of PFP plans cover employees (see Table 1). Although theoretical approaches have 
advanced in recent work, much of the empirical work considering the multiple types of PFP 
plans has used methodological means to approximate the perceived link between pay and 
performance without measuring actual individual perceptions toward their PFP plans.    
3.4.1. Contingent Pay and Managerial Performance (Kahn & Sherer, 1990) 
Kahn and Sherer (1990) developed a conceptual model for assessing the effectiveness of 
multiple PFP systems on employee job performance. They then empirically examined the actual 
relationship between financial incentives (i.e., merit pay and lump-sum bonuses) and employee 
job performance by using a two-stage methodological procedure. This is one of the first studies 
showing more than one type of PFP plan assessed simultaneously (cf., Schwab & Olson, 1990).   
To capture differences in reward schedules, they estimated regression equations predicting 
rewards (in their case, merit percent and bonus percent) as a function of performance, control 
variables, and the interaction of performance with those control variables. They then used the 
first derivative of the results as a measure of each individual’s PFP relationship. Specifically, the 
initial regression step predicted 1985 awards using 1984 data. They then used the computed 
derivative as a measurement of each individual’s PFP relationship for each pay form to predict 
performance in 1985.  
Kahn and Sherer (1990) showed that a bonus produced a significant effect on employees’ 
future job performance, but merit pay failed to produce a positive effect. On its face, these results 
seem confusing, but as Park and Sturman (2013) describe, it can be explained by considering the 
characteristics of the studied pay plans. In the Kahn and Sherer (1990) study, the effect of 
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performance on merit pay was minimal. Their regression predicting merit raises had no 
significant effect associated with performance (main effect or interactions). In this study, 
therefore, the rewards from the merit pay plan were not actually strongly associated with job 
performance ratings. These concerns, though, are not completely generalizable to all 
implementations of merit pay. Rather, when viewed through the lens of expectancy theory, they 
suggest that merit pay was poorly implemented because it failed to generate instrumentality. It 
appears that in the company studied by Kahn and Sherer (1990), what was called a merit pay 
plan was not really a PFP plan (because there appeared to be no relationship between pay and 
performance). Hence, had expectancy theory been applied, it would have correctly predicted that, 
in their sample, Kahn and Sherer (1990) would see a positive effect for the bonus plan, but no 
effect for the so-called merit plan. 
3.4.2. Relative Incentive and Sorting Effects of Multiple PFP Plans (Park & Sturman, 2013) 
Park and Sturman (2013) found that the effects of multiple types of PFP plans on 
employee performance vary depending on the proposed company data investigated by different 
studies. The characteristics of PFP plans under the same name by definition (merit pay, bonuses, 
and stock option) can differ across organizational pay policies, pay structures, and pay practices. 
For example, the study by Schwab and Olson (1990) found that the merit pay system, which had 
a strong link between pay and performance in the created organizations in a simulation in the 
study, had a significantly more positive effect on employee performance than did a bonus 
system. However, Kahn and Sherer (1990) showed that the effects of performance on bonus pay 
were much higher than that of merit pay due to the weak link between pay and performance.  
Although there is still some debate as to which type of PFP plan is more effective, Park 
and Sturman (2013) suggested that indeed measuring the specific characteristics of each PFP 
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plan is more critical than just looking at the form of the PFP plan. Their findings show that the 
different forms (i.e., merit pay increases base pay, bonuses are one-time pay, and stock options 
are delayed awards) and characteristics (i.e., functionality: the degree to which pay and 
performance are linked and the size of the rewards) cause different incentive effects and sorting 
effects on employee motivation. The study found that individuals are more likely to be motivated 
and to improve their performance with merit pay (which increases their base pay) than with 
bonuses and stock options. The findings showed that merit pay provides the strongest incentive 
and sorting effects. It is noteworthy that the link between previous performance and rewards was 
stronger for merit pay than for bonuses in the study. Thus, the study implied that compensation 
research should not merely take into consideration overall PFP plans, but should also specify the 
nature of the plan. The study modified Kahn and Sherer’s (1990) two-stage procedure and 
applied it to measuring the relative effects of three types of PFP plans: merit pay, annual lump-
sum bonus, and long-term incentives (stock option plans). Unfortunately, the study did not 
measure individuals’ actual PFP perceptions.    
3.4.3. Integrating Psychological and Economic Principles toward a Contingency 
Perspective (Nyberg, Pieper, & Trevor, In Press) 
 Drawing upon broad perspectives from economics (incentive intensity principle) and 
psychology (expectancy theory), Nyberg et al. (in press) developed a contingency-based 
conceptual model to examine the effectiveness of multiple PFP plans on individual job 
performance. In addition to a type (merit pay and bonus pay) and a time frame dimension (trend 
for both PFP plans), the researchers in their PFP effectiveness model considered four contextual 
factors (employee characteristics: tenure, job characteristics: sale and non-sales jobs, pay system 
characteristics: PFP types, and pay system experience: PFP trend). Unlike Park and Sturman’s 
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(2013) study, which distinguished forms (PFP types) and functionalities (PFP characteristics) of 
multiple PFP plans, this study considered PFP types as pay system characteristics. The results 
showed that both merit pay and bonuses have positive effects on future employee performance. 
When the two different types of PFP plans were compared, the findings showed that the effect of 
bonus pay was stronger than that of merit pay. Note that the study looked only at the amount of 
rewards provided by an organization that Nyberg et al. (in press) studied when they 
differentiated types of PFPs. The underlying assumption of the study is that individuals within a 
company are under the same PFP relationship. In other words, although instrumentality (“the 
perceived link between performance and pay”) has been considered the primary concept to 
discuss and determine the effectiveness of PFP plans, the study considered the link between 
performance and pay based only on “valence” (i.e., the amount of rewards). That is, the 
instrumentality that they measured in their study was not based on the actual strength between 
performance and pay for each type of PFP plans (i.e., what % of merit pay or bonus pay 
individuals would get when they increase certain levels of their performance). Their findings also 
showed that low tenure and positive pay trends (the trajectories, or slopes, of pay over time) lead 
to strong effectiveness of multiple PFP plans (merit pay and bonus pay) on employee future 
performance. 
3.4.4. Summary 
Although previous compensation theories have provided well-developed theoretical 
frameworks, previous compensation research that has measured the effectiveness of multiple 
PFP plans has used only methodological means to approximate the link between pay and 
performance. This has led to a disconnection between theory and empirical support for 
predictions in the compensation literature. To predict the true effects of current multiple PFP 
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plans, research should look into the underlying psychological mechanisms–how employees 
perceive their incentive systems–and to find out how such perceptions influence future employee 
performance when employees are covered by multiple PFP plans.  
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Table 1. Models of Multiple Pay-For-Performance Plans  
 
Model Dimensions Theoretical Basis Advances Implications 
 
 
Contingent Pay and 
Managerial 
Performance (Kahn 
& Sherer, 1991) 
 
 
 
(1) The linkage between 
previous performance and 
financial rewards 
(2) The linkage between 
financial rewards and 
future performance 
 
 
Expectancy theory 
Equity theory 
Efficiency wage 
theory 
 
Considered different 
types of PFP plans – 
merit pay and bonuses. 
The relative effects of 
different types of PFP 
plans can differ. 
 
A particular type of pay 
plan (Bonus) has a positive 
effect on employee 
performance (but merit pay 
does not). 
 
 
Relative Incentive 
and Sorting Effects 
of Multiple PFP 
Plans (Park & 
Sturman, 2013) 
 
 
 
(1) The linkage between 
previous performance and 
financial rewards 
(2) The linkage between 
financial rewards and 
future performance 
 
Expectancy theory 
Equity theory 
Agency theory 
Tournament theory 
Prospect theory 
 
Considered the relative 
motivation effects of 
multiple PFP plans – 
merit pay, bonuses, and 
stock options. 
Looked at the specific 
characteristics of each 
PFP plan. 
 
Each type of PFP plan has 
unique characteristics. 
Organizations have to 
consider the link between 
pay and performance and 
the different characteristics, 
not only the name itself 
(pay-for-performance). 
 
Integrating 
psychological and 
economic principles 
toward a contingency 
perspective  
(Nyberg et al., in 
press) 
 
 
(1) Instrumentality 
(2) Incentive Intensity 
(3) Contextual factors: 
tenure, PFP trend, 
PFP types, and job 
types. 
 
 
Expectancy theory 
Incentive intensity 
principle 
 
Considered a broader 
perspective on the effect 
of multiple PFP plans on 
employee future 
performance. 
 
In addition to pay policy 
and/or pay practices of an 
organization, there should 
be considered a variety of 
context factors including 
employee characteristics, 
employee experiences 
within the system, PFP 
system characteristics, and 
job characteristics. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DEFINING PERCEPTIONS OF PAY-FOR-PERFORMANCE PLANS  
(PFP PERCEPTIONS) 
In this chapter, I define a key construct–PFP perceptions–and conceptualize the 
psychological mechanism of PFP plans after I review a number of PFP perception definitions 
that have been used in previous studies. I elaborate on the theoretical dimensions of PFP 
perceptions underlying its measurement (PFP perceptions questionnaire: PPQ).  
4.1. The Construct of Pay-For-Performance Perceptions  
4.1.1. The Definition of PFP Perceptions from Previous Research  
The construct of PFP perceptions has long been narrowly defined (See Table 2). For 
example, some studies that looked at the effects of employee PFP perceptions on organizational 
outcomes (e.g., Organizational Citizenship Behavior (OCB), work attitudes, pay-level 
satisfaction, and turnover intention) narrowly defined the PFP perception construct as “the 
degree to which employees perceived a strong link between their performance and pay” (Deckop 
et al., 1999, p. 423), “the degree to which employees perceived a strong link between their 
performance and pay outcomes” (Chiang & Birtch, 2010, p. 635),  or “the perceived linkage 
between performance and pay” (Schaubroeck et al., 2008, p. 425). Nyberg (2010) also defined 
perceived pay for performance as “the employee’s view of the degree that performance and pay 
are linked” (p.444). All of these definitions are deficient because they do not fully capture key 
aspects of individual subjective perceptions of PFP rewards that are predicted by theory. 
Consistent with these narrow definitions, most previous PFP research has considered the 
construct as a uni-dimensional concept–the link between pay and performance–and adapted a 
single item measure of PFP perceptions. Yet, Heneman et al. (1988) argued that previous PFP 
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research was somewhat flawed because it treated PFP perceptions as a one-dimensional 
construct. Indeed, in their study, they identified PFP perceptions as a multidimensional construct 
and then examined the relationship between PFP perceptions and pay satisfaction. Their study 
used the survey items of Perry and Pearce (1983) as a multi-item measure of PFP perceptions 
(i.e., four-item scale: “If I perform especially well on my job, it is likely that I would get a pay 
raise”; “The pay raises that I receive on my job make me work harder”; “The best workers in the 
hospital get the highest pay raises”; and “High performance and low performers seem to get the 
same pay raises”).  
The most regularly used measure of PFP perceptions (Perry & Pearce, 1983) focused on 
motivational perceptions to measure PFP perceptions. As shown in Table 2, the three 
components of expectancy theory are reflected in each question. In a similar vein, Fong and 
Shaffer (2003) used a measure of PFP perceptions as a predictor of pay satisfaction when they 
tested how group incentive plans affected employee pay satisfaction. They also used the same 
measure of PFP perceptions (Heneman et al., 1988: adopted and modified from Perry & Pearce, 
1983; Perry & Pearce, 1983;) that other compensation studies had used. However, they created 
two sub-scales, instrumentality perceptions and expectancy perceptions, which other studies 
(e.g., Ilgen et al., 1981) had used interchangeably when measuring “work motivation”.  
Erez and Isen (2002) examined the effect of positive affect on the relationship between 
individual motivation and their task performance. In their experimental studies, they adapted 
Ilgen et al.’s (1981) measures of work motivation. Drawing upon Vroom’s (1964) expectancy 
theory, Ilgen et al. (1981) clearly defined the three components of expectancy theory 
(expectancy, instrumentality, and valence) and developed more stable and valid measures of 
work motivation. Erez and Isen (2002), after modifying the measure, applied the measures of 
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work motivation to their study related to pay. The study measured overall individual motivation, 
expectancy motivation perceptions (“the perceived link between effort and performance,” p. 
1058), instrumentality motivation perceptions (“the perceived link between performance and 
rewards,” p. 1057), and valence perceptions (“the attractiveness of rewards”). For overall 
motivation, participants responded to the following proposition: “I would look forward to taking 
the same test in the future.” For expectancy perceptions, participants were asked to indicate 
“their subjective probability that exerting a given level of effort would result in each level of 
performance” (p. 1059). Instrumentality perceptions were measured similarly to the expectancy 
measure but instrumentality perceptions related performance to the outcome. For valence 
perceptions, participants were asked to indicate the attractiveness of cash rewards. In sum, the 
study considered the three dimensions that have been used to measure work motivation in order 
to measure the relationship between the perceived dimensions and financial rewards. 
Recently, Bamberger and Belogolovsky (2010) examined the impact of pay secrecy on 
individual task performance; they defined the instrumentality perceptions as “the perceived 
performance-outcome contingencies (p.989). Most recently, Belogolovsky and Bamberger (in 
press) used the same concept from their previous study (Bamberger & Belogolovsky, 2010) but 
called it pay-for-performance (PFP) perceptions and defined it as “the perceptions employees 
hold regarding the nature of performance-pay contingencies” (p. 3). Bamberger and 
Belogolovsky (2010) and Belogolovsky and Bamberger (in press) used PFP perceptions as a 
mediator in their experimental studies when they examined the effects of pay secrecy on 
individual task performance. Both studies adapted the measure of PFP perceptions from Erez and 
Isen (2002). As a measure of PFP perceptions in their studies, they used only the instrumentality 
perceptions–the perceived link between performance and rewards.   
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Because the primary concept of PFP is derived from motivational theories, in particular 
expectancy theory, it is very reasonable that those motivational perceptions are being used to 
measure individual perceptions of PFP plans. To measure how people perceive more than one 
type of PFP plan in multi PFP environments, I argue that those various aspects of dimensions 
should be considered. In sum, to focus on PFP perceptions, this dissertation uses the sub-
dimensions of the construct of PFP perceptions–instrumentality, expectancy, and valence 
perceptions.  
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Table 2. Pay-For-Performance Perceptions Construct 
 
Construct Definition Measure 
 
Gupta (1980) 
 
Perceived degree of reward 
contingency 
 
The extent to which intrinsic 
rewards and/or pay increases 
were likely to result from 
effective job performance. 
 
 
Created survey questionnaires. 
 
“How likely is it that this may happen 
when you do your job well.. (You) will 
get a bonus or a pay increase (for 
performance- pay contingency).” 
 
“…(You) will get a good feeling that 
(you have) really done something 
important and useful” (for performance-
intrinsic reward contingency) 
 
 
Perry & Pearce 
(1983) 
 
Reactions to merit pay 
 
How much managers value pay 
increases, the extent to which a 
manager sees a clear link 
between pay, performance, and 
motivation. 
 
Created survey questionnaires. 
 
- The importance of organizational 
rewards 
 
“How important are each of the 
following factors in your decision to 
remain in your present position? 
- Pay 
- Challenging work responsibilities  
- Friendliness of the people you work 
with 
- Fringe benefits 
- Promotional opportunities 
- Job security 
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- Opportunity for public service 
- Retirement benefits 
- Location 
 
- The accuracy of objectives-based 
appraisals 
 
“All in all, I feel that the current 
performance appraisal process is 
effective.” 
“I am not sure what standards have been 
used to evaluate my performance.” 
“The standards used to evaluate my 
performance have been fair and 
objective.” 
“Overall, the current performance 
process helps me to improve my job 
performance.” 
“The present performance appraisal 
system contributes to overall agency 
effectiveness.” 
“I have no control over the factors on 
which my performance is judged.” 
“It is difficult to document the actual 
performance differences among 
managers and supervisors.” 
 
- Reports of pay practices 
 
“Performance appraisals influence 
rewards and punishments in this 
organization.” 
“If I perform especially well on my 
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present job it is likely I would get a cash 
award or unscheduled pay increase.” 
“Supervisors and managers are paid in 
proportion to their contribution to the 
organization.” 
“Under the present system, financial 
rewards are seldom related to manager 
or supervisor performance.” 
“All in all, current merit pay provisions 
encourage me to performance my job 
well.” 
“I can believe that pay practices have 
significantly changed in the last six 
months.” 
“I would probably work harder on my 
job performance if I thought I would 
then receive a cash reward or 
unscheduled pay increase.” 
 
 
Heneman, 
Greenberger & 
Strasser (1988) 
 
The perceived adequacy of pay-
system administration 
 
The extent to which pay is 
perceived by employees to be 
linked to performance.  
 
Adapted from Perry & Pearce (1983). 
 
"If I perform especially well on my job, 
it is likely that I would get a pay raise," 
"The pay raises that I receive on my job 
make me work harder,"  
"The best workers in the hospital get the 
highest pay raises,"  
"High performers and low performers 
seem to get the same pay raises." 
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 Construct Definition Measure 
 
Deckop, Mangel, & 
Cirka (1999) 
 
Performance-pay link 
 
The degree to which employees 
perceived a strong link between 
their performance and pay. 
 
Developed survey questionnaires. 
 
"Increased productivity means higher 
pay for employees," 
"My individual performance actually has 
little impact on any incentive pay award" 
(reverse-coded) 
"My performance actually has little 
impact on my salary" (reverse-coded). 
 
 
Erez & Isen (2002) 
 
Perceptions of Expectancy, 
Instrumentality, and 
Valence 
(VIE measures) 
 
 
Expectancy perceptions: 
Perceived link between effort 
and performance. 
 
Instrumentality perceptions: the 
perceived link between 
performance and rewards. 
 
Valence perceptions:  
the attractiveness of an outcome   
 
Experimental study. 
Validated and developed from Ilgen et 
al. (1981). 
 
(Expectancy perceptions) 
“Indicate your subjective probability that 
exerting a given level of effort would 
result in each level of performance.” 
(Instrumentality perception) 
“Indicate your subjective probability that 
a level of performance relates to an 
expected level of rewards.” 
(Valence perception) 
“Indicate the attractiveness of different 
amounts of prizes.” 
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Construct Definition Measure 
 
Fong & Shaffer 
(2003) 
 
Pay for performance perceptions 
 
The perceived relationship 
between performance and pay. 
 
Adapted from Heneman et al. (1988) 
 
(Instrumentality perceptions) 
“If employees perform well, there will 
be a payout from the company’s group 
incentive plan.” 
“My company’s group incentive plan 
makes me work harder.” 
(Expectancy perceptions) 
“The performance measures established 
for my company’s group incentive plan 
are achievable.” 
“The financial gates established for my 
company’s group incentive plan are 
achievable.” 
 
 
Schaubroeck, 
Shaw, Duffy & 
Mitra (2008). 
 
PFP perceptions 
 
The extent to which an employee 
believes that his or her 
performance will be reliably 
related to merit pay raises.  
 
Adapted from Perry & Pearce (1983) 
and Heneman et al. (1988).  
 
“The best performers will get the biggest 
pay raises.” 
 
 
Chiang & Birtch 
(2010). 
 
PFP link 
 
The degree to which employees 
perceived a strong link between 
their performance and pay 
outcomes. 
 
Adapted from Chiang & Jang (2008) & 
Deckop et al (1999).  
 
“Whether they would receive good pay, 
an incentive pay award, monetary 
bonuses, and pay increases when they 
perform well in their job.” 
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Construct Definition Measure 
 
Nyberg (2010). 
 
The perceived pay for 
performance 
 
The employee’s view of the 
degree that performance and pay 
are linked. 
 
Created survey questionnaires. 
 
“The compensation plans of this 
organization reward outstanding job 
performance.” 
“The better my performance, the better 
my pay will be.” 
“This organization recognizes 
productive people.” 
 
 
Bamberger & 
Belogolovsky 
(2010). 
 
Instrumentality perceptions 
 
The perceived performance-
outcome contingencies. 
 
Experimental study. 
Adapted from Ilgen, Peterson, Martin, & 
Boeschen (1981) and Erez & Isen 
(2002). 
 
“Participants were asked to estimate the 
likely bonus (with 0 – 8 ranges) 
associated with (a) a low performance 
level and (b) a high performance level.” 
 
“Perceived instrumentality was then 
calculated as the difference between the 
bonuses expected by the participant 
under conditions of high and low 
performance as a proportion of total pay 
and could thus range from 0% to 40%.” 
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Construct Definition Measure 
 
Belogolovsky & 
Bamberger (In 
press). 
 
Pay-for-performance perceptions 
(PFP perceptions) 
 
The perceptions employees hold 
regarding the nature of 
performance-pay contingencies. 
 
Experimental study. 
Adapted from Erez & Isen (2002). 
 
“Participants were asked to estimate the 
probability that a given level of 
performance (i.e., score) would result in 
a specific levels of bonus pay.” 
 
 
 42  
4.1.2. Defining PFP Perceptions 
The first step toward advancing our understanding of how PFP plans motivate employees 
is to clearly define the construct of PFP perceptions (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Schwab, 1980). 
Based on the preceding discussion, I define pay-for-performance perceptions (PFP perceptions) 
to clearly reflect the underlying mechanism of the construct so as to advance a valid 
measurement in compensation, particularly under multi-PFP plan environments, and also to see 
if the construct of interest has practical value to be used in any relevant research (Sturman & 
Short, 2000; Tracey & Tews, 2005). Accordingly, I define employee PFP perceptions as the 
following: 
The subjective experience of pay for performance, which is composed of a 
subjective belief about the link between pay and performance, the perceived 
achievability of given tasks, and the subjective value of associated financial  
rewards. 
This set of perceptions is expected to depend on employees’ previous histories with their 
organizations (e.g., policies, their knowledge of the performance ratings), their previous 
performance levels, future expectations, and different characteristics of various types of PFP 
plans. 
In complex multi PFP plan environments, I also define individual perceptions of different 
types of PFP plans. I define individual perceptions of a raise as the following: 
The subjective experience of a raise (merit pay), which is composed of a  
subjective belief about the link between pay and performance, the perceived  
achievability of given tasks, and the subjective value of associated financial 
rewards. 
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Bonus perceptions are defined as the following: 
The subjective experience of bonus, which is composed of a subjective belief  
about the link between pay and performance, the perceived achievability of 
 given tasks, and the subjective value of associated financial rewards.  
Among the different aspects of various PFP plans, we should consider the individual perceptions 
of those types of PFP plans. For example, types of bonus rewards can vary based on the team, 
division/department, and/or organizational level of the performance metric, such as 
team/department/organization-based performance bonuses, profit sharing, and stock 
options/grants. Therefore, the definition of individual perceptions of these various rewards 
should be distinctively defined according to the type of reward.   
4.2. The Previous Measures of General PFP Perceptions 
Without a clear definition of PFP perceptions, Perry and Pearce (1983) who put forth the 
most cited measure of PFP perceptions–conceptualized (but did not explicitly define the 
construct) and developed survey questionnaires about PFP perceptions for a federal employee 
(managers) survey. Based on the difference between the new pay system (i.e., merit pay) that had 
just emerged (in the late 1970s and early 1980s) and the old pay systems, they identified three 
major attributes of PFP plans that should be considered: 1) “Do federal managers (the recipients) 
value pay increases? 2) Are federal managers more likely to expect effort to lead to highly rated 
performance under the objectives-based appraisal systems? 3) Are federal managers more likely 
to expect good performance to lead to increased pay under merit pay than under previous time-
in-grade compensation programs?” (p. 231). Perry and Pearce (1983) focused on one key 
purpose of merit pay: to change managerial motivation. Therefore, their conceptualizations were 
influenced by the three motivational factors of expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964). Based on their 
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conceptualization, they developed 15 items of merit pay reactions (i.e., employee perceptions of 
merit pay) under three dimensions: 1) the importance of organizational rewards, 2) the accuracy 
of objectives-based appraisals, and 3) reports of pay practices (measuring the link between pay 
and performance). Yet most subsequent research that measured PFP perceptions had adapted 
some survey questions from only one dimension, the “reports of pay practices.” As a result, 
previous research using the construct of PFP perceptions has been limited in scope.   
4.2. The New Measures of Overall PFP Perceptions 
Until recently, compensation research has generally paid attention to a measure of PFP 
perceptions that measures how people feel and react to their overall PFPs, regardless of other 
PFP plans that they also receive simultaneously. This dissertation recognizes two important 
factors that PFP research should consider. The first factor is the complex PFP environment, in 
which employees usually receive more than one PFP at a time. Measuring only general 
perceptions of PFPs in modern compensation practices is likely insufficient to have greater 
accuracy when assessing the effectiveness of PFPs. The second factor is that single-dimensional 
measures do not fully capture the multidimensional experience of the motivational effects of PFP 
plans that are predicted by theory. Based on expectancy theory and on subsequent advances to 
motivation theory that have built on expectancy theory, PFP perceptions should be multi-
dimensional. This dissertation develops and validates a multi-dimensional measure of individual 
PFP perceptions for complex pay system environments, overall, within, and across PFPs. In this 
chapter, I first explore a measure of overall PFP perceptions (see Figure 1). I propose that 
measures of overall PFP perceptions should include three components: instrumentality, 
expectancy, and valence perceptions. Instrumentality perceptions (the link between pay and 
performance) measures whether an individual believes that each type of PFP plan is linked to 
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performance (i.e., performance in a previous time period) of either an individual or 
group/organization depending on the specific type of rewards. It measures if employees are 
aware that their performance is connected with financial incentives (i.e., the linkage between 
employees’ previous performance and subsequent PFP plans) and if employees understand the 
rationale behind PFP plans. Expectancy perceptions (the link between each individual’s efforts 
and a certain level of job performance that determines financial rewards) would measure if 
individuals believe that a certain level of job performance for financial rewards is realistically 
and achievably set up for each individual. This perception is more likely to be determined by 
past experience and future expectations (Bandura, 1982; George & Jones, 2000). Valence 
perceptions (the perceived value of financial rewards) would measure the degree to which 
individuals subjectively value financial rewards. In addition to the dimensional structure of the 
overall PFP perceptions construct, I expect that the three dimensions should be interrelated and 
influence one another to shape individuals’ subjective perceptions of overall PFPs that they are 
eligible to receive. Thus, with the overall nature of the compensation system, I expect the 
following: 
Hypothesis 1: Of their overall PFP plans, employees differentiate between 
instrumentality, expectancy, and valence perceptions.  
Hypothesis 2: Of their overall PFP plans, all three PPQ dimensions (instrumentality, 
expectancy, and valence perceptions) are positively associated with each other. 
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Figure 1. Hypothesized Factor Structure for PFP Perceptions Dimensions  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: measured variables, lower order factors, and disturbance terms are omitted for simplicity.   
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CHAPTER V 
COMPARISONS WITHIN AND ACROSS PFP PLANS 
Research on compensation has focused largely on general PFP systems, taking no 
account of other co-existing PFP plans that employees also received simultaneously (for a 
review, see Gerhart et al., 2009). In the previous chapter, I looked at how individuals perceive 
and react to their PFP plans overall. In this chapter, I explore more closely multiple PFP plan 
environments with the developed measurement of PFP perceptions (PPQ) by considering how 
individuals perceive PFP plans when being paid in a multi-PFP plan environment. Then, after 
establishing the dimensional structure of the overall PFP perceptions measure, I examine the 
construct validity of each PFP perceptions measure, including testing the convergent and 
discriminant validity of the scales for specific types of PFP plans.  
I examined multiple PFP plans both within and across PFP plans in multiple PFP 
environments. “Within PFP plans” refers to examining the structure of the three dimensions of a 
particular PFP plan and looking at a single PFP plan at a time. When making within–plan 
comparisons (see Figure 2), I predict that individuals perceive each PFP component, even when 
they are being paid by at least more than one PFP at a time. In other words, I explore how the 
three dimensions of each PFP plan are associated within a specific PFP plan. 
“Across PFP plans” refers to making comparisons of how individuals perceive a given 
dimension of PFP perceptions across multiple PFP plans and looking at a single dimension at a 
time. I examine how individuals perceive each of the three dimensions of PFP perceptions 
compared to the same dimension from the other co-existing PFP plans. In other words, I explore 
how individuals in a multiple PFP environment (across PFP plans) perceive differently and 
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distinctively each dimension of the PFP perceptions measurement. Figure 3 presents the 
hypothesized factor structure for PFP perceptions across PFPs.  
In order to examine how individuals perceive their multiple PFP plans in actual multi-
PFP environments, I compare different types of PFP plans under seven combinations of multiple 
PFPs. In this study, based on the popularity of PFP plans that many organizations implement 
(WorldatWork Salary Budget Survey, 2012), I considered four PFPs: raises, individual-based 
performance bonuses, team-based performance bonuses, and organization-based performance 
bonuses. I examine these plans through seven different combinations. The combinations are (1) 
raises and individual-based performance bonuses, (2) individual-based performance bonuses and 
team-based performance bonuses, (3) raises and team-based performance bonuses, (4) team-
based performance bonuses and organization-based performance bonuses, (5) individual-based 
performance bonuses and organization-based performance bonuses, (6) raises and organization-
based performance bonuses, and (7) raises, individual-based performance bonuses, and team-
based performance bonuses (See Table 7). 
5.1. Exploring PFP Perceptions within a PFP Plan              
To measure how people perceive PFP plans in multiple PFP environments, I first 
examine individual perceptions within PFP plans. When covered by multiple PFP plans 
simultaneously, for any type of PFP plan, PFP perceptions will be constituted by the perceived 
link between pay and performance and the attractiveness of the financial rewards for each reward 
(Steel & Konig, 2006). Thus, I expect that individuals will differentiate the three dimensions 
(instrumentality, expectancy, and valence) that can capture key aspects of individual subjective 
perceptions of PFP rewards of each type of PFP in a multiple PFP environment. In addition to 
the dimensionality of the measure, I predict the presence of both convergent and discriminant 
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validity (Schwab, 1980, 2005). Convergent validity for PFP perceptions that measure any 
specific type of PFP should be viewed by significant correlations among the conceptually related 
dimensions of instrumentality, expectancy, and valence. That is, in a situation where individuals 
are offered various types of PFPs, the three dimensions that I developed for PFP perceptions 
should be interrelated and influence one another in such a way to shape individuals’ subjective 
perceptions of each PFP plan. Thus, I expect there to be substantial correlations between the 
three dimensions of PFP perceptions within a PFP plan (i.e., per type of PFP). Note that, as I 
predict in the previous chapter, the three dimensions of the PFP plans should all be correlated for 
overall perceptions for convergent validity. Although the measures share similar item content, 
these items are combined so as to create a unique concept (cf., Macey & Schneider, 2008). This 
should be evidenced by the hypothesized multi-dimensional structure fitting the data better than 
other models. Thus, I expect 
Hypothesis 3: When looking within PFP plans under a combination of different 
PFP plans, employees differentiate among instrumentality, expectancy, and 
valence perceptions within each PFP plan.  
Hypothesis 4: When looking within PFP plans under a combination of different PFP 
plans, the three dimensions within each PFP (raise, individual bonus, team bonus, and 
organization bonus) are positively associated with one another. 
5.2. Exploring PFP Perceptions Across PFPs    
Temporal motivational theory (Steel & Konig, 2006) suggests that individuals value, are 
motivated by pay, but make decisions about pay differently based on immediacy/delay, goals, 
utility (strength of need), and the amount of rewards from each pay plan, all of which vary within 
and across organizations. Across PFP plan practices of organizations, each PFP (even under the 
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same name) may have varying strengths in the relationship between performance and rewards 
and different reward size (Park & Sturman, 2012, 2013). These dynamic factors of PFP plans 
often lead to different effects on individual performance (Park & Sturman, 2012, 2013). Previous 
findings of compensation research show disparate incentive effects of merit pay (raises: r = .30: 
Trevor et al., 1997; r = .05: Salamin & Hom, 2005) and of individual-based performance bonuses 
(r = .42: Salamin & Hom, 2005, r = .15: Mizruchi et al., 2011). Thus, I predict that employees 
will perceive the three dimensions–instrumentality, expectancy, and valence– differently, due to 
different forms and characteristics across multiple PFPs.  
Individuals may develop different subjective feelings about the characteristics of each 
plan based on the form (either permanent pay increase, a one-time payment, or a delayed 
payment), the plan’s characteristics (the strength of the relationship between pay and 
performance and reward size), and the various subjective components of choice (e.g., the needs 
for achievement, affiliation, and power). Whatever feelings do arise are related to the three 
dimensions of PFP perceptions (instrumentality, expectancy, and valence) for each PFP in 
environments that cover employees with a portfolio of PFP plans. For example, when individuals 
are covered by multiple PFPs that are at the individual level of the performance metric (e.g., 
raises and individual-based performance lump sum bonuses), they may clearly perceive the 
instrumentality, expectancy, and valence of the rewards. 
Compared to long-term and/or group incentives (e.g., stock options/grants, team 
incentives), the individual level of the PFP plans is clear, and employees can more easily see the 
connections between their own performance and the reward, the link between their efforts and 
the required level of job performance to attain the rewards, and the amount of the rewards. At the 
group level of rewards, such as team-based performance bonuses or organization-based 
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performance bonuses, the link between individual effort and team/group or organizational 
performance may not always be clear to employees (i.e., line of sight problem) (Boswell & 
Boudreau, 2001). For those rewards, it is very difficult to predict the performance of other 
employees (team members or employees in the same department or the entire group of 
employees), along with the firm’s objectives to achieve the firm’s goals (i.e., line of sight). The 
line of sight problem may lead to a weaker link between each dimension and the group level of 
the rewards relative to the individual-level PFPs across PFP plans.  
 Thus, I expect that individual-level rewards (raises, individual-based performance 
bonuses) will have the potential for greater instrumentality, expectancy, and valence than the 
group-level PFP plans (team-based performance bonuses and organization-based performance 
bonuses). Thus, I expect the following:   
Hypothesis 5: When comparing the level of instrumentality associated with different PFP 
plans, the level of instrumentality for individual-level PFP plans (raises and individual 
bonuses) will be higher than that of group-level PFP plans (team bonuses and 
organization bonuses). 
Hypothesis 6: When comparing the level of expectancy associated with different PFP 
plans, the level of expectancy for individual-level PFP plans (raises and individual 
bonuses) will be higher than that of group-level PFP plans (team bonuses and 
organization bonuses). 
Hypothesis 7: When comparing the level of valence associated with different PFP plans, 
the level of valence for individual-level PFP plans (raises and individual bonuses) will be 
higher than that of group-level PFP plans (team bonuses and organization bonuses). 
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Figure 2. Hypothesized Factor Structure for PFP Perceptions Dimensions Per PFP Plan (Within a PFP Plan) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: measured variables, lower order factors, and disturbance terms are omitted for simplicity.   
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Figure 3. Hypothesized Factor Structure for PFP Perceptions Dimensions (Across PFP Plans) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: measured variables, lower order factors, and disturbance terms are omitted for simplicity.   
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CHAPTER VI 
CRITERION-RELATED VALIDITY OF PFP PERCEPTIONS: THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN PFP PERCEPTIONS AND EMPLOYEE JOB ATTITUDES 
6.1. Establishing a Criterion-Related Validity of PFP Perceptions  
The main purpose of this chapter is to examine the criterion-related validity of the PFP 
perception measures–a necessary part of construct validation. Such an examination should yield 
further evidence of construct validity for the overall and specific plan PFP perceptions measures 
(Hinkin, 1995; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994). It has been suggested that the construct of interest 
(i.e., PFP perceptions) is proved to be more valid when the measure of the construct provides 
support for the relationships with other measures that are in the nomological network (Schwab, 
2005). 
Although research has drawn attention to the value of studying the effects of PFP 
systems, little attention has been given to employee perceptions of PFP. Thus, it is not yet known 
why, how, or when PFP perceptions may link to various important constructs, which in turn 
affects organizational effectiveness. Except for pay satisfaction research, there has not been 
research into how employee perceptions of PFP affect a variety of constructs. Rather, extant 
research has focused on the pay system per se, not on employee perceptions. Examining 
criterion-related validity can provide evidence that the PFP perceptions measure is valid by 
establishing its nomological network (Schwab, 1980). 
Previous research has implied that employees’ perceptions of PFP should be related to 
various attitudes and behaviors, such as pay satisfaction, job satisfaction, organizational 
commitment, trust, and turnover intention (e.g., Bloom, 2004; Heneman et al., 1988). For 
example, Bloom (2004) found that “given the vital role that compensation systems play in 
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employment relationships, it is also very likely that they play an important role in shaping 
whether people feel they are treated with dignity, trust, and respect and whether they believe the 
values and culture of the organization are worthy of their fullest commitment and highest efforts” 
(p. 149). As a human resources management practice, the main goal of designing compatible 
compensation systems is to influence employees’ attitudes and behaviors at work. Hence, they 
exert more effort and, in turn, become more productive (Alfes, Shantz, & Truss, 2012). There is 
abundant empirical evidence of the positive relationship between employee perceptions of 
human resources management practices and a number of individual outcomes, such as a variety 
of positive behaviors and performance (e,g., Alfes et al., 2012; Allen, Shore, & Griffeth, 2003; 
Eisenberger, Huntington, Hutchison, & Sowa, 1986; Kuvaas & Dysvik, 2010; Nishii, Lepak, & 
Schneider, 2008; Rhoades & Eisenberger, 2002; Wayne, Shore, & Liden, 1997). Given such 
evidence, I propose that employee perceptions of their PFP plans should shape and influence 
workers’ attitudes and behaviors in the organization. To illustrate, I examine the relationship 
between overall PFP perceptions and five important outcomes: pay satisfaction, job satisfaction, 
organizational commitment, trust, and turnover intention. Specifically, to look at the nomological 
relationships with the five outcomes, I consider the individuals’ overall perceptions of PFPs. 
Previous studies have mostly looked at the relationship between overall perceptions of PFPs and 
employees' attitudes and behaviors. Thus, this approach will provide general insights into the 
validity of the nomological network. Furthermore, I examine the relationship between PFP 
perceptions of specific types of PFPs (raises, individual bonuses, team bonuses, and organization 
bonuses) and the associated satisfaction of the four specific types of PFPs: raise satisfaction, 
individual bonus satisfaction, team bonus satisfaction, and organization bonus satisfaction. In 
this chapter, I begin by providing an overview of the pay satisfaction, job satisfaction, 
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organizational commitment, trust, turnover, and PFP satisfaction theories. I then investigate how 
they are related to the PFP perceptions construct. Next, I suggest specific hypotheses about each 
of them, and how they are associated with PFP perceptions. 
Pay satisfaction. Pay satisfaction refers to “the amount of overall positive or negative 
affect (or feelings) that individuals have toward their pay” (Miceli & Lane, 1991, p.246). 
Because of its importance in organizational outcomes, pay satisfaction has received a great deal 
of attention from compensation researchers and practitioners over the past four decades (Currall, 
Towler, Judge, & Kohn, 2005; Heneman, 1985; Heneman & Schwab, 1979; Heneman et al., 
1988; Williams, McDaniel, & Nguyen, 2006). Previous research has reported that pay 
satisfaction is positively associated with job performance and negatively associated with 
absenteeism and turnover (e.g., Currall et al., 2005; Heneman, 1985). 
 The main theories explaining pay satisfaction over the past 40 years are equity theory and 
discrepancy theory (Heneman, 1985; Heneman & Judge, 2000; Lawler, 1971, 1981). Equity and 
discrepancy theories offer insight into how pay satisfaction is determined and suggest possible 
consequences of pay dissatisfaction. The key argument of the equity model is that individuals 
compare the ratio of their outcomes to inputs to the outcome-input ratios of other individuals. 
Employees feel satisfied with their pay when their ratios are comparable to those of others. 
Likewise, the discrepancy theory suggests that individuals’ perceived pay satisfaction is 
influenced by a discrepancy between their “should–receive” perceptions of how much pay they 
think they should receive and their “do–receive” perceptions. When the two perceptions match, 
employees feel satisfied with their pay. 
   Pay satisfaction is a complex reaction to one’s environments, and it is often regarded as 
the consequence of the feelings employees have toward their pay systems. On the other hand, 
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PFP perceptions reflect individuals’ psychosocial experiences associated with their pay systems, 
performance appraisals, and the work environments they encounter. Based on their own 
perceptions of the environment (i.e., PFP perceptions), individuals tend to react and have 
feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with their pay (Adams, 1965; Lawler, 1971, 1981). That 
is, individuals’ perceptions of their compensation systems give rise to the ratio of their outcomes 
to inputs compared to the ratio of outcomes and inputs of other employees. Furthermore, the 
discrepancy between individuals’ perceptions of the payment they feel that they should receive 
and the payment they do receive arises from how they perceive their compensation system. 
Although there is a handful of previous studies that have examined the relationship between PFP 
perceptions and pay satisfaction, most of them considered each of these variables as a uni-
dimensional construct. Consequently, they used a single-item measure of PFP perceptions and 
pay satisfaction (Heneman et al., 1988). Only a small number of studies have attempted to show 
the associations between perceptions of pay (e.g., “adequacy of pay-system administration”: 
Dyer & Theriault, 1976; “PFP perceptions”: Heneman et al., 1988; “perceptions of pay policies 
and administration”: Williams et al., 2006) and pay satisfaction using multidimensional measures 
of pay satisfaction. No empirical research has been directly conducted on the impact of PFP 
perceptions on pay satisfaction by using measures of PFP perceptions with multiple dimensions.  
 Prior compensation research has found a direct and positive relationship between PFP 
perceptions and pay satisfaction (Dyer & Theriault, 1976; Heneman et al., 1988; Lawler, 1971; 
Penner, 1966). In other words, the level of employee pay satisfaction increases when employees 
perceive that their pay is based on performance. Drawing on equity theory and discrepancy 
theory, a number of studies have shown that PFP perceptions are positively related to pay 
satisfaction (Dyer & Theriault, 1976; Gupta, 1980; Heneman, 1984; Heneman et al., 1988; 
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Williams et al., 2006). If individuals perceive that their pay system and the policy in their 
organizations to be fair and instrumental for their rewards, they should be satisfied with their pay 
outcomes (pay raises satisfaction, pay level satisfaction, and overall pay satisfaction) (Heneman, 
1984; Heneman et al., 1988; Lawler, 1971; Williams et al., 2006). Gupta (1980) argued that 
individuals are more likely to have higher levels of pay satisfaction under PFP plans because 
they can internally control their performance levels.  
 Furthermore, the link between performance and pay–the main functionality of PFP–leads 
individuals to have strong feelings of equity. These are highly related to pay satisfaction because 
individuals believe that ability, which they can control, is the main factor determining reward 
allocation in performance contingent reward systems. In contrast, under seniority reward 
systems, individuals are more likely to have feelings of inequity because they believe that “non-
ability variables (sex, age, race, etc)” play significant roles in reward allocations. Overall, PFP 
perceptions are a distinct construct but related to pay satisfaction insofar as being a key 
determinant. Therefore, I expect a positive link between employees’ overall PFP perceptions and 
pay satisfaction.  
Hypothesis 8: Employees’ overall perceptions of PFP plans are positively 
associated with pay satisfaction. 
 Job satisfaction. Job satisfaction refers to “complex emotional reactions to the job” 
(Locke, 1969, p.314). More specifically, it is “the pleasurable emotional state resulting from the 
appraisal of one’s job as achieving or facilitating the achievement of one’s job values” (Locke, 
1969, p.316). Research has repeatedly shown that money is a strong motivator and positively 
related to job satisfaction (e.g., Currall et al., 2005; Gomez-Mejia & Balkin, 1992; Green & 
Heywood, 2008; Greene, 1973; Igalens & Roussel, 1999; Nawab & Bhatti, 2011). Most recently, 
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Judge, Piccolo, Podsakoff, Shaw, and Rich’s (2010) meta-analysis of the relationship between 
pay and job satisfaction showed that pay level is positively but marginally correlated with job 
satisfaction (r = .15) and with pay satisfaction (r = .23). Note that most previous research has 
used the construct of either pay satisfaction or pay level to examine the relationship between pay 
and job satisfaction. No study has focused on how employees’ perceptions of PFP are related to 
job satisfaction. It is still unclear whether PFP perceptions determine individuals’ job satisfaction 
and how these two operate. 
Drawing on discrepancy theory and equity theory, Lawler (1973) suggested that what 
individuals actually receive versus what they feel they deserve determines job satisfaction. Job 
satisfaction is an attitude by which individuals evaluate statements (either favorable or 
unfavorable) towards their jobs. The attitude may be characterized as “the summation of sense, 
belief and thoughts which the individual forms in direction with his perceptions about his 
environment” (Man, Modrak, Dima, & Pachura, 2011, p. 9). It often reflects how a person feels 
about something. Furthermore, researchers in management and I/O psychologists have found that 
job satisfaction has a close relationship with motivation (Lawler, 1973). Employees who believe 
their PFP systems are fair are more likely to be satisfied with their jobs; given this, employees’ 
perceptions of PFP can play a significant role in influencing their affective reactions to their jobs. 
Furthermore, because financial incentives can be a strong motivator that leads to job satisfaction, 
the perceptions of employees towards PFP should also be related to their attitudes towards their 
jobs. Hence, I expect: 
Hypothesis 9: Employees’ overall perceptions of PFP plans are positively associated 
with job satisfaction. 
Organizational commitment. Organizational commitment has been defined as “the 
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relative strength of an individual’s identification with and involvement in a particular 
organization” (Mowday, Steers & Porter, 1979, p.226). As with job satisfaction, management 
researchers have considered organizational commitment to be an important attitudinal variable. 
Indeed, it is related to employee turnover, which impacts organizational outcomes (e.g., Porter, 
Steers, Mowday, & Boulian, 1974; Tett & Meyer, 1993). As it is an attitudinal behavior, research 
suggests that organizational commitment reflects employees’ strong beliefs in their 
organizations’ goals and values and desires to remain in their organizations (Mowday et al., 
1979). Until recently, the literature has been dominated by three dimensions of organizational 
commitment (Solinger, Olffen, & Roe, 2008): affective commitment, continuance commitment, 
and normative commitment (Allen & Meyer, 1990).  Affective commitment refers to the 
emotional attachment to the goals and values of the organization, such as whether an employee is 
happy about, enjoys, or feels attached to a particular organization. Continuance commitment 
refers to the attachment to the organization based on the costs that an employee has to pay when 
leaving an organization. Normative commitment refers to the extent to which an employee feels 
obligated to stay with the organization. There has, however, been criticism of the three 
dimensions that they are rather conceptualized so as to measure employee voluntary turnover 
(e.g., Solinger et al., 2008). As such, a number of studies have used affective commitment to 
measure compensation-related variables (i.e., pay satisfaction, pay level) (e.g., Mathieu & Zajac, 
1990; Sturman & Short, 2000). In this study, I also consider affective commitment to test the 
relationship between PFP perceptions and the construct of organizational commitment.  
As described in many studies exploring the relationship between organizational 
commitment, job satisfaction and/or pay satisfaction, the nature of the construct of organizational 
commitment suggests that employees’ perceptions of a pay system may affect their attitudinal 
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behavior, which is their attachment to their organizations. For example, Dulebohn and 
Martocchio (1998) showed that organizational commitment is positively correlated with 
employees’ belief in their group pay plan’s effectiveness (r = .49) and understanding of their 
group pay plan (r = .42). Affective commitment is also an affective state, just as job satisfaction 
is. However, they are distinct constructs in that affective commitment is an emotional attachment 
to an organization while job satisfaction is an emotional feeling toward the job (Kooij, Jansen, 
Dikkers, & Lange, 2010). Thus, I expect the following: 
Hypothesis 10: Employees’ overall perceptions of PFP plans are positively associated 
with employee organizational commitment. 
Trust. Trust refers to “the intention to accept vulnerability to a trustee based on positive 
expectations of his/her actions” (Colquitt, Scott, & Lepine, 2007). According to the literature on 
organizational trust, trust violations occur when positive expectations of the trustee are disrupted, 
and vice versa. Trust in the workplace has a huge impact on employee motivation and 
performance. The impact is such that “trust in one’s employer relates to an employee’s belief 
about the likelihood that the employer’s future actions will be beneficial, favorable, or at least 
not harmful, to an employee’s own interest, and is therefore a crucial factor influencing an 
employee’s behavior” (Alfes et al., 2012, p.412).   
Alfes et al. (2012) showed that trust in an employer moderates the relationship between 
perceptions of HRM practices, including compensation and task performance, turnover 
intentions and employee well-being. That is, a high level of trust in the employer strengthens the 
relationship between perceived HRM practices and employee task performance. It does so by 
leading employees to interpret the HRM practices in positive ways (such as “an investment in 
them”) so that they put more effort into their work. In contrast, employees with low trust in their 
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employer are more likely to interpret HRM practices less positively. This leads to a decrease in 
their task performance. In a similar vein, the level of trust that employees have in their 
supervisors and the top management may influence employee perceptions of PFP plans. 
Within an organization where social exchange relationships between employees and 
employers exist, tangible outcomes, particularly financial rewards, play a significant role in 
building or violating trust with supervisors and top management (Desmet, De Cremer, & Van 
Dijk, 2011). The size of financial compensation has been identified as the leading cause of 
building, disrupting and/or repairing trust (e.g., Desmet et al., 2011). Nonetheless, all of the 
processes of employee compensation–such as the performance appraisal process and 
interpersonal relationships between employees and their bosses–should also have significant 
impacts on trust. Thus, I predict that employees’ perceptions of PFP plans have a positive 
relationship with their trust in supervisors and top management. Therefore, I expect    
Hypothesis 11: Employees’ overall perceptions of PFP plans are positively associated 
with trust in supervisors as well as top management. 
Turnover Intention.  As noted above, we have yet to fully know the effect of PFP 
perceptions on various other variables, particularly turnover intentions, due to the lack of a 
clearly defined construct. Although other research has not yet fully examined this, we can still 
learn from previous research related to the variables of interests. Previous research has shown 
that turnover intention (or voluntary turnover) is related to pay satisfaction (e.g., Sturman & 
Short, 2000) and employee job performance (e.g., Trevor et al., 1997). For example, Sturman 
and Short (2000) found a negative effect of lump-sum bonus satisfaction on turnover intention. 
Trevor et al. (1997) also found that high performers are more likely to leave their organizations 
when their performance is not reflected in their pay growth as a reward. Although these previous 
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studies and findings are not directly focused on PFP perceptions, supportive findings have 
implications for understanding the relationship between PFP perceptions and turnover intentions. 
The variance of the relationships between employee PFP perceptions and turnover intentions will 
vary depending on the level of performance (high vs. low). Overall, however, employees will 
attempt to leave their organizations when they perceive a low level of PFP perceptions: they will 
attempt to stay in their organizations when they have strong PFP perceptions. Therefore, I predict 
Hypothesis 12: Employees’ overall perception of PFP plans is negatively associated with 
turnover intention. 
PFP satisfaction. Taking a closer look at multiple PFPs, we can see that organizations 
administratively manage different types of PFPs separately, and that individuals are likely to 
perceive all types of PFPs that have different forms and functionalities, such as raises and lump-
sum bonuses, distinctively (Sturman & Short, 2000). Thus, the nomological relationship between 
each type of PFP and the associated satisfaction should be considered separately. Sturman and 
Short (2000) suggested that satisfaction with multiple pay practices should be captured with a 
separate measure of each PFP because the Pay Satisfaction Questionnaire (PSQ; Heneman & 
Schwab, 1985) does not fully capture the modern compensation practices that are multiple and 
complex. Thus, with a very similar approach to the nomological relationship between pay 
satisfaction and individuals’ overall perceptions of PFPs, I also expect a positive link between 
employees’ perceptions of specific types of PFPs and their associated satisfaction. Thus, I expect     
Hypothesis 13a: Employees’ perceptions of raises are positively associated with 
raise satisfaction. 
Hypothesis 13b: Employees’ perceptions of individual bonuses are positively 
associated with individual bonus satisfaction. 
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Hypothesis 13c: Employees’ perceptions of team bonuses are positively 
associated with team bonus satisfaction. 
Hypothesis 13d: Employees’ perceptions of organization-based performance 
bonuses are positively associated with organization-based performance bonus 
satisfaction. 
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Figure 4. Nomological Network of Overall PFP Perceptions in the Workplace 
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Figure 5. Nomological Network of Specific Plan PFP Perceptions in the Workplace 
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CHAPTER VII 
METHODS 
TESTING RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY OF PFP PERCEPTIONS  
7.1. Participants and Setting 
 Data for this dissertation was collected from Amazon’s mechanical turk (Mturk) 
(www.Mturk.com). Mturk is an open online marketplace that provides online survey 
opportunities for researchers by connecting “requesters” who publish tasks (“hits”) and “human 
providers (“workers”) who complete them. This web-based data collection place has recently 
become very popular among social scientists, who account for over 100,000 users from over 100 
countries conducting large numbers of experiments and surveys (Buhrmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011). Collecting employee attitude data that comes from a wide variety of occupations 
and organizations is a very useful way to get data, particularly for this dissertation, because one 
of the main purposes of this study is to consider a variety of multiple PFP environments. It 
provides a good opportunity to measure individual perceptions of different types of PFPs in 
different combinations of multiple PFPs, which is very difficult to do with data from a single 
organization. For this study, I prescreened participants to be (1) full-time employees and (2) who 
are eligible for types of performance-related financial rewards (e.g., merit pay, individual-based 
bonuses under PFP plans) that a company provides.  
Mturk provides a system where a requester deposits an amount of money the requester 
has set prior to recruiting participants. The requester can always reject participants who do not 
provide acceptable answers and can invite new participants until the sample size meets the 
requester’s needs. At first, I recruited 100 prescreened participants for a pre-test. A total of 167 
people attempted to participate in the survey. Sixty-seven people were rejected because they 
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either did not follow the instructions or they did not complete the survey. Each participant who 
agreed to take the survey and who provided acceptable answers (i.e., followed my instructions 
and completed the survey) was paid 75 cents. 
After a week having experienced the entire survey process and feeling confident about 
conducting a survey with Mturk, I recruited another 650 participants (the Mturk system blocked 
participants who attempted to and/or conducted the previous survey) for the same survey. Again, 
a number of people were rejected because they did not provide acceptable answers. As a total, 
1,526 people attempted to participate in the survey. 650 people who provided acceptable answers 
and completed the survey were paid 50 cents each. Because I used the same survey questionnaire 
at both time points with no overlaps across participants, I combined the surveys from the 
participants of the pre-test and of the survey. Eliminating improper responses produced a final 
sample size of 562. The sample was diverse in terms of occupation (management: 42%; service: 
15%; sales and office: 15%; construction: 6%; production: 8%; government: 5%; others 
including IT and education: 9%). Of these 562, 68% were men; the median age was 25-29 years; 
the average dyadic tenure was 2.43 year; the average current job tenure was 2.91 years, and their 
average current organizational tenure was 4.54 years.  
7.2. Measures 
7.2.1. Item Generation and Refinement for PFP Perceptions 
 PFP Perceptions. I developed a measure of PFP perceptions using items for multiple 
dimensions. First, I reviewed and identified a number of PFP perception survey items that had 
been used in previous studies. These items have been typically used as a unidimentional 
construct: the link between pay and performance (Heneman et al.,1988; Gerhart et al., 2009). 
Second, I phrased a number of items similarly to those from previous research (Erez & Isen, 
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2002; Fong & Shaffer, 2003; Heneman et al., 1988; Perry & Pearce, 1983). Third, following the 
above definition, I established three dimensions of PFP perceptions: instrumentality, expectancy, 
and valence.  
 Two types of PFP perceptions measures were considered to be developed. One was PFP 
perceptions of overall PFPs and the other was PFP perceptions of specific types of PFPs. Using a 
deductive approach to scale development (Hinkin, 1995), I initially generated 23 items that were 
divided into three dimensions of PFP perceptions: 1) Instrumentality perceptions measure if 
individuals believe that each type of PFP plan is linked to performance (i.e., performance in a 
previous time period) of either an individual or group/organization, depending on the specific 
type of rewards. Employees should be aware that they get financial incentives for their 
performance (the linkage between employees’ performance previous to and subsequent to PFP 
plans). 2) Expectancy perceptions represent the link between each individual’s efforts and a 
certain level of job performance that determines financial rewards. And 3) valence perceptions 
measure the degree to which individuals value financial rewards. To review those items, I used a 
group of 10 people currently working in different industries. They identified items that were 
redundant or poorly worded. Based on their feedback, I refined some items before the survey 
was conducted.  
7.2.2. Overall PFP Perceptions 
The final items for overall PFP perceptions included 12 items in three dimensions: the 
instrumentality perceptions dimension is measured with six items; the expectancy perceptions 
dimension is measured with three items, and the valence perceptions dimension is measured with 
three items (See table 3). The PFP perception items were rated on a 7-point scale asking how an 
individual feels about PFP plans (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).  
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7.2.3. PFP Perceptions of Specific Types of PFPs 
In order to measure individuals’ PFP perceptions of specific types of PFPs, I employed 
11 items in three dimensions: four for the instrumentality perceptions dimension, three for the 
expectancy perceptions dimension, and four for the valence perceptions dimension (see Table 4). 
Note that the measure of PFP perceptions of specific types of PFPs was limited to seven types of 
PFPs (raises, individual-based performance bonuses, team-based performance bonuses, 
divisional-based performance bonuses, organizational-based performance, stock options, and 
stock grants). The three types of PFPs, divisional-based performance bonuses, stock options, and 
stock grants were, however, excluded from the analysis due to small sample size. Using a 7-point 
scale ranging from 1–“strongly disagree; 7– “strongly agree,” respondents reported how strongly 
they felt about each type of received PFP: raises (merit pay), individual-based performance 
bonuses, team performance-based bonuses, divisional performance-based bonuses, and 
organizational performance-based bonuses. 
7.2.2. Other Measures 
Pay satisfaction.  Pay satisfaction was assessed using Heneman and Schwab’s (1985) 
scale: the modified pay satisfaction questionnaire (PSQ). Eighteen items were assessed to 
measure participants’ perception of pay satisfaction. The item anchors ranged from 1 (very 
dissatisfied) to 7 (very satisfied).  
PFP satisfaction. I developed measures of PFP satisfaction for five specific PFPs that are 
phrased similarly to those of the lump-sum bonus satisfaction questionnaire (Sturman & Short, 
2000): (1) raise satisfaction, (2) individual bonus satisfaction (3) team bonus satisfaction, (4) 
divisional bonus satisfaction, and (5) organization bonus satisfaction. The four items of each type 
of PFP satisfaction were assessed to measure participants’ perception of (1) raise satisfaction, (2) 
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individual bonus satisfaction, (3) team bonus satisfaction, (4) divisional bonus satisfaction, and 
(5) organization bonus satisfaction. The item anchors ranged from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 7 (very 
satisfied).  
Job satisfaction.  Job satisfaction was assessed with Hackman and Oldham’s (1975) 3- 
item scale. These items were used to measure how satisfied they were with their current jobs. 
Anchors ranged from 1 (very dissatisfied) to 7 (very satisfied).  
Affective organizational commitment. Organizational commitment was measured using 
Allen and Meyer’s (1990) affective organizational commitment 4-item scale. The anchors ranged 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
Trust (supervisor). Trust in supervisor was measured using Mayer and Gavin’s (2005) 
scale, updated from Mayer and Davis’s (1999), with all items using anchors of 1 = strongly 
disagree to 7 = strongly agree. Five items were assessed to measure how trusting participants 
were of their supervisors.  
Trust (management).  Trust in management was assessed with Mayer and Gavin’s (2005) 
scale, updated from Mayer and Davis’s (1999). Four items were assessed to measure the degree 
to which participants trust their (top) management. The item anchors ranged from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
Turnover intention.  Turnover intention was assessed with Kelloway, Gottlieb, and 
Barham’s (1999) 4-item scale. Anchors ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).   
Control variables. I controlled for the demographic characteristics of respondents 
including age and gender, which can be associated with individuals’ PFP perceptions. In order to 
avoid biased parameter estimates, I also controlled for the effects of dyadic tenure, job tenure, 
and organization tenure in estimating respondents’ perceived patterns of their PFPs.  
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7.3. Reliability, Confirmatory Factor Analyses, Paired T Tests, and Multiple Regressions 
To test construct validity, I took four steps in an empirical examination (Cronbach & 
Meehl, 1955; Schwab, 1980, 2005). First, it was necessary to measure the reliability of the focal 
construct (PFP perceptions) (Hinkin, 1995; Schwab, 1980; Sturman & Short, 2000). Reliability 
refers to “the systematic or consistent variance of a measure (the degree to which measurement 
scores are free of random errors)” (Schwab, 2005, p.32). Cronbach’s alpha was used to measure 
internal consistency, the extent to which a set of items measures the same construct (Cronbach & 
Meehl, 1955; Schwab, 1980, 2005). The value of 0.7 or higher indicates an acceptable fit and 
0.90 or greater indicates a good fit (Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994; Schwab, 1980).  
In the second step of the construct validation, I conducted factor analysis, which has been 
most frequently used in construct validation to test the dimensionality of new measures. 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) is aimed mostly at assessing “the quality of the factor 
structure by statistically testing the significance of the overall model and of item loadings on 
factors” (Hinkin, 1995, p.976). In order to run confirmatory factor analysis, I employed R (R 
Development Core Team, 2014) and JMP (SAS Institute Inc., 2009, 2012). Model fit was 
assessed via the comparative fit index (CFI), the non-normed fit index (NNFI), incremental fit 
index (IFI), Standardized Root Mean Square Residual (SRMR), Bentler-Bonnett NFI, and the 
root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA). A good fit is indicated by CFI values of .90 
or greater, NNFI close to 1, IFI values of .90 or greater, SRMR values of less than .08, NFI 
values of .95 or greater, and RMSEA values of less than .08 (Bentler & Bonett, 1980; Browne & 
Cudeck, 1993).  
For discriminant validity, the measure of PFP perceptions should be distinctive in the 
three dimensions within and also across different types of PFPs (i.e., raises, individual-based 
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performance bonuses, team-based performance bonuses, divisional-based performance bonuses, 
or organizational-based performance bonuses). In this study, to support the dimensionality of the 
measure, chi-square difference tests were used to test discriminant validity. Furthermore, paired t 
tests were also used to test the significance of a difference of each dimension of the three 
dimensions of PFP perceptions measure across multiple PFPs. This was done to measure how 
differently and distinctively individuals perceived each dimension of the PFP perceptions 
measurement in a multiple PFP environment. 
Third, using CFA, I assessed convergent validity. Convergent validity is the degree to 
which the three dimensions of PFP perceptions are significantly associated with each other 
(Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Schwab, 1980). To establish convergent validity, the evidence must 
show that all items loaded should be significant on their hypothesized dimension (Nifadkar, Tsui, 
& Ashforth, 2012). Thus, each item of the three dimensions of PFP perceptions should be 
significantly correlated with its hypothesized construct. Fourth, correlation matrices and multiple 
regressions were used to demonstrate nomological relationships for criterion-related validity.  
In sum, based on Cronbach and Meehl’s (1955) and Schwab’s (1980, 2005) construct 
validity studies, I examined the construct validity of the measure of PFP plans by examining (1) 
the reliability of the measure, (2) the dimensionality of the measure and discriminant validity (to 
see whether constructs that are conceptually distinct should not be related), (3) convergent 
validity (to see whether constructs that are conceptually related should be related), and (4) 
criterion-related validity (to measure the relationship between PFP perceptions and employee job 
attitudes). 
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CHAPTER VIII 
RESULTS 
8.1. Descriptive Information 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics and correlations. Tables 6 and 7 report types of PFP 
plans participants reported that they receive within their organizations. Of the same respondents, 
I differentiated categories of types of PFP plans: Table 6 is sorted based on PFPs that 
respondents received and Table 7 shows the number of PFPs that respondents received 
regardless of the type of other PFPs they also received simultaneously. Table 8 reports the 
Cronbach’s alphas for reliability of measures used in this study.  
8.2. Testing the Validity of the Overall PFP Perceptions Measure 
To investigate how individuals feel and react to their overall PFPs, I needed to test 
whether the overall PFP perceptions measure that has been developed in this dissertation is a 
valid measure. Thus, I tested (1) the dimensionality of overall PFP perceptions, (2) whether the 
dimensions are distinctive from each other (discriminant validity) to support the dimensionality 
of overall PFP perceptions, and (3) the association of specific items with each of the other 
dimensions of the PFP perceptions construct (convergent validity). To test hypotheses 1 and 2, I 
employed Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). CFA was conducted on the 12-item measure of 
overall PFP perceptions. I hypothesized that the construct was composed of three dimensions 
(instrumentality, expectancy, and valence perceptions). The fit statistics of the hypothesized and 
alternative models of overall PFP perceptions are presented in Table 9. 
  Single-factor model. In this step, I specified a one-factor alternative measurement model, 
consisting of individuals’ overall PFP perceptions, where all 12-items loaded on a single factor. 
The fit indices for the one-factor model were consistently poor. This indicates that it is not 
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reasonable to conclude that all 12-iems measure a single PFP perceptions construct. The fit 
statistics for this model were   (54, N = 562) = 465.57, p < .001; NNFI = 0.84; NFI = 0.85;  
IFI = 0.87; CFI = 0.87; RMSEA = 0.12; and SRMR = 0.08.  
 Two-factor model.  I examined two alternative two-factor models. The first alternative 
two-factor model specified items for instrumentality perceptions as one dimension and as the 
other dimension consisting of the items for expectancy and valence perceptions (I vs. E, V). The 
fit indices for the model were   (53, N = 562) = 193.13, p < .001; NNFI = 0.94; NFI = 0.94; IFI 
= 0.95; CFI = 0.95; RMSEA = 0.07; and SRMR = 0.05. The second alternative two-factor model 
specified items for instrumentality and expectancy perceptions as one dimension and as the other 
dimension composed of valence perceptions items (I, E vs. V). The fit indices for the model were 
  (53, N = 562) = 318.13, p < .001; NNFI = 0.89; NFI = 0.90; IFI = 0.91; CFI = 0.91;  
RMSEA = 0.09; and SRMR = 0.07.  
Three-factor model. This model includes the three hypothesized PFP perceptions 
dimensions (instrumentality perceptions, expectancy perceptions, and valence perceptions). The 
fit indices for the model were   (48, N = 562) = 110.82, p < .001; NNFI = 0.97; NFI = 0.96;  
IFI = 0.98; CFI = 0.98; RMSEA = 0.05; and SRMR = 0.03.  
Hypothesis 1 predicted that individuals would differentiate between instrumentality, 
expectancy, and valence perceptions of their overall PFP plans. Of the four models, the three-
factor model fits the data best. The fit statistics indicated that the three-factor model fit the data 
significantly better than did the alternative one-factor model and the two two-factor models. 
With regard to discriminant validity, a chi-square difference test was conducted. Chi-
square difference tests “compare fixed and freely estimated two-factor models for all pairs of 
factors” (Hamann, Schiemann, Bellora, & Guenther, 2013, p.81). The test suggests that 
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compared constructs are distinctive when two models differ significantly on a chi-square 
difference test (Bagozzi et al., 1991). Very small p-values of the difference between every two- 
factor models that were compared indicate that the null hypothesis (either the one-factor model 
or two two-factor models) should be rejected (Kline, 2011). The result of the chi-square 
difference test for overall PFP perceptions shows that all factors in the hypothesized model 
demonstrate discriminant validity (See Table 10). As a result, it suggests that instrumentality, 
expectancy, and valence perceptions are distinct from one another. Taken together, this provides 
support for Hypothesis 1.  
With regard to convergent validity, Hypothesis 2 predicted that the three dimensions of 
the overall PPQ construct would be positively associated with one another. CFA was used to 
assess whether a number of items of the same construct show sufficient levels of covariance 
(Bagozzi, Yi, & Phillips, 1991). Results are presented in Table 11 and support the hypothesis. 
Instrumentality perceptions, expectancy perceptions, and valence perceptions of overall PFP 
perceptions were positively related to each other. There was a range from .67 to .82 for 
instrumentality; for expectancy, there was a range from .46 to .73; for valence, there was a range 
from .53 to .84. P-values of all factor loadings were significant at 1% level (p < 0.01). Factor 
loadings of .40 or higher specified in the three-factor models for overall PFP perceptions 
provided evidence of convergent validity (Spector, 1992). The results suggest that the 12-item 
measure is a valid measure of PFP perceptions. 
8.3. Testing the Validity of Specific Plan PFP Perception Measures: Within-PFP Plan 
Comparisons  
 To measure how people perceive PFP plans when covered by more than one PFP plan, I 
tested the structure of the three dimensions of each particular PFP plan in multi-PFP 
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environments. Hypotheses 3 and 4 predicted that individuals would differentiate the three 
dimensions of PFP perceptions of each type of PFP, and that the three dimensions would be 
interrelated with one another in a situation where employees are offered multiple PFPs. To 
accurately test the multiple PFPs environments, I sorted seven combinations of multiple PFPs. 
The combinations are sorted based on PFPs that respondents received regardless of the type of 
other PFPs they also received simultaneously. The seven combinations of multiple PFPs are (1) 
raises and individual-based performance bonuses (N = 234), (2) individual-based performance 
bonuses and team-based performance bonuses (N=180), (3) raises and team-based performance 
bonuses (N = 128), (4) team-based performance bonuses and organizational-based performance 
bonuses (N = 97), (5) individual-based performance bonuses and organizational-based 
performance bonuses (N = 131), (6) raises and organizational-based performance bonuses (N = 
106), and (7) raises, individual-based performance bonuses, and team-based performance 
bonuses (N = 98) (see Table 7). To test the construct validity of specific plan PFP perceptions 
measures, CFA was conducted on the various 11-item measures, composed of the three 
hypothesized dimensions (instrumentality, expectancy, and valence perceptions). 
8.3.1. Testing the Dimensionality of Specific Plan PFP Perceptions 
The CFA results show that the hypothesis tests were largely supported. Of the four 
models (the one-factor model, two two-factor models, and the three-factor model), the three-
factor model statistically fits the data significantly better than did the alternative models in all 
seven combinations of multiple PFP plans. The fit statistics indicated that the three-factor model 
fit the data significantly better than did the alternative one-factor model and the two two-factor 
models.  
8.3.1.1. The Combination of Raises and Individual-Based Performance Bonuses (N = 234) 
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When people are in a situation where raises (merit pay) and individual-based 
performance bonuses are simultaneously paid, the fit statistics for the three-factor model of raises 
were   (46, N = 234) = 119.53, p < .001; NNFI = 0.93; NFI = 0.91; IFI = 0.94; CFI = 0.94; 
RMSEA = 0.08; and SRMR = 0.06; and the fit statistics for the three-factor model of individual 
bonuses were   (39, N = 234) = 93.82, p < .001; NNFI = 0.95; NFI = 0.94; IFI = 0.96;  
CFI = 0.96; RMSEA = 0.08; and SRMR = 0.048. Of the four models (a one-factor model, two 
two-factor models (I, EV; IE, V), and a three-factor model (I, E, V)), the three-factor model fits 
the data best (See Table 12). This finding suggests that people differentiate the three dimensions 
of raises and individual bonuses respectively when they are paid both PFPs at a time. 
8.3.1.2. The Combination of Individual-Based Performance Bonuses and Team-Based 
Performance Bonuses (N=180) 
 When people are covered by both individual-based performance bonuses and team-based 
bonuses, the fit statistics for the three-factor model of individual bonuses were   (41, N = 180) = 
103.46, p < .001; NNFI = 0.91; NFI = 0.89; IFI = 0.93; CFI = 0.93; RMSEA = 0.09; and  
SRMR = 0.05; and the fit statistics for the three-factor model of team bonuses were   (41, N = 
180) = 82.86, p < .001; NNFI = 0.95; NFI = 0.93; IFI = 0.96; CFI = 0.96; RMSEA = 0.08; and 
SRMR = 0.04. This suggests the best fit to the data for each PFP for the three-factor model (see 
Table 13). It suggests that people clearly differentiate the three dimensions of each type of PFP 
(individual bonuses and team bonuses) respectively when they are paid with these plans 
simultaneously.  
8.3.1.3. The Combination of Raises and Team-Based Performance Bonuses (N = 128) 
When people are paid both raises and team-based performance bonuses, the fit statistics 
for the three-factor model of raises were   (45, N = 128) = 84.71, p < .001; NNFI = 0.93;  
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NFI = 0.89; IFI = 0.95; CFI = 0.94; RMSEA = 0.08; and SRMR = 0.07; and the fit statistics for 
the three-factor model of team bonuses were   (41, N = 128) = 55.59, p < .001; NNFI = 0.98; 
NFI = 0.94; IFI = 0.98; CFI = 0.98; RMSEA = 0.05; and SRMR = 0.04. This suggests the best fit 
to the data for each PFP for the three-factor model (see Table 14). This finding tells us that 
individuals differentiate instrumentality, expectancy, and valence of raises and team bonuses 
respectively. 
8.3.1.4. The Combination of Team-Based Performance Bonuses and Organization-Based 
Performance Bonuses (N = 97) 
 When in a situation where team bonuses and organization bonuses are both paid, the fit 
statistics for the three-factor model of team bonuses were   (39, N = 97) = 55.41, p < .001; 
NNFI = 0.95; NFI = 0.89; IFI = 0.96; CFI = 0.96; RMSEA = 0.07; and SRMR = 0.05; and the fit 
statistics for the three-factor model of organization based performance bonuses were   (40,  
N = 97) = 56.65, p < .001; NNFI = 0.95; NFI = 0.88; IFI = 0.96; CFI = 0.96; RMSEA = 0.07; 
and SRMR = 0.06. This suggests that the model of each PFP was a good fit for the three-factor 
model (see Table 15). People clearly differentiate the three dimensions of each PFP plan, team 
bonuses, and organization bonuses respectively when they are paid with these multiple PFP 
plans.  
8.3.1.5. The Combination of Individual-Based Performance Bonuses and Organization-
Based Performance Bonuses (N = 131) 
 When individuals are covered by individual bonuses and organization-based performance 
bonuses at a time, the fit statistics for the three-factor model of individual bonuses were   (40,  
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N = 131) = 66.63, p < .001; NNFI = 0.93; NFI = 0.89; IFI = 0.95; CFI = 0.95; RMSEA = 0.07; 
and SRMR = 0.05; and the fit statistics for the three-factor model of organization based 
performance bonuses were   (39, N = 131) = 75.73, p < .001; NNFI = 0.94; NFI = 0.91;  
IFI = 0.96; CFI = 0.96; RMSEA = 0.09; and SRMR = 0.05. This suggests that the model of each 
PFP was a good fit for the three-factor model (see Table 16).  
8.3.1.6. The Combination of Raises and Organization-Based Performance Bonuses (N = 
106) 
 When raises and organization-based performance bonuses are paid simultaneously, the fit 
statistics for the three-factor model of raises were   (46, N = 106) = 56.21, p < .001;  
NNFI = 0.98; NFI = 0.90; IFI = 0.98; CFI = 0.98; RMSEA = 0.05; and SRMR = 0.06; and the fit 
statistics for the three-factor model of organization based performance bonuses were   (39,  
N = 106) = 72.39, p < .001; NNFI = 0.94; NFI = 0.91; IFI = 0.96; CFI = 0.96; RMSEA = 0.09; 
and SRMR = 0.05. The fit indices support the superiority of the three-factor model (see Table 
17). This suggests that individuals clearly differentiate the three dimensions of each PFP when 
paid with these PFPs.  
8.3.1.7. The Combination of Raises, Individual-Based Performance Bonuses, and Team-
Based Performance Bonuses (N = 98) 
 When people are covered by raises, individual bonuses, and team bonuses at the same 
time, the fit statistics for the three-factor model of raises were   (45, N = 98) = 72.57, p < .001; 
NNFI = 0.94; NFI = 0.88; IFI = 0.95; CFI = 0.95; RMSEA = 0.08; and SRMR = 0.06; the fit 
statistics for the three-factor model of individual bonuses were   (41, N = 98) = 73.81, p < .001; 
NNFI = 0.90; NFI = 0.85; IFI = 0.93; CFI = 0.92; RMSEA = 0.09; and SRMR = 0.06; and the fit 
statistics for the three-factor model of team bonuses were   (41, N = 98) = 64.54, p < .001; 
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NNFI = 0.96; NFI = 0.92; IFI = 0.97; CFI = 0.97; RMSEA = 0.08; and SRMR = 0.05. The fit 
indices show that the three-factor model was superior to the one-factor and two-factor models 
(see Table 18). This suggests that individuals clearly differentiate the three dimensions of raises, 
individual bonuses, and team bonuses respectively, even when covered by at least three PFP plan 
simultaneously.    
8.3.2. Testing the Discriminant Validity of Specific Plan PFP Perception Measures: Within-
PFP Plan Comparisons  
To measure the dimensionality of the construct, I also tested discriminant validity that all 
three dimensions of the measure of PFP perceptions for a single PFP would be distinct from one 
another when other PFPs were considered simultaneously. The chi-square difference tests 
showed mixed results, depending on combinations of specific PFPs. The three dimensions of 
each PFP are distinct from one another in some combinations of multiple PFP plans; however, 
some factors in the hypothesized model in some combinations do not support discriminant 
validity. 
8.3.2.1. The Combination of Raises and Individual-Based Performance Bonuses (N = 234) 
In the combination of raises and individual bonuses, the chi-square difference test for 
individual bonuses was not significant between the three-factor hypothesized model and the two-
factor alternative model where the expectancy and valence items were combined into a single 
dimension (instrumentality, expectancy vs. valence dimensions). The chi-square difference tests, 
which compared the second alternative two-factor model (IE vs. V) and the hypothesized three-
factor model (I, E, V) for individual bonuses when employees were covered by the combination 
of raises and individual bonuses, was not also significant (   (2) = 3.29, p = 0.096) (see Table 
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19). This suggests that individuals did not clearly distinguish between instrumentality and 
expectancy when they received individual bonuses and team bonuses simultaneously.  
8.3.2.2. The Combination of Individual-Based Performance Bonuses and Team-Based 
Performance Bonuses (N=180) 
When subjects had the combination of individual bonuses and team bonuses, the chi-
square difference test for individual bonuses was not significant between the one-factor model 
and the first two-factor (I vs. EV) alternative model (   (1) = 2.59, p = 0.068). The chi-square 
difference test for individual bonuses was not also significant between the second two-factor 
alternative model (I, E vs. V) and the hypothesized three-factor model (   (2) = 4.29,  
p = 0.059). In the same combination of the individual bonuses and team bonuses, the chi-square 
difference test for team bonuses was not significant between the one-factor model and the first 
two-factor model (I vs. EV) (   (1) = 2.59, p = 0.068). In addition, the chi-square difference test 
for team bonuses was not significant between the second two-factor alternative model (IE vs. V) 
and the hypothesized three-factor model (   (2) = 4.29, p = 0.059) (See Table 20). 
8.3.2.3. The Combination of Individual-Based Performance Bonuses and Organization-
Based Performance Bonuses (N = 131) 
When subjects had combination of individual bonuses and organization bonuses (See 
Table 23), the chi-square difference test for individual bonuses was not significant between the 
one-factor model and the first two-factor (I vs. EV) alternative model (   (1) = 0.02, p = 0.89). 
8.3.2.4. The Combination of Raises, Individual-Based Performance Bonuses and Team-
Based Performance Bonuses (N = 98) 
When subjects possessed the combination of raises, individual bonuses, and team 
bonuses, the chi-square difference test for individual bonuses was not significant between the 
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one-factor model and the first two-factor (I, EV) alternative model (   (1) = 0.14, p = 0.99). 
With the same combination of PFP plans, the chi-square difference test for individual bonuses 
was not also significant between the first two-factor model (IE, V) and the three-factor model 
(   (2) = 0.44, p = 0.44) (See Table 25).  
The results of chi-square difference tests within PFPs suggest that instrumentality, 
expectancy, and valence perceptions within a specific PFP are most likely to be differentiated 
empirically in multiple PFP environments. However, the three dimensions of some PFPs, mostly 
individual bonuses, are not differentiable when in combination with some combinations of 
various PFPs. The results provide partial evidence of discriminant validity for the three 
dimensions for each PFP plan. Thus, Hypothesis 3 was partially supported, as the results of CFA 
and chi-square difference tests provide mixed evidence.  
8.3.3. Testing the Convergent Validity of Specific Plan PFP Perception Measures: Within-
PFP Plan Comparisons  
Hypothesis 4 predicted that the three dimensions of the measure of PFP perceptions for 
each of the PFP perception measures would be positively associated with one another. The 
results of the standardized factor loadings for the three-factor model of the seven combinations 
of multiple PFPs are presented in Tables 26-32 and support the hypothesis.  
8.3.3.1. The Combination of Raises and Individual-Based Performance Bonuses (N = 234) 
In the combination of raises and individual-based performance bonuses, for 
instrumentality of raises, there was a range from .73 to .88; for expectancy, there was a range 
from .65 to .78; for valence, there was a range from .55 to .77. For individual bonuses in the 
combination of raise and individual bonuses, for instrumentality, there was a range from .77 to 
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.84; for expectancy, there was a range from .65 to .77; for valence, there was a range from .71 to 
.81 (See Table 26).  
8.3.3.2. The Combination of Individual-Based Performance Bonuses and Team-Based 
Performance Bonuses (N=180) 
In the combination of individual bonuses and team bonuses, for instrumentality of 
individual bonuses, there was a range from .54 to .73; for expectancy, there was a range from .69 
to.79; for valence, there was a range from .66 to .76. For team bonuses in the combination of 
individual bonuses and team bonuses, for instrumentality, there was a range from .58 to .83; for 
expectancy, there was a range from .75 to .84; for valence, there was a range from .70 to .79 (See 
Table 27).  
8.3.3.3. The Combination of Raises and Team-Based Performance Bonuses (N = 128) 
In the combination of raises and team bonuses, for instrumentality of raises, there was a 
range from .73 to .84; for expectancy, there was a range from .66 to .87; for valence, there was a 
range from .68 to .75. For team bonuses in the combination of raise and team bonuses, for 
instrumentality, there was a range from .67 to .81; for expectancy, there was a range from .72 to 
.83; for valence, there was a range from .76 to .86 (See Table 28). 
8.3.3.4. The Combination of Team-Based Performance Bonuses and Organization-Based 
Performance Bonuses (N = 97) 
In the combination of team bonuses and organizational bonuses, for instrumentality of 
team bonuses, there was a range from .61 to .79; for expectancy, there was a range from .69 to 
.80; for valence, there was range from .62 to .77. For organizational bonuses in the combination 
of team bonuses and organizational bonuses, for instrumentality, there was a range from .64 to 
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.79; for expectancy, there was a range from .62 to .80; for valence, there was a range from .58 to 
.71 (See Table 29).  
8.3.3.5. The Combination of Individual-Based Performance Bonuses and Organization-
Based Performance Bonuses (N = 131) 
In the combination of individual bonuses and organizational bonuses, for instrumentality 
of individual bonuses, there was a range from .48 to .83; for expectancy, there was a range from 
.47 to .84; for valence, there was a range from .62 to .71. For organizational bonuses, for 
instrumentality, there was a range from .75 to .87; for expectancy, there was a range from .74 to 
.84; for valence, there was a range from .59 to .74 (See Table 30). 
8.3.3.6. The Combination of Raises and Organization-Based Performance Bonuses (N = 
106) 
In the combination of raises and organizational bonuses, for instrumentality of raises, 
there was a range from .75 to .85; for expectancy, there was a range from .68 to .76; for valence, 
there was a range from .52 to .76. For organizational bonuses in the combination of raise and 
organizational bonuses, for instrumentality, there was a range from .80 to .87; for expectancy, 
there was a range from .72 to .85; for valence, there was a range from .63 to .82 (See Table 31).  
8.3.3.7. The Combination of Raises, Individual-Based Performance Bonuses, and Team-
Based Performance Bonuses (N = 98) 
In the combination of raises, individual bonuses, and team bonuses, for instrumentality of 
raises, there was a range in correlations from .77 to .82; for expectancy, there was a range from 
.71 to .84; for valence, there was a range from .64 to .80. For individual bonuses in the same 
combination, for instrumentality, there was a range in the correlations from .68 to .71; for 
expectancy, there was a range from .71 to .75; for valence, there was a range from .66 to .73. For 
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team bonuses, for instrumentality, there was a range from .74 to .81; for expectancy, there was a 
range from .82 to .84; for valence, there was a range from .76 to .87 (See Table 32).  
The results show that all the standardized factor loadings of respective items exceed .40 
in the three-factor models for PFP perceptions of specific types of PFPs in the seven 
combinations of multiple PFPs. The results indicate that the three dimensions of each PFP in a 
situation where multiple PFPs are provided simultaneously are positively associated with one 
another (Spector, 1992). Thus, Hypothesis 4 was supported.  
8.4. Across-PFP Plan Comparisons 
 As another way to investigate how individuals perceive PFP plans when covered by 
various PFP plans, I examined comparisons of each dimension of the three dimensions of the 
PFP perceptions across multiple PFPs. For this set of comparisons, I examined if individuals 
distinguished between the sources of each key dimension (I, E, or V) when each PFP plan was 
compared with the other co-existing PFP plans. Second-order CFAs and paired t tests were used 
to assess the convergent validity and discriminant validity of the PFP perceptions measures in the 
seven combinations of types of PFP plans (Tables 33-54). All factor loadings were statistically 
significant (P < .001). 
8.4.1. Instrumentality 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that the level of instrumentality for individual-level PFP plans 
would be higher than the level of instrumentality for group-level PFP plans. The results are 
reported in Tables 34, 35, 37, 38 and 54.  
8.4.1.1. The Combination of Individual-Based Performance Bonuses and Team-Based 
Performance Bonuses (N = 180) 
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As shown in Table 34, in the combination of individual bonuses and team bonuses, the 
magnitude of the standardized factor loading of instrumentality for individual bonuses (average 
loading: 0.97) was larger than the magnitude of the standardized factor loadings for team 
bonuses (average loading: 0.30). Similarly, the result of the paired t tests shows that there was a 
significant difference in the level of instrumentality for individual bonuses and team bonuses 
(M=5.59, SD=1.09; M=5.34, SD=1.17, p<0.001, respectively) (See Table 54).  
8.4.1.2. The Combination of Raises and Team-Based Performance Bonuses (N = 128) 
When raises and team bonuses were given, the magnitude of the standardized factor 
loading of instrumentality for raises (average loading: 0.89) was larger than the magnitude of the 
standardized factor loadings for team bonuses (average loading: 0.70) (See Table 38). Also, the 
paired t tests show that there was greater instrumentality for raises than for team bonuses 
(M=5.51, SD=1.20; M=5.33, SD=1.25, p<0.05, respectively).  
8.4.1.3. The Combination of Individual-Based Performance Bonuses and Organization-
Based Performance Bonuses (N = 131) 
In the combination of individual bonuses and organization bonuses, the size of the 
standardized factor loading of instrumentality for individual bonuses (average loading: 0.85) was 
larger than the size of the standardized factor loadings for organization-based performance 
bonuses (average loading: 0.66) (See Table 40). The paired t tests show that there were 
significantly greater levels of instrumentality for individual bonuses than for organization 
bonuses (M=5.45, SD=1.23; M=5.12, SD=1.38, p<0.001).  
8.4.1.4. The Combination of Raises and Organization-Based Performance Bonuses (N = 
106) 
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When raises and organization bonuses were provided, the size of the standardized factor 
loading of instrumentality for raises (average loading: 0.91) was larger than the size of the 
standardized factor loadings for organization-based performance bonuses (average loading: 0.66) 
(See Table 41). Similarly, the paired t tests show that the level of instrumentality for raises was 
greater than the level for team bonuses (M=5.33, SD=1.28; M=5.07, SD=1.41, p<0.05, 
respectively).  
The results of CFAs and the paired t tests support Hypothesis 5. As predicted, the level of 
instrumentality for individual-level PFP plans, such as raises and individual bonuses was higher 
than the level of instrumentality for group-level PFP plans, such as team bonuses and 
organization bonuses. When they are provided both an individual-level PFP and a group-level 
PFP together, people tend to more strongly perceive the link between pay and performance 
(instrumentality). The findings show that the levels of instrumentality are different depending on 
the level of the performance metric (individual or group-level incentives). 
8.4.2. Expectancy 
Hypothesis 6 predicted that the level of expectancy for individual-level PFP plans would 
be higher than the level of expectancy for group-level PFP plans when people are provided both 
PFP rewards. Results are presented in Tables 41, 42, 44, 45, and 54.  
8.4.2.1. The Combination of Raises and Team-Based Performance Bonuses (N = 128) 
CFA results also showed that the size of the standardized factor loading of expectancy for 
raises (average loading: 0.75) was larger than the size of the standardized factor loadings for 
team-based performance bonuses (average loading: 0.65) when raises and team bonuses were 
given (See Table 42). The level of expectancy for raises was higher than the level of expectancy 
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for team bonuses (M=5.62, SD=1.07; M=5.46, SD=1.10, p<0.05, respectively) in paired 
comparisons.  
8.4.2.2. The Combination of Individual-Based Performance Bonuses and Organization-
Based Performance Bonuses (N = 131) 
In the combination of individual bonuses and organization bonuses, the size of the 
standardized factor loading of expectancy for individual bonuses (average loading: 0.87) was 
larger than the size of the standardized factor loadings for organization-based performance 
bonuses (average loading: 0.68) (See Table 44). The level of expectancy for individual bonuses 
was higher than the level of expectancy for organization bonuses (M=5.59, SD=0.98; M=5.25, 
SD=1.23, p<0.001, respectively) in paired comparisons.  
8.4.2.3. The Combination of Raises and Organization-Based Performance Bonuses (N = 
106) 
When raises and organization bonuses were provided, the size of the standardized factor 
loading of expectancy for raises (average loading: 0.99) was larger than the size of the 
standardized factor loadings for organization-based performance bonuses (average loading: 0.72) 
(See Table 45). The level of expectancy for raises was higher than the level of expectancy for 
organization bonuses (M=5.49, SD=1.11; M=5.25, SD=1.27, p<0.01, respectively) in paired 
comparisons.  
8.4.2.4. The Combination of Individual-Based Performance Bonuses and Team-Based 
Performance Bonuses (N = 180) 
Interestingly, the results of the paired t tests and the CFA testing for the level of 
expectancy in the combination of individual bonuses and team bonuses were not consistent. The 
level of expectancy for individual bonuses was higher than the level of expectancy for team 
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bonuses (M=5.59, SD=1.02; M=5.43, SD=1.08, p<0.05, respectively) in paired comparisons. 
However, the CFA result showed that the size of the standardized factor loading of expectancy 
for individual-based performance bonuses (average loading: 0.74) was smaller than the size of 
the standardized factor loadings for team-based performance bonuses (average loading: 0.76) 
when individual bonuses and team bonuses were provided (See Table 41).  
As predicted, people felt more strongly the link between their own efforts and their 
performance (expectancy) for individual-level PFP plans than for group-level PFP plans when 
they were given multiple PFPs, except when people were covered by both individual bonuses 
and team bonuses. Thus, the results mostly support Hypothesis 6.  
8.4.3. Valence 
Hypothesis 7 predicted that the level of valence for raises would be higher than the level 
of valence for team bonuses and organization bonuses. Results are presented in Tables 48, 49, 
51, 52, and 54.  
8.4.3.1. The Combination of Individual-Based Performance Bonuses and Team-Based 
Performance Bonuses (N = 180) 
CFA results show that the size of the standardized factor loading of valence for 
individual-based performance bonuses (average loading: 0.93) was larger than the size of the 
standardized factor loadings for team-based performance bonuses (average loading: 0.66) when 
individual bonuses and team bonuses were provided (See Table 48). Similarly, the result of the 
paired t tests shows that there was a significant difference in the level of valence for individual 
bonuses and team bonuses (M=5.67, SD=0.93; M=5.51, SD=1.06, p<0.01, respectively) (See 
Table 54). This indicates that the level of valence for individual bonuses was higher than the 
level of valence for team bonuses. 
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8.4.3.2. The Combination of Raises and Team-Based Performance Bonuses (N = 128) 
When raises and team bonuses were given, the size of the standardized factor loading of 
valence for raises (average loading: 0.95) was larger than the size of the standardized factor 
loadings for team-based performance bonuses (average loading: 0.57) (See Table 49). The result 
of the paired t tests shows that level of valence for raises was greater than the valence for team 
bonuses (M=5.78, SD=1.05; M=5.49, SD=1.13, p<0.001, respectively) (See Table 54).  
8.4.3.2. The Combination of Individual-Based Performance Bonuses and Organization-
Based Performance Bonuses (N = 131) 
In the combination of individual bonuses and organization bonuses, the size of the 
standardized factor loading of valence for individual bonuses (average loading: 0.91) was larger 
than the size of the standardized factor loadings for organization-based performance bonuses 
(average loading: 0.60) (See Table 51). Likewise, the result of the paired t tests shows that the 
level of valence for individual bonuses was greater than the level of valence for organization 
bonuses (M=5.63, SD=0.96; M=5.37, SD=1.15, p<0.001, respectively) (See Table 54).  
8.4.3.3. The Combination of Raises and Organization-Based Performance Bonuses (N = 
106) 
When raises and organization bonuses were provided, the size of the standardized factor 
loading of valence for raises (average loading: 0.99) was larger than the size of the standardized 
factor loadings for organization-based performance bonuses (average loading: 0.49) (See Table 
52). Similarly, the result of the paired t tests shows that there was a significant difference in the 
level of valence for raises and organization bonuses (M=5.69, SD=1.04; M=5.37, SD=1.20, 
p<0.001, respectively) (See Table 54). This result indicates that the level of valence for raises 
was higher than the level of valence for organization bonuses. 
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As predicted, the level of valence for individual-level PFP plans (raises and individual 
bonuses) was higher than the level of valence for group-level PFP plans (team bonuses and 
organization bonuses). Thus, these results support Hypothesis 7.  
8.5. Criterion-Related Validity 
8.5.1. Testing the Criterion-Related Validity of Overall PFP Perception Measures 
 Hypotheses 8 through 12 predicted that overall PFP perceptions would be positively 
related to various employee attitudes and behaviors. I first tested these hypotheses by examining 
the correlation between overall PFP perceptions and the various outcomes.  
 Hypothesis 8 predicted that individuals’ overall PFP perceptions would be positively 
related to pay satisfaction. This hypothesis was supported (see Table 5), with individuals’ PFP 
perceptions being significantly positively related to pay satisfaction (r = .68, p < .05). Hypothesis 
9 predicted that individuals’ overall PFP perceptions would be positively related to job 
satisfaction. The hypothesis was supported, with PFP perceptions being significantly positively 
associated with job satisfaction (r = .64, p < .05) (see Table 5).  
Hypothesis 10 predicted that overall PFP perceptions would be positively associated with 
affective organizational commitment, and it was supported. PFP perceptions were also 
significantly positively related to affective organizational commitment (r = .58, p < .05) (see 
Table 5). Hypothesis 11 predicted that overall PFP perceptions would be positively related to 
trust in supervisors and trust in top management. This hypothesis was supported, in that 
individual PFP perceptions were significantly positively related to trust in both supervisors  
(r = .50, p <.05) and top management (r = .47, p < .05) (see Table 5). Finally, Hypothesis 12 
predicted that individuals’ overall PFP perceptions would be negatively related to turnover 
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intentions. This hypothesis was supported: Individuals’ PFP perceptions were significantly 
negatively related to turnover intentions (r = - .37, p < .05) (see Table 5).  
Multiple regressions were also conducted to confirm the criterion-related validity (see 
Tables 55 and 56). As predicted, the overall PFP perceptions construct was significantly 
positively related to pay satisfaction, job satisfaction, affective organizational commitment, and 
trust in supervisor (see Table 55). Note that the results of multiple regression analyses showed 
that individuals’ PFP perceptions were not significantly positively related to trust in top 
management and were not significantly negatively related to turnover intentions when pay 
satisfaction was controlled for. The findings support full mediation of pay satisfaction in the 
relationship between PFP perceptions and trust in supervisor, between PFP perceptions and trust 
in top management, and between PFP perceptions and turnover intentions. As has been shown in 
previous research showed (Heneman & Schwab, 1979; Heneman et al., 1988; Williams et al., 
2006), the findings in this dissertation also suggest that PFP perceptions and pay satisfaction 
have a direct and strongly positive relationship, and PFP perceptions are a strong determinant of 
pay satisfaction. 
8.5.2. Testing the Criterion-Related Validity of Specific Plan PFP Perception Measures 
Hypotheses 13a through 13d predicted that PFP perceptions of specific types of PFPs 
(raises, individual bonuses, team bonuses, and organization bonuses) would be positively 
associated with their associated satisfaction. Multiple regressions were used to assess the 
criterion-related validity of PFP perceptions of specific types of PFPs. These results are reported 
in Table 56. All specific types of PFP perceptions constructs were significantly positively related 
to their associated satisfaction constructs (all at p < .001). Thus, Hypotheses 13a through 13d 
were supported.  
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CHAPTER VIIII 
DISCUSSION 
9.1. General Discussion   
Compensation plays a critical role in maintaining and enhancing the motivation of 
employees. Pay for performance (PFP) compensation systems have become one of the most 
effective human resources tools for motivating certain kinds of behaviors, including job 
performance (Gerhart et al., 2009). PFP plans increase an organization’s overall productivity by 
attracting and retaining more talented employees and by inducing employees to increase their 
efforts (Cadsby et al., 2007; Gerhart & Rynes, 2003; Gerhart et al., 2009; Jenkins et al., 1998; 
Lawler, 1971). Despite researchers’ emphasis on this, when the literature measures the 
effectiveness of PFP, a wide gap is revealed as separating theory from practice (Gerhart et al., 
2009; Rynes et al., 2005). There are a number of reasons for the gap. First, most compensation 
research has only considered a single PFP plan at a time; second, methodological means are used 
to approximate the link between pay and performance; third, research has only typically used a 
single-dimensional measure of PFP perceptions when actually trying to measure individuals’ 
reactions toward their PFP plans; and fourth, when the effectiveness of PFP plans is measured, 
the research has not explicitly considered how individuals feel and react to all of the forms of 
PFP that they receive. It is important not only for theory to develop and extend the correct 
measurement with a clear definition to better measure and explain the effects of PFPs on 
retention, sorting, and other various outcomes, it is also important for industries to find answers 
so as to be able to structure and apply compensation systems.  
The key concept of PFPs is to pay people to motivate them to higher performance, and 
currently, many organizations provide multiple PFPs. Given these two factors, it is critical to 
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understand how employees perceive PFP plans, particularly when they are paid in a multi-PFP 
plan environment. Correctly measuring the effectiveness of PFPs was the motivation behind this 
study’s efforts to define this construct, perform a construct validation test, and explore the 
conceptual dimensions of individual PFP perceptions. This dissertation provides an initial step 
toward developing and validating a multidimensional measure of individual PFP perceptions of 
multi-PFP plan environments. Its objective is to give insights into how people perceive PFP 
plans when in multi-PFP environments. Employee-attitude data drawn from different job types 
and organizations provide tests across multiple PFP environments and lead to substantiation of 
the convergent, discriminant, and criterion-related validity of the measurement model of the 
hypothesized three dimensional measure.    
Overall, the findings support the psychometric properties (reliability, validity, and 
nomological network) of the PFP perceptions measurement. The results show that people form 
complex conceptualizations of a PFP when in multiple PFP environments, as suggested by 
traditional and contemporary motivational theories. Quite clearly, people do not conceptualize 
PFP simply, one-dimensionally, or in relation to only one factor. The validation tests support the 
distinct perceptions of instrumentality, expectancy, and valence as being critical dimensions of 
the individuals’ PFP perceptions. The convergent and discriminant validity tests show three 
related but distinct PFP perception dimensions of overall PFPs. These were largely supported 
when comparisons were made within a single PFP plan and across multiple PFPs. In other 
words, the validity testing supports the uniqueness of the PPQ overall and within PFPs, and that 
more than one dimension of PFP perceptions should exist simultaneously when testing the 
effectiveness of PFPs across multiple PFPs. 
On the other hand, not all the predictions were supported. In particular, for some PFPs, 
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the hypothesized difference among the three dimensions of PFP perceptions were not supported. 
When employees were covered by multiple PFPs, people perceived the three dimensions of each 
received PFP a bit differently in some combinations of PFPs. As the results show, individuals 
who received simultaneously both raises (merit pay) and individual-based performance bonuses, 
which are both individual-level performance rewards, clearly perceived the three dimensions of 
raises. In contrast, for the individual bonuses plans, they did not distinctively distinguish between 
instrumentality and expectancy, although they did perceive the valence dimension of PFP 
perception for individual-based bonuses.  
Interestingly, employees who received individual-based performance bonuses and team-
based performance bonuses simultaneously perceived the valence dimensions of the PFP 
perceptions clearly, but did not distinguish between the other two dimensions–instrumentality 
and expectancy–for each PFP. The results showed that individuals did not recognize these two 
dimensions clearly when the model that has instrumentality and expectancy as one dimension 
and the other model that has instrumentality and expectancy as two separate dimensions were 
compared. 
People who received individual-based performance bonuses and organization-based 
performance bonuses did not clearly differentiate between the instrumentality and expectancy 
dimensions of individual-based performance bonuses even though they clearly recognized the 
valence dimension for each specific PFP.  
Finally, individuals who simultaneously received raises, individual-based bonuses, and 
team-based bonuses differentiated the valence dimensions of each PFP even though they did not 
distinctively differentiate either the instrumentality or expectancy dimensions of individual-
based performance bonuses. The results may suggest that, while people clearly differentiate the 
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three distinct but related dimensions for their PFP plans in general, there are limits to how much 
they recognize some dimensions. This seems most notable for the instrumentality and 
expectancy dimensions, when they are covered by multiple PFPs simultaneously. This suggests 
that the link between their own efforts and performance and the link between their achieved 
performance and each type of PFP plan can be confusing and unclear to employees. But, 
valence-the subjective attractiveness of a reward which is often based on the size of a reward-
clearly is distinguished by people. This is an intriguing finding, as previous research has argued 
that people tend to focus on the instrumentality of pay systems, paying little attention to the 
valence of pay outcomes under different pay systems (See Gerhart et al., 1995). Yet with the 
multiple pay forms, the findings show that people do perceive differences in the valence of pay 
outcomes.  
The findings from across PFPs comparisons show that the perceived link between pay 
and performance, between an individual’s own efforts and the required performance to attain 
rewards, and the subjective attractiveness of rewards differ depending on the level of the 
performance metric (individual or group level incentives). As predicted, people differentiate 
between types of PFP rewards, and react more to individual-level PFP rewards. The line of sight 
problem, raised by Lawler (1971) and echoed by Boswell and Boudreau (2001), was validated 
here. That is, when individuals are less able to see the link between their own efforts and the 
goals they must achieve, they perceive lower levels of instrumentality, expectancy and valence 
for the group-oriented PFP plans. In addition, the results show that people perceive each of the 
three dimensions differently when they are covered by multiple PFPs. Employees clearly 
differentiated the instrumentality, expectancy, and valence of the individual-based performance 
PFPs but did not differentiate between group-based performance PFPs. This suggests that 
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individuals may be more reactive to their individual incentives than group incentives due to their 
being unable to clearly see the links between their efforts, performance, and rewards for team-
based incentives. The findings from the across-PFPs comparisons show that individuals value 
rewards distinctively and differently among multiple PFPs.  
Finally, the results from the criterion-related validation testing show that individuals’ PFP 
perceptions are significantly associated with key attitudes and behaviors. This confirms that PFP 
perceptions play a significant role in critical employee relationships including pay satisfaction, 
job satisfaction, affective organizational commitment, trust in supervisor/top management, and 
turnover intentions. In addition, the results also find that PFP perceptions of specific types of 
PFPs are significantly and positively related to the associated satisfaction. The results support the 
nomological network of the PFP perceptions measurement.       
9.2. Theoretical Implications 
Motivational theories were used as a basis for the dimensional structure of the 
measurement. Those theories have strongly supported the underlying mechanisms of PFP plans 
regarding the extent to which financial rewards can motivate employees to higher performance 
and the desirable behaviors that organizations expect. Situations have become, for both 
organizations and employees, more multifaceted due to organizations providing more complex 
compensation system environments and employees being covered by multiple PFP plans. Future 
compensation research needs to consider more carefully the effectiveness of PFPs. Indeed, each 
PFP has a different form and set of characteristics, and all of the different combinations of 
multiple PFPs that organizations provide will have relative effects on various important 
outcomes. Of course, employees have to face more complex decision-making and motivation 
processes. Theoretically, this should be a very different set of dynamics to explore than what has 
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been the focus of previous research. In multi-PFP environments, the same single PFP plan 
(namely, PFPs with the same name, like merit pay or bonuses) will work differently than what 
prior work has found to work in a single PFP condition. As suggested by temporal motivational 
theory, there are many other factors that compensation literature ought to consider.     
This dissertation takes the initiative to consider various important aspects that people may 
perceive when involved in multiple PFPs. When looking at the construct of PFP perceptions, it is 
very easy to be confused between the measurement of work motivation and PFP perceptions. 
Both work motivation and PFP perceptions are based on motivational theories, and are thus 
highly related. For example, the classical motivation model that Lawler (1971) developed, based 
on expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964), is composed of three essential perceptions: (1) the effort-
to-performance expectancy (E P), (2) the combination of the performance-to-outcomes 
expectancy (PO) and valence (V), and (3) instrumentality (I). With the three dimensions, the 
model explains how pay influences human behavior. The most regularly used measurement of 
PFP perceptions (Perry & Pearce, 1983) included the same motivational perceptions (the three 
components of expectancy theory) to measure PFP perceptions (even though subsequent research 
only adapted a single dimension from it). In a similar vein, Fong and Shaffer (2003) used the 
three dimensions focused on in this study as predictors of pay satisfaction when they tested how 
group incentive plans affected employee pay satisfaction. They adapted the same measurement 
of PFP perceptions (Heneman et al., 1988: adopted and modified from Perry & Pearce, 1983; 
Perry & Pearce, 1983) that other compensation studies had used, but they created two sub-
scales–instrumentality perceptions and expectancy perceptions–which are also interchangeably 
used in other studies (e.g., Ilgen et al., 1981) when “work motivation” is measured. In this 
dissertation, the sub-dimensions of the construct of PFP perceptions – instrumentality, 
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expectancy, and valence perceptions–are used to focus on PFP perceptions. As such, the three 
dimensions that I developed for PFP perceptions are interrelated and influence one another to 
shape individuals’ subjective perceptions of PFP plans. In other words, employees may form the 
belief that their efforts will lead to good performance once they find out the financial rewards 
they are to receive. Then employees may form the belief that their good performance will lead to 
the attainment of PFP rewards. Also, the perceived link between pay and performance and the 
attractiveness of financial rewards may form subjective PFP perceptions.  
As the primary concept of PFP is derived from motivational theories, and in particular, 
from expectancy theory, it is very reasonable that those motivational perceptions are being used 
to measure individual perceptions of PFP plans. This dissertation is based on both traditional and 
contemporary motivational theories that have already established a theoretical framework for 
understanding an overall PFP system and its important role in employee motivation. The 
dissertation contributes over this prior work, however, to embrace the theoretical and practical 
complexities found in current PFP environments by developing a measure of PFP perceptions.  
This dissertation theoretically contributes to the compensation literature by showing 
results that differ from what previous research has argued. First, this study identified three 
factors that people clearly differentiate between when they perceive their PFPs, even when they 
are covered by multiple PFPs. Prior research has considered only one factor–the relationship 
between pay and performance–when measuring the effectiveness of PFP plans. Not only has this 
been an oversimplification of how people perceive a simple PFP plan, it also fails to represent 
aspects of instrumentality, expectancy, and valence that most employees are experiencing 
because they have such perceptions from other PFP plans that were not being considered.  
Second, this dissertation recognizes the importance of measuring individuals’ perceptions 
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toward multiple PFPs by identifying the complexity of pay environments that current 
organizations face. It expands on prior compensation theory in order to consider the implications 
of multiple pay plans being implemented simultaneously. While some previous studies examined 
the effect of multiple PFPs, they did not explicitly assess individual perceptions of the PFP plans. 
This study does indeed explore how people perceive PFPs when in a multiple PFP environment. 
In particular, this dissertation provides a closer look at various PFPs in seven combinations. The 
results support previous PFP research that has found that different PFP plans have different 
forms and characteristics. This tells us that future research should consider a more sophisticated 
theory and approach to multiple PFP environments when testing the effectiveness of PFPs. This 
dissertation also provides some explanation for the mixed results that previous research has put 
forward. Depending on the combination of different multiple PFPs, some PFP plans can be 
effective or ineffective.  
Third, this dissertation provides a thorough definition of PFP perceptions that can be 
applied to various types of PFPs. This study also provides a validated measure that corresponds 
to current theories and compensation systems. The findings will thus lead to advances in the 
current understanding of the effectiveness of PFP plans under complex compensation systems 
and to an exploration of various important relationships related to PFPs that have not yet been 
investigated.  
Fourth, prior work has suggested that, “generally speaking, pay systems differ most in 
their impact on instrumentality…valence of pay outcomes should remain the same under 
different pay systems” (Gerhart et al., 1995, p.531). However, this study shows that individual 
PFP perceptions of multiple PFPs had the strongest impact on valence perceptions among the 
three dimensions. The findings show that people do pay attention to the subjective attractiveness 
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of PFPs under different pay systems, clearly distinguishes valence both within and across PFP 
plans, and express different levels of valence for different PFP plans.    
9.3. Practical Implications 
Employee compensation is the largest single cost for many organizations, and PFP plans 
in organizations continue to grow and spread. Recent compensation surveys show that 
approximately 90 percent of companies plan to continue offering performance-based awards to 
their employees in the coming year (Miller, 2012; Worldatwork salary budget survey, 2013). 
Furthermore, it is very common today for organizations to provide their employees with more 
than one type of PFP. As many organizations are focusing more on PFP plans, implementing a 
single or multiple PFP plan(s) is not a differentiator among organizations. 
So far, many organizations have focused only on measuring the costs of PFP plans (e.g., 
Nyberg, 2010). If organizations fail to measure how their PFP plans are perceived by employees, 
companies may fall into the trap of not measuring the true returns on money spent for PFP plans. 
Thus, it is a significant endeavor for practitioners to explore research on measuring how 
employees truly value their multiple PFP plans within an organization.  
This dissertation suggests several important implications for practice. First, the findings 
show that employees do differentiate their feelings and reactions among their multiple PFPs. 
With knowledge of this finding, organizations may make more informed decisions about how 
much and how many differentiated PFP plans they provide to employees when considering the 
design of their compensations systems. Companies should avoid bombarding employees with 
multiple rewards without considering their employees’ reactions to the PFP plans.    
Second, the results of this dissertation raise interesting questions about the use of 
individual-based performance bonuses. The findings show that people were less able to clearly 
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recognize between instrumentality (the link between pay and performance) and expectancy (the 
alignment between their own efforts and their performance), especially for individual-based 
performance bonuses, when they were in some combinations of multiple PFP plans. Companies 
may prefer to pay individual-based performance incentives due to the suggested incentive effects 
(e.g., Nyberg et al., in press) or their unique characteristics (e.g., Park & Sturman, 2013). The 
results of this dissertation, however, show that individual-based performance bonuses may get 
scant attention if they are provided along with other PFP plans. This suggests that such bonuses 
require a stronger link between PFPs and individuals’ belief that their efforts lead to greater 
achievements, compared to other types of PFP plans.  
9.4. Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 Like all research, this study is not without limitations. First, data from a single resource 
(Mturk) limits the generalizability of the findings. The data provided excellent evidence by 
measuring a variety of simultaneous and multiple combinations of PFP environments among 
different organizations. Yet, this paper was not able to address the dynamics of individual 
perceptions of certain PFP plans under the same organization context. Given that the main goal 
of PFP is to enhance individual performance, it is critical for both researchers and practitioners to 
examine how the individual perceptions of their pay plans affect their future performance 
(incentive effects) and/or voluntary turnover (sorting effects) within an organization.  
Second, from a theoretical and methodological perspective, this study is also limited by 
the cross-sectional data to develop and validate the measurement of the PFP perceptions. One of 
the most important components in temporal motivational theory is time. People change their 
attitudinal perceptions and behaviors over time, which affects decision-making and motivation in 
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complex and uncertain environments. This study was unable to test cause-effect inferences, 
namely the relationship between pay and performance through individual perceptions.  
Future research should address the limitations inherent in this dissertation of the PFP 
perceptions in complex pay system environments. First, future research should address the 
generalizability of the measurement of PFP perceptions in more diverse samples and 
organizational settings across countries. Given different characteristics of individuals, jobs, 
organization types, and cultures, conceptual factors may make people react differently to their 
PFPs. For example, future research should examine the effects of risk-aversion for individuals in 
PFP perceptions (Cadsby et al., 2007; Eisenhardt, 1989). People who are risk averse with respect 
to pay and people with low risk aversion may react differently (Cable & Judge, 1994; Deckop, 
Merriman & Blau, 2004). Second, future research should examine a more comprehensive 
nomological network of PFP effectiveness by exploring more in-depth relationships between 
PFP perceptions and various key employee attitudinal variables. Prior HR and OB research has 
repeatedly suggested that compensation systems play significant roles in employment 
relationships, including shaping individual attitudes, behavior, and organizational cultures and 
values. With the new valid measure of PFP perceptions (PPQ), future research should further 
explore a broader set of consequences of multiple PFP plans and the nomological network of 
PFP with other key HR practices and OB outcomes. 
9.5. Conclusion 
  This dissertation has developed and validated a theoretically-based multi-dimensional 
measure of individual PFP perceptions that is applicable in complex pay system environments. 
Using online survey data, this study confirmed the three dimensions associated with pay for 
performance plans, and it assessed individual feelings and reactions to individuals’ multiple PFP 
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plans. In environments of complex PFP plans, employees generally distinguish between aspects 
of PFP plans and across PFP plan types. The separate effects of the elements of PFP plans 
suggest a need to recognize the complexity of pay environments in order to better understand HR 
practices in organizations. These findings contribute to the compensation literature and provide 
practical implications for current organizations regarding the effectiveness of PFP plans. The 
findings may also provide a sophisticated story in terms of how the effects of PFP should be 
measured correctly for precise theory testing. The newly developed and validated measurement 
should be useful for studying modern compensation systems.   
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Table 3. Item Development of Pay-For-Performance Perceptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dimensions Items 
 
 
 
 
Instrumentality 
perceptions 
 
1. I believe that my company pays for performance.  
2. If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get 
financial rewards. 
3. The best workers in my organization get financially rewarded.  
4. High performers and low performers certainly get different 
financial rewards in my organization.  
5. I can see a clear link between my performance and financial 
rewards provided by my organization.   
6. I believe that current financial rewards plans in my 
organization are achievable. 
 
 
 
Expectancy 
perceptions 
 
1. I believe I can successfully improve my performance when I 
make more effort.  
2. In the past, I was able to achieve the performance goals set by 
my organization/my supervisor.  
3. I believe that I can do the work that is required to achieve 
financial rewards in my organization.  
 
 
 
Valence perceptions 
 
1. I believe financial rewards motivate me to reach the 
performance goals set by my organization/my supervisor. 
2. I am motivated by financial rewards. 
3. Financial rewards are very important to me. 
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Table 4. Items by Different Types of PFP Plans 
Types of PFP plans Items 
 
 
 
 
 
Raises (Merit pay 
plans) 
 
 
 
 
Instrumentality perceptions 
R1.  If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get 
a pay raise. 
R2.  The best workers in my organization get the highest pay 
raises. 
R3.  High performers and low performers certainly get 
different pay raises in my organization. 
R4.  I can see a clear link between my performance and pay 
raises provided by my organization.  
 
Expectancy perceptions 
R5.  I believe I can get a pay raises when I make more effort. 
R6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
determine my pay raise are achievable. 
R7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to achieve 
a pay raises in my organization.   
 
Valence perceptions 
R8.  I value pay raises to motivate me to improve my job 
performance. 
R9.  I believe pay raises motivate me to reach the performance 
goals set by my organization/my supervisor. 
R10.   Getting pay raises is important for me to be motivated. 
R11.  I value pay raises. 
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Individual-based 
performance bonuses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instrumentality perceptions 
B1.  If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get 
individual-based performance bonuses. 
B2.  The best workers in my organization get the 
highest individual-based performance bonuses. 
B3.  High performers and low performers certainly get 
different individual-based performance bonuses in my 
organization. 
B4.  I can see a clear link between my performance and individual-
based performance bonuses provided by my organization. 
 
Expectancy perceptions 
B5.  I believe I can get individual-based performance bonuses 
when I make more effort. 
B6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
determine my individual-based performance bonuses are 
achievable. 
B7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to achieve 
individual-based performance bonuses in my organization. 
 
Valence perceptions 
B8.  I value individual-based performance bonuses to motivate me 
to improve my job performance. 
B9.  I believe individual-based performance bonuses motivate me 
to reach the performance goals set by my organization/my 
supervisor. 
B10.   Getting individual-based performance bonuses is important 
for me to be motivated. 
B11.  I value individual-based performance bonuses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Team performance-
 
Instrumentality perceptions 
TB1. If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get     
team-performance based bonuses 
TB2.     The best workers in my organization get the highest team-
performance based bonuses. 
TB3.     High performers and low performers certainly get 
different team-performance based bonuses in my organization. 
TB4.     I can see a clear link between my performance and team-
performance based bonuses provided by my organization. 
 
Expectancy perceptions 
TB5.  I believe I can get team-performance based bonuses when I 
make more effort. 
TB6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
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based bonuses 
 
 
 
determine my team-performance based bonuses are achievable. 
TB7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to achieve 
team-performance based bonuses in my organization. 
 
Valence perceptions 
TB8.  I value team-performance based bonuses to motivate me to 
improve my job performance. 
TB9.  I believe team-performance based bonuses motivate me to 
reach the performance goals set by my organization/my supervisor. 
TB10.   Getting team-performance based bonuses is important for 
me to be motivated. 
TB11.  I value team-performance based bonuses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Divisional 
performance-based 
bonuses 
 
 
 
 
Instrumentality perceptions 
DB1.  If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get 
divisional-performance based bonuses 
DB2.   The best workers in my organization get the 
highest divisional-performance based bonuses. 
DB3.   High performers and low performers certainly get 
different divisional-performance based bonuses in my 
organization. 
DB4.   I can see a clear link between my performance 
and divisional-performance based bonuses provided by my 
organization. 
 
Expectancy perceptions 
DB5.  I believe I can get divisional-performance based bonuses 
when I make more effort. 
DB6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
determine my divisional -performance based bonuses are 
achievable. 
DB7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to achieve 
divisional-performance based bonuses in my organization. 
 
Valence perceptions 
DB8.  I value divisional-performance based bonuses to motivate 
me to improve my job performance. 
DB9.  I believe divisional-performance based bonuses motivate me 
to reach the performance goals set by my organization/my 
supervisor. 
DB10.   Getting divisional-performance based bonuses is important 
for me to be motivated. 
DB11.  I value divisional-performance based bonuses. 
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Organizational 
performance-based 
bonuses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Instrumentality perceptions 
OB1.      If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get 
organizational-performance based bonuses. 
OB2.     The best workers in my organization get the 
highest organizational-performance based bonuses. 
OB3.     High performers and low performers certainly get 
different organizational-performance based bonuses in my 
organization. 
OB4.     I can see a clear link between my performance 
and organizational-performance based bonuses provided by my 
organization. 
 
Expectancy perceptions 
OB5.  I believe I can get organizational-performance based 
bonuses when I make more effort. 
OB6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
determine my organizational-performance based bonuses are 
achievable. 
OB7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to achieve 
organizational-performance based bonuses in my organization. 
 
Valence perceptions 
OB8.  I value organizational-performance based bonuses to 
motivate me to improve my job performance. 
OB9.  I believe organizational-performance based bonuses 
motivate me to reach the performance goals set by my 
organization/my supervisor. 
OB10.   Getting organizational-performance based bonuses is 
important for me to be motivated. 
OB11.  I value organizational-performance based bonuses. 
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29
1. IP 5.11 1.14 1
2. EP 5.39 0.88 .71** 1
3. VP 5.41 0.96 .62** .69** 1
4. PFP Perceptions (3 dimensions) 5.3 0.88 .89** .89** .86** 1
5. R: IP 5.23 1.23 .83** .61** .58** .79** 1
6. R: EP 5.45 0.98 .71** .73** .62** .78** .73** 1
7. R: VP 5.68 0.87 .44** .61** .72** .66** .49** .63** 1
8. BI: IP 5.39 1.07 .79** .59** .61** .76** .80** .69** .48** 1
9. BI: EP 5.47 0.89 .61** .65** .63** .71** .60** .74** .57** .74** 1
10. BI: VP 5.62 0.86 .42** .57** .70** .63** .36** .45** .76** .58** .64** 1
11. BT: IP 5.28 0.95 .67** .50** .48** .63** .72** .63** .42** .66** .53** .42** 1
12. BT: EP 5.38 0.94 .64** .64** .59** .71** .52** .61** .43** .68** .61** .52** .69** 1
13. BT: VP 5.44 0.92 .55** .51** .61** .63** .39** .46** .53** .48** .46** .58** .69** .75** 1
14. BD: IP 5.2 1.08 .42** .34* .33* .42** .45* .38* .30* .59** .47** .27* .83** .69** .75** 1
15. BD: EP 5.29 1.03 .33* .28* .34* .36* .42* .33* .34* .56** .55** .34* .71** .72** .69** .87** 1
16. BD: VP 5.17 1.05 .35* .25* .32* .35* .35* .30* .33* .53** .55** .42* .81** .63** .82** .86** .87** 1
17. BO: IP 5.09 1.2 .61** .41** .40** .57** .60** .55** .40** .69** .41** .30* .61** .42** .37* .89** .83** .81** 1
18. BO: EP 5.27 1.03 .46** .53** .41** .54** .46** .54** .40** .50** .54** .22* .47** .48** .27* .80** .82** .80** .67** 1
19. BO: VP 5.36 0.87 .35** .35** .44** .45** .28* .27* .47** .39** .26* .45** .3* .29* .54** .85** .81** .87** .71** .64** 1
20. Pay satisfaction 4.94 1.12 .73** .58** .46** .68** .69** .61** .29** .61** .51** .29** .67** .54** .51** .44** .38* .41* .5** .48** .23* 1
21. Job satisfaction 5.42 1.07 .59** .59** .52** .64** .53** .55** .38** .57** .61** .46** .47** .56** .43** .42** .42** .38* .45** .44** .29** .60** 1
22. Affective Org. Commitment 5.02 1.14 .6** .48** .44** .58** .53** .44** .29** .57** .44** .33** .48** .5** .46** .43** .46** .46** .5** .46** .37** .62** .69** 1
23. Trust (Supervisor) 5.08 0.97 .48** .46** .38** .50** .44** .42** .31** .45** .41** .31** .34** .38** .32** .42** .37* .33* .39** .38** .25* .51** .59** .58** 1
24. Trust (Top management) 4.87 1.05 .48** .39** .36** .47** .45** .39** .28** .46** .36** .28** .39** .41** .40** .49** .51** .52** .43** .42** .35** .51** .54** .61** .6** 1
25. Turnover Intension 3.82 1.80 -.35** -.32** -.31** -.37** -.39** -.38** -.27** -.34** -.38** -.27** -.17* -.20* -.11 -.08 -.12 -.14 -.23* -.34** -.19* -.42** -.43** -.34** -.22** -.2** 1
26. Dyadic tenure 2.43 2.65 -.04 .03 -.05 -.02 -.04 -.09 -.07 -.10* -.10* -.05 -.09 -.10 -.05 .14 .07 .06 -.07 -.03 .12 -.04 .01 -.03 .13* .03 -.02 1
27. Job tenure 2.91 2.82 .01 .06 .04 .04 -.004 -.002 -.02 -.06 -.05 -.03 -.11 -.06 .03 -.03 -.04 -.08 -.08 -.10 .03 .01 .03 .02 .11* .04 -.07 .65** 1
28. Org. tenure 4.54 4.33 -.01 .08 .04 .04 .002 .003 .05 .004 .004 .07 .02 .01 .07 .12 .10 .10 -.02 .03 .05 -.01 .08 .08 .12* .01 -.16** .60** .68** 1
29. Age - - -.12* .04 .05 -.02 -.13* -.05 .02 -.16* -.07 .04 -.13* -.08 .03 .07 .09 0.06 -.19* -.06 .04 -.15* -.05 -.11* -.02 -.09* -.06 .42** .47** .59** 1
Notes: N =562; * p < .05; ** p < .01; IP: Instrumentality Perception; EP: Expectancy Perception; VP: Valence Perception; R: Raises; 
BI: Individual-based performance Bonuses; BT: Team Bonuses; BD: Divisional based Bonuses; BO: Organizational based Bonuses. 
Age was a categorical variable; 1: 20 or less; 2: 20-24; 3: 25-29; 4: 30-39; 5:40-49; 6: 50-59; 7: 60 and above.
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Table 6. Types of PFP Plans Participants Received. (A) 
 
Merit Pay 
(Raises) 
 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
Individual-Based 
Performance 
Bonuses 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Team 
Performance-
Based Bonuses 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
Divisional 
Performance-
Based Bonuses 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
Organizational 
Performance-
Based Bonuses 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
Stock Options 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
Stock Grants 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
Total 
 
37 69 21 13 75 43 35 23 21 21 17 12 12 11 10 10 8 8 6 6 5 5 5 
  N=562 
  X= Yes. O= No. 
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Merit Pay (Raises) 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
Individual-Based 
Performance 
Bonuses 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
Team 
Performance-
Based Bonuses 
 
X  
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
 O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
Divisional 
Performance-
Based Bonuses 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
Organizational 
Performance-
Based Bonuses 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
Stock Options 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
Stock Grants 
 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
Total 
 
4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
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Merit Pay 
(Raises) 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
Individual-Based 
Performance 
Bonuses 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
Team 
Performance-
Based Bonuses 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
Divisional 
Performance-
Based Bonuses 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
Organizational 
Performance-
Based Bonuses 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
Stock Options 
 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
Stock Grants 
 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
O 
 
X 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
O 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Total 
 
2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Table 7. Types of PFP Plans Participants Received. (B) 
 
Merit Pay 
(Raises) 
 
 
X 
       
X 
  
X 
   
X 
 
X 
     
X 
 
X 
 
X 
   
X 
 
X 
  
X 
Individual-
Based 
Performance 
Bonuses 
 
 
 
X 
      
X 
 
X 
 
 
  
X 
  
X 
    
X 
 
 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
  
X 
Team 
Performance-
Based 
Bonuses 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
      
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
  
X 
 
X 
  
X 
 
 
    
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Divisional 
Performance-
Based 
Bonuses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
        
 
   
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
 
  
X 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Organizational 
Performance-
Based 
Bonuses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
      
X 
 
X 
 
X 
   
X 
 
X 
 
 
     
X 
  
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
Stock Options 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
            
X 
 
X 
  
X 
     
X 
 
X 
 
Stock Grants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
X 
 
                    
X 
Total 
 
324 418 245 86 180 81 25 234 180 128 97 131 106 98 48 42 28 60 59 53 44 
 
36 27 25 21 9 6 
N=562 
X= Yes. Blank: Not Counted. 
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Table 8. Reliability 
Construct Cronbach's alpha Construct Cronbach's alpha 
Instrumentality perception 0.90 
Divisional Bonus 
Instrumentality perception 
0.86 
Expectancy perception  0.74 
Divisional Bonus 
Expectancy perception 
0.82 
Valence perception  0.74 
Divisional Bonus 
Valence Perception 
0.87 
Raises 
Instrumentality perception 
0.89 
Org. Bonus 
Instrumentality Perception 
0.88 
Raises 
Expectancy perception 
0.75 
Org. Bonus 
Expectancy Perception 
0.79 
Raises 
Valence perception 
0.77 
Org. Bonus 
Valence Perception 
0.74 
Individual bonuses 
Instrumentality perception 
0.83 Turnover Intention 0.94 
Individual bonuses 
Expectancy perception 
0.74 Global Job Satisfaction  0.80 
Individual bonuses 
Valence perception 
0.82 Trust (Top management) 0.76 
Team Bonus 
Instrumentality perception 
0.80 Trust (Supervisor) 0.77 
Team Bonus 
Expectancy perception 
0.81 Affective Org. Commitment 0.79 
Team Bonus 
Valence perception 
0.85 Pay Satisfaction 0.96 
Raise Satisfaction 0.89 Team Bonus Satisfaction 0.87 
Individual Bonus Satisfaction 0.88 Organization Bonus Satisfaction 0.90 
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Table 9. Fit Statistics of Hypothesized and Alternative Models of PFP Perceptions (Overall) 
 
Model 2 df NNFI NFI IFI CFI RMSEA SRMR 
1-factor model 465.57 54 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.87 0.12 0.08 
2-factor model         
(I, EV) 
193.13 
 
53 
 
0.94 
 
0.94 
 
0.95 
 
0.95 
 
0.07 
 
0.05 
(IE, V) 318.13 53 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.09 0.07 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
110.82 48 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.05 0.03 
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Table 10. Discriminant Validity Evidence for Overall PFP Perceptions: Chi-Square Difference Test 
 
 1-factor model 2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
3-factor model 
     (I, E, V) 
1-factor model  272.44*** (1) 147.44*** (1) 354.75***(6) 
2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
   82.31***(5) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
    207.31***(5) 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
    
     *** p < .001 
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Table 11. CFA Standardized Factor Loadings of Overall PFP Perceptions 
 
 
Items 
CFA Factor Loadings 
Instrumentality 
perception 
Expectancy 
perception 
Valence 
perception 
If I perform especially well on my present job, I 
will get financial rewards. 
0.79 
 
  
The best workers in my organization get 
financially rewarded. 
0.82 
 
  
High performers and low performers certainly get 
different financial rewards in my organization. 
0.67 
 
  
I can see a clear link between my performance 
and financial rewards provided by my 
organization.   
0.79 
 
  
I believe that current financial rewards plans in 
my organization are achievable. 
0.75 
 
  
I believe that my company pays for performance. 0.82 
 
  
I believe I can successfully improve my 
performance when I make more effort. 
 
0.59 
 
 
In the past, I was able to achieve the performance 
goals set by my organization/my supervisor. 
 
0.46 
 
 
 I believe that I can do the work that is required to 
achieve financial rewards in my organization. 
 
0.73 
 
 
I believe financial rewards motivate me to reach 
the performance goals set by my organization/my 
supervisor. 
  
0.84 
 
I am motivated by financial rewards.   0.61 
Financial rewards are very important to me.   0.53 
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Table 12. Fit Statistics of Hypothesized and Alternative Models of PFP perceptions (Within-PFP plan) (R & BI, N=234) 
 
Model 2 df NNFI NFI IFI CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Dimensions for Merit Pay (Raises) Perceptions 
1-factor model 313.39 51 0.78 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.15 0.10 
2-factor model         
(I, EV) 228.33 50 0.85 0.83 0.86 0.86 0.12 0.08 
(IE, V) 194.23 50 0.88 0.86 0.89 0.89 0.11 0.08 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
119.53 46 0.93 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.08 0.06 
Dimensions for Individual-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model 286.43 42 0.78 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.16 0.09 
2-factor model         
(I, EV) 247.06 41 0.81 0.83 0.86 0.86 0.15 0.09 
(IE, V) 97.11 41 0.95 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.08 0.05 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
93.82 39 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.08 0.048 
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Table 13. Fit Statistics of Hypothesized and Alternative Models of PFP Perceptions (Within-PFP plan) (BI & BT, N=180) 
Model 2 df NNFI NFI IFI CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Dimensions for Individual-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model 158.65 44 0.84 0.83 0.87 0.87 0.12 0.07 
2-factor model         
(I, EV) 156.06 43 0.84 0.83 0.87 0.87 0.12 0.07 
(IE, V) 107.75 43 0.91 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.09 0.05 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
103.46 41 0.91 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.09 0.05 
Dimensions for Team-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model 145.98 44 0.88 0.87 0.90 0.90 0.11 0.06 
2-factor model         
(I, EV) 114.28 43 0.91 0.90 0.93 0.93 0.10 0.05 
(IE, V) 103.01 43 0.93 0.91 0.94 0.94 0.09 0.05 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
82.86 41 0.95 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.08 0.04 
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Table 14. Fit Statistics of Hypothesized and Alternative Models of PFP Perceptions (within-PFP plan) (R & BT, N=128) 
Model 2 df NNFI NFI IFI CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Dimensions for Merit Pay (Raises) Perceptions 
1-factor model 160.74 48 0.82 0.79 0.84 0.84 0.14 0.09 
2-factor model         
(I, EV) 138.04 47 0.85 0.82 0.87 0.87 0.12 0.08 
(IE, V) 98.69 47 0.92 0.87 0.93 0.93 0.09 0.07 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
84.71 45 0.93 0.89 0.95 0.94 0.08 0.07 
Dimensions for Team-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model 135.96 44 0.87 0.86 0.90 0.90 0.13 0.06 
2-factor model         
(I, EV) 96.22 43 0.92 0.90 0.94 0.94 0.10 0.06 
(IE, V) 82.76        43 0.94 0.91 0.96 0.96 0.09 0.05 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
55.59 41 0.98 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.05 0.04 
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Table 15. Fit Statistics of Hypothesized and Alternative Models of PFP Perceptions (Within-PFP plan) (BT & BO, N=97) 
Model 2 df NNFI NFI IFI CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Dimensions for Team-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model    108.71 42 0.80 0.78 0.85 0.85 0.13 0.08 
2-factor model         
(I, EV) 92.34 41 0.84 0.81 0.89 0.88 0.11 0.07 
(IE, V) 76.07 41 0.89 0.85 0.92 0.92 0.09 0.06 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
55.41 39 0.95 0.89 0.96 0.96 0.07 0.05 
Dimensions for Organization-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model 80.17 43 0.89 0.84 0.92 0.91 0.09 0.07 
2-factor model         
(I, EV) 71.12 42 0.91 0.85 0.93 0.93 0.08 0.07 
(IE, V) 62.16        42 0.94 0.87 0.95 0.95 0.07 0.06 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
56.65 40 0.95 0.88      0.96 0.96 0.07 0.06 
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Table 16. Fit Statistics of Hypothesized and Alternative Models of PFP Perceptions (Within-PFP plan) (BI & BO, N=131) 
Model 2 df NNFI NFI IFI CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Dimensions for Individual-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model    113.89 43        0.83 0.80 0.87 0.87 0.11 0.08 
2-factor model         
(I, EV) 113.87 42 0.82 0.80 0.87 0.86 0.11 0.08 
(IE, V) 71.68 42 0.93 0.88 0.95 0.94 0.07 0.06 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
66.63 40 0.93 0.89 0.95 0.95 0.07 0.05 
Dimensions for Organization-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model 132.76 42 0.86 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.13 0.07 
2-factor model         
(I, EV) 100.64 41 0.90 0.89 0.93 0.93 0.11 0.06 
(IE, V) 128.54        41 0.86 0.85 0.90 0.89 0.13 0.07 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
75.73 39 0.94 0.91      0.96     0.96 0.09 0.05 
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Table 17. Fit Statistics of Hypothesized and Alternative Models of PFP Perceptions (Within-PFP plan) (R & BO, N=106) 
Model 2 df NNFI NFI IFI CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Dimensions for Merit Pay (Raises) Perceptions 
1-factor model    113.22 49      0.86  0.80 0.88 0.88 0.11 0.09 
2-factor model         
(I, EV) 78.19 48 0.93 0.86 0.94 0.94 0.08 0.08 
(IE, V) 76.43 48      0.94 0.87 0.95 0.95 0.08 0.07 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
56.21 46 0.98 0.90 0.98 0.98 0.05 0.06 
Dimensions for Organization-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model 127.46 42 0.86 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.14 0.06 
2-factor model         
(I, EV) 102.65 41 0.89 0.88 0.92 0.92 0.12 0.06 
(IE, V) 85.01       41       0.92 0.90 0.94 0.94 0.10 0.05 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
72.39 39 0.94 0.91       0.96 0.96 0.09 0.05 
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Table 18. Fit Statistics of Hypothesized and Alternative Models of PFP Perceptions (Within-PFP Plan) (R & BI & BT, N=98) 
Model 2 df NNFI NFI IFI CFI RMSEA SRMR 
Dimensions for Merit Pay (Raises) Perceptions 
1-factor model    139.84 48       0.81 0.77 0.83 0.83 0.14 0.10 
2-factor model         
(I, EV) 133.08 47 0.82 0.78 0.84 0.84 0.14 0.09 
(IE, V) 85.72 47      0.92 0.86 0.93 0.93 0.09 0.07 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
72.57 45 0.94 0.88 0.95 0.95 0.08 0.06 
Dimensions for Individual-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model 138.27 44 0.73 0.71 0.79 0.78 0.15 0.11 
2-factor model         
(I, EV) 138.13 43 0.72 0.71 0.78 0.78 0.15 0.11 
(IE, V) 74.25        43       0.91 0.85 0.93 0.93 0.09 0.06 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
73.81 41 0.90 0.85      0.93 0.92 0.09 0.06 
Dimensions for Team-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model 151.31 44 0.81 0.80 0.85 0.85 0.16 0.08 
2-factor model         
(I, EV) 123.61 43 0.86 0.84 0.89 0.89 0.14 0.07 
(IE, V) 78.85        43      0.94 0.90 0.95 0.95 0.09 0.05 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
64.54 41 0.96 0.92      0.97 0.97 0.08 0.05 
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Table 19. Discriminant Validity Evidence for Raises and Individual Bonuses: Chi-square Difference Test (Within-PFP plan) 
 
 
 1-factor model 2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
3-factor model 
     (I, E, V) 
Dimensions for Merit Pay (Raises) Perceptions 
1-factor model  85.06*** (1) 119.16*** (1) 193.86*** (5) 
2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
   108.8***(4) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
    74.7***(4) 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
    
Dimensions for Individual-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model 
 39.37***(1) 
 
189.32***(1) 192.61***(3) 
2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
   153.24***(2) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
    3.29(2) 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
    
     *** p < .001 
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Table 20. Discriminant Validity Evidence for Individual Bonuses and Team Bonuses: Chi-square Difference Test  
(Within-PFP plan) 
 
 
  1-factor model 2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
3-factor model 
    (I, E, V) 
Individual-Based Performance Bonuses 
1-factor model  2.59(1) 50.9***(1) 55.19***(3) 
2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
   52.6***(3) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
    4.29(2) 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
    
Team-Based Performance Bonuses 
1-factor model  2.59(1) 50.9***(1) 55.19***(3) 
2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
   52.6***(3) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
    4.29(2) 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
    
  *** p < .001 
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Table 21. Discriminant Validity Evidence for Raises and Team Bonuses: Chi-square Difference Test (Within-PFP plan) 
 
 
  1-factor model 2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
Dimensions for Merit Pay (Raises) Perceptions 
1-factor model  22.7***(1) 62.05***(1) 76.03***(3) 
2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
   53.33***(2) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
    13.98***(2) 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
    
Dimensions for Team-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model  39.74***(1) 53.2***(1) 80.37***(3) 
2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
   40.63***(2) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
    27.17***(2) 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
    
      ***p<.001 
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Table 22. Discriminant Validity Evidence for Team Bonuses and Organization Bonuses: Chi-square Difference Test  
(Within-PFP plan) 
 
 
 1-factor model 2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
3-factor model 
   (I, E, V) 
Dimensions for Team-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model  16.37***(1) 32.64***(1) 53.3***(3) 
2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
   36.93***(2) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
    20.66***(2) 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
    
Dimensions for Organization-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model  9.05**(1) 18.01***(1) 23.52***(3) 
2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
   14.47***(2) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
    5.51*(2) 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
    
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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Table 23. Discriminant Validity Evidence for Individual Bonuses and Organization Bonuses: Chi-square Difference Test 
(Within-PFP plan) 
 
 
 1-factor model 2-factor model 
      (I, EV) 
2-factor model 
      (IE, V) 
3-factor model 
    (I, E, V) 
Dimensions for Individual-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model  0.02 (1) 42.21***(1) 47.26***(3) 
2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
   47.24***(2) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
    5.05*(2) 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
    
Dimensions for Organization-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model  32.12***(1) 32.12***(1) 57.03***(3) 
2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
   24.91***(3) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
    52.81***(3) 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
    
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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Table 24. Discriminant Validity Evidence for Raises, Organization Bonuses: Chi-square Difference Test (Within-PFP plan) 
 
  
 1-factor model 2-factor model 
       (I, EV) 
2-factor model 
      (IE, V) 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
Dimensions for Merit Pay (Raises) Perceptions 
1-factor model  35.03*** (1) 36.79***(1) 57.01***(3) 
2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
   21.98***(2) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
    20.22***(2) 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
    
Dimensions for Organization-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model  24.81***(1) 42.45***(1) 55.07***(3) 
2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
   30.26***(2)  
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
    12.62***(2) 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
    
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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Table 25. Discriminant Validity Evidence for Raises, Individual Bonuses, and Team Bonuses: Chi-square Difference Test 
(Within-PFP plan) 
 
 
Merit Pay 1-factor model 2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
3-factor model 
     (I, E, V) 
Dimensions for Merit Pay (Raises) Perceptions 
1-factor model  6.76**(1) 54.12***(1) 67.27***(3) 
2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
   60.51***(2) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
    13.15***(2) 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
    
Dimensions for Individual-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model  0.14(1) 64.02***(1) 64.46***(3) 
2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
   64.32***(2) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
    0.44(2) 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
    
Dimensions for Team-Based Performance Bonuses Perceptions 
1-factor model  27.7***(1) 72.46***(1) 86.77***(3) 
2-factor model 
(I, EV) 
   59.07***(2) 
2-factor model 
(IE, V) 
    14.31***(2) 
3-factor model 
(I, E, V) 
    
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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Table 26. Standardized Loadings for the Hypothesized Measurement Model for Raises and 
Individual-Based Performance Bonuses 
Items 
PFP plans 
Raises 
(Merit 
pay) 
Bonus 
(Individual) 
Instrumentality Perceptions 
R1. If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get a pay 
raise. 
0.77  
R2. The best workers in my organization get the highest pay raises. 0.87  
R3. High performers and low performers certainly get different pay 
raises in my organization. 
0.73  
R4. I can see a clear link between my performance and pay 
raises provided by my organization.  
0.88  
B1.  If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get 
individual-based performance bonuses. 
 0.84 
B2.  The best workers in my organization get the highest individual-
based performance bonuses. 
 0.82 
B3.  High performers and low performers certainly get 
different individual-based performance bonuses in my organization. 
 0.77 
B4.  I can see a clear link between my performance and individual-
based performance bonuses provided by my organization. 
 0.77 
Expectancy Perceptions 
R5.  I believe I can get a pay raises when I make more effort. 0.65  
R6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
determine my pay raise are achievable. 
0.71  
R7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to achieve a pay 
raises in my organization.   
0.78  
B5.  I believe I can get individual-based performance bonuses when I 
make more effort. 
 0.74 
B6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
determine my individual-based performance bonuses are achievable. 
 0.77 
B7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to achieve 
individual-based performance bonuses in my organization.   
 0.65 
Valence Perceptions 
R8.  I value pay raises to motivate me to improve my job 
performance. 
0.77  
R9.  I believe pay raises motivate me to reach the performance goals 
set by my organization/my supervisor. 
0.69  
R10.   Getting pay raises is important for me to be motivated. 0.69  
R11.  I value pay raises. 0.55  
B8.  I value individual-based performance bonuses to motivate me to 
improve my job performance. 
 0.71 
B9.  I believe individual-based performance bonuses motivate me to 
reach the performance goals set by my organization/my supervisor. 
 0.77 
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B11.  I value individual-based performance bonuses.  0.81 
B10.   Getting individual-based performance bonuses is important 
for me to be motivated. 
 0.79 
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Table 27. Standardized Loadings for the Hypothesized Measurement Model for Individual-
Based Performance Bonuses and Team-Based Performance Bonuses 
 
Items 
PFP plans 
Bonus 
(Individual) 
Bonus 
(Team) 
Instrumentality Perceptions 
B1.  If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get 
individual-based performance bonuses. 
0.71  
B2.  The best workers in my organization get the 
highest individual-based performance bonuses. 
0.71  
B3.  High performers and low performers certainly get 
different individual-based performance bonuses in my 
organization. 
0.54  
B4.  I can see a clear link between my performance 
and individual-based performance bonuses provided by my 
organization. 
0.73  
TB1. If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get 
team-performance based bonuses. 
 0.83 
TB2. The best workers in my organization get the highest team-
performance based bonuses. 
 0.58 
TB3. High performers and low performers certainly get 
different team-performance based bonuses in my organization. 
 0.72 
TB4. I can see a clear link between my performance and team-
performance based bonuses provided by my organization.  
 0.73 
Expectancy Perceptions 
B5.  I believe I can get individual-based performance bonuses 
when I make more effort. 
0.69  
B6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
determine my individual-based performance bonuses are 
achievable. 
0.79  
B7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to achieve 
individual-based performance bonuses in my organization.   
0.77  
TB5.  I believe I can get team-performance based bonuses when I 
make more effort. 
 0.78 
TB6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
determine my team-performance based bonuses are achievable. 
 0.84 
TB7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to achieve 
team-performance based bonuses in my organization.   
 0.75 
Valence Perceptions 
B8.  I value individual-based performance bonuses to motivate me 
to improve my job performance. 
0.69  
B9.  I believe individual-based performance bonuses motivate me 
to reach the performance goals set by my organization/my 
supervisor. 
0.66  
B10.   Getting individual-based performance bonuses is important 0.76  
  
137 
 
for me to be motivated. 
B11.  I value individual-based performance bonuses. 0.67  
TB8.  I value team-performance based bonuses to motivate me to 
improve my job performance. 
 0.78 
TB9.  I believe team-performance based bonuses motivate me to 
reach the performance goals set by my organization/my 
supervisor. 
 0.79 
TB10.   Getting team-performance based bonuses is important for 
me to be motivated. 
 0.70 
TB11.  I value team-performance based bonuses.  0.78 
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Table 28. Standardized Loadings for the Hypothesized Measurement Model for Raises and 
Team-Based Performance Bonuses 
 
Items 
PFP plans 
Raises 
(Merit pay) 
Bonus 
(Team) 
Instrumentality Perceptions 
R1. If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get a pay 
raise. 
0.78  
R2. The best workers in my organization get the highest pay raises. 0.82  
R3. High performers and low performers certainly get different pay 
raises in my organization. 
0.73  
R4. I can see a clear link between my performance and pay 
raises provided by my organization.  
0.84  
TB1. If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get     
team-performance based bonuses. 
 0.80 
TB2. The best workers in my organization get the highest team-
performance based bonuses. 
 0.67 
TB3. High performers and low performers certainly get 
different team-performance based bonuses in my organization. 
 0.81 
TB4. I can see a clear link between my performance and team-
performance based bonuses provided by my organization.  
 0.79 
Expectancy Perceptions 
R5.  I believe I can get a pay raises when I make more effort. 0.66  
R6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
determine my pay raise are achievable. 
0.75  
R7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to achieve 
a pay raises in my organization.   
0.87  
TB5.  I believe I can get team-performance based bonuses when I 
make more effort. 
 0.78 
TB6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
determine my team-performance based bonuses are achievable. 
 0.83 
TB7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to achieve 
team-performance based bonuses in my organization.   
 0.72 
Valence Perceptions 
R8.  I value pay raises to motivate me to improve my job 
performance. 
0.73  
R9.  I believe pay raises motivate me to reach the performance 
goals set by my organization/my supervisor. 
0.71  
R10.   Getting pay raises is important for me to be motivated. 0.68  
R11.  I value pay raises. 0.75  
TB8.  I value team-performance based bonuses to motivate me to 
improve my job performance. 
 0.84 
TB9.  I believe team-performance based bonuses motivate me to 
reach the performance goals set by my organization/my supervisor. 
 0.81 
TB10.   Getting team-performance based bonuses is important for  0.76 
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me to be motivated. 
TB11.  I value team-performance based bonuses.  0.86 
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Table 29. Standardized Loadings for the Hypothesized Measurement Model for Team-
Based Performance Bonuses and Organization-Based Performance Bonuses 
 
 
Items 
PFP plans 
Bonus 
(Team) 
Bonus 
(Org.) 
Instrumentality Perceptions 
TB1. If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get     
team-performance based bonuses. 
0.79  
TB2. The best workers in my organization get the highest team-
performance based bonuses. 
0.61  
TB3. High performers and low performers certainly get 
different team-performance based bonuses in my organization. 
0.65  
TB4. I can see a clear link between my performance and team-
performance based bonuses provided by my organization.  
0.76  
OB1. If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get 
organizational-performance based bonuses. 
 0.79 
OB2. The best workers in my organization get the 
highest organizational-performance based bonuses. 
 0.64 
OB3. High performers and low performers certainly get 
different organizational-performance based bonuses in my 
organization. 
 0.74 
OB4. I can see a clear link between my performance 
and organizational-performance based bonuses provided by my 
organization.  
 0.77 
Expectancy Perceptions 
TB5.  I believe I can get team-performance based bonuses when I 
make more effort. 
0.80  
TB6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
determine my team-performance based bonuses are achievable. 
0.77  
TB7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to achieve 
team-performance based bonuses in my organization.   
0.69  
OB5.  I believe I can get organizational-performance based 
bonuses when I make more effort. 
 0.62 
OB6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
determine my organizational-performance based bonuses are 
achievable. 
 0.74 
OB7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to achieve 
organizational-performance based bonuses in my organization.   
 0.80 
Valence Perceptions 
TB8.  I value team-performance based bonuses to motivate me to 
improve my job performance. 
0.77  
TB9.  I believe team-performance based bonuses motivate me to 
reach the performance goals set by my organization/my supervisor. 
0.65  
TB10.   Getting team-performance based bonuses is important for 
me to be motivated. 
0.62  
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TB11.  I value team-performance based bonuses. 0.69  
OB8.  I value organizational-performance based bonuses to 
motivate me to improve my job performance. 
 0.70 
OB9.  I believe organizational-performance based bonuses 
motivate me to reach the performance goals set by my 
organization/my supervisor. 
 0.58 
OB10.   Getting organizational-performance based bonuses is 
important for me to be motivated. 
 0.71 
OB11.  I value organizational-performance based bonuses.  0.64 
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Table 30. Standardized Loadings for the Hypothesized Measurement Model for Individual-
Based Performance Bonuses and Organizational-Based Performance Bonuses 
 
 
Items 
PFP plans 
Bonus 
(Individual) 
Bonus 
(Org.) 
Instrumentality 
B1.  If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get 
individual-based performance bonuses. 
0.63  
B2.  The best workers in my organization get the 
highest individual-based performance bonuses. 
0.82  
B3.  High performers and low performers certainly get 
different individual-based performance bonuses in my 
organization. 
0.48  
B4.  I can see a clear link between my performance and individual-
based performance bonuses provided by my organization. 
0.83  
OB1. If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get 
organizational-performance based bonuses. 
 0.87 
OB2. The best workers in my organization get the 
highest organizational-performance based bonuses. 
 0.75 
OB3. High performers and low performers certainly get 
different organizational-performance based bonuses in my 
organization. 
 0.82 
OB4. I can see a clear link between my performance 
and organizational-performance based bonuses provided by my 
organization.  
 0.80 
Expectancy 
B5.  I believe I can get individual-based performance bonuses 
when I make more effort. 
0.47  
B6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
determine my individual-based performance bonuses are 
achievable. 
0.71  
B7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to achieve 
individual-based performance bonuses in my organization.   
0.84  
OB5.  I believe I can get organizational-performance based 
bonuses when I make more effort. 
 0.84 
OB6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
determine my organizational-performance based bonuses are 
achievable. 
 0.83 
OB7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to achieve 
organizational-performance based bonuses in my organization.   
 0.74 
Valence 
B8.  I value individual-based performance bonuses to motivate me 
to improve my job performance. 
0.62  
B9.  I believe individual-based performance bonuses motivate me 
to reach the performance goals set by my organization/my 
0.67  
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supervisor. 
B10.   Getting individual-based performance bonuses is important 
for me to be motivated. 
0.62  
B11.  I value individual-based performance bonuses. 0.71  
OB8.  I value organizational-performance based bonuses to 
motivate me to improve my job performance. 
 0.69 
OB9.  I believe organizational-performance based bonuses 
motivate me to reach the performance goals set by my 
organization/my supervisor. 
 0.64 
OB10.   Getting organizational-performance based bonuses is 
important for me to be motivated. 
 0.74 
OB11.  I value organizational-performance based bonuses.  0.59 
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Table 31. Standardized Loadings for the Hypothesized Measurement Model for Raises and 
Organizational-Based Performance Bonuses 
 
Items 
PFP plans 
Raises 
(Merit pay) 
Bonus 
(Org.) 
Instrumentality Perceptions 
R1. If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get a pay 
raise. 
0.76  
R2. The best workers in my organization get the highest pay raises. 0.82  
R3. High performers and low performers certainly get different pay 
raises in my organization. 
0.75  
R4. I can see a clear link between my performance and pay 
raises provided by my organization.  
0.85  
OB1. If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get 
organizational-performance based bonuses. 
 0.87 
OB2. The best workers in my organization get the 
highest organizational-performance based bonuses. 
 0.80 
OB3. High performers and low performers certainly get 
different organizational-performance based bonuses in my 
organization. 
 0.85 
OB4. I can see a clear link between my performance 
and organizational-performance based bonuses provided by my 
organization.  
 0.86 
Expectancy Perceptions 
R5.  I believe I can get a pay raises when I make more effort. 0.68  
R6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
determine my pay raise are achievable. 
0.70  
R7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to achieve 
a pay raises in my organization.   
0.76  
OB5.  I believe I can get organizational-performance based bonuses 
when I make more effort. 
 0.85 
OB6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
determine my organizational-performance based bonuses are 
achievable. 
 0.72 
OB7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to achieve 
organizational-performance based bonuses in my organization.   
 0.79 
Valence Perceptions 
R8.  I value pay raises to motivate me to improve my job 
performance. 
0.69  
R9.  I believe pay raises motivate me to reach the performance 
goals set by my organization/my supervisor. 
0.76  
R10.   Getting pay raises is important for me to be motivated. 0.64  
R11.  I value pay raises. 0.52  
OB8.  I value organizational-performance based bonuses to 
motivate me to improve my job performance. 
 0.70 
OB9.  I believe organizational-performance based bonuses  0.72 
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motivate me to reach the performance goals set by my 
organization/my supervisor. 
OB10.   Getting organizational-performance based bonuses is 
important for me to be motivated. 
 0.82 
OB11.  I value organizational-performance based bonuses.  0.63 
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Table 32. Standardized Loadings for the Hypothesized Measurement Model for Raises, 
Individual-Based Performance Bonuses and Team-Based Performance Bonuses 
 
 
Items 
 
PFP plans 
Raises 
(Merit 
pay) 
Bonus 
(Individual) 
Bonus 
(Team) 
Instrumentality Perceptions 
R1. If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get 
a pay raise. 
0.81   
R2. The best workers in my organization get the highest pay 
raises. 
0.81   
R3. High performers and low performers certainly get 
differe pay raises in my organization. 
0.77   
R4. I can see a clear link between my performance and pay 
raises provided by my organization.  
0.82   
B1.  If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get 
individual-based performance bonuses. 
 0.68  
B2.  The best workers in my organization get the 
highest individual-based performance bonuses. 
 0.68  
B3.  High performers and low performers certainly get 
different individual-based performance bonuses in my 
organization. 
 0.70  
B4.  I can see a clear link between my performance 
and individual-based performance bonuses provided by my 
organization. 
 0.71  
TB1. If I perform especially well on my present job, I will get     
team-performance based bonuses. 
  0.80 
TB2. The best workers in my organization get the 
highest team-performance based bonuses. 
  0.74 
TB3. High performers and low performers certainly get 
different team-performance based bonuses in my 
organization. 
  0.81 
TB4. I can see a clear link between my performance 
and team-performance based bonuses provided by my 
organization.  
  0.76 
Expectancy Perceptions 
R5.  I believe I can get a pay raises when I make more effort. 0.71   
R6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
determine my pay raise are achievable. 
0.74   
R7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to 
achieve a pay raises in my organization.   
0.84   
B5.  I believe I can get individual-based performance bonuses 
when I make more effort. 
 0.75  
B6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
determine my individual-based performance bonuses are 
 0.71  
  
147 
 
achievable. 
B7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to 
achieve individual-based performance bonuses in my 
organization.   
 0.74  
TB5.  I believe I can get team-performance based bonuses 
when I make more effort. 
  0.82 
TB6.  I believe that the performance measures used to 
determine my team-performance based bonuses are 
achievable. 
  0.84 
TB7.  I believe that I can do the work that is required to 
achieve team-performance based bonuses in my 
organization.   
  0.82 
Valence Perceptions 
R8.  I value pay raises to motivate me to improve my job 
performance. 
0.75   
R9.  I believe pay raises motivate me to reach the 
performance goals set by my organization/my supervisor. 
0.64   
R10.   Getting pay raises is important for me to be motivated. 0.70   
R11.  I value pay raises. 0.80   
B8.  I value individual-based performance bonuses to 
motivate me to improve my job performance. 
 0.66  
B9.  I believe individual-based performance bonuses motivate 
me to reach the performance goals set by my organization/my 
supervisor. 
 0.71  
B10.   Getting individual-based performance bonuses is 
important for me to be motivated. 
 0.73  
B11.  I value individual-based performance bonuses.  0.66  
TB8.  I value team-performance based bonuses to motivate 
me to improve my job performance. 
  0.83 
TB9.  I believe team-performance based bonuses motivate me 
to reach the performance goals set by my organization/my 
supervisor. 
  0.87 
TB10.   Getting team-performance based bonuses is important 
for me to be motivated. 
  0.76 
TB11.  I value team-performance based bonuses.   0.87 
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Table 33. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Instrumentality 
Dimension of Raises and Individual Bonuses: Across-PFP Plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 34. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Instrumentality 
Dimension of Individual Bonuses and Team Bonuses: Across-PFP plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.87*** 
OI 
R 
IR2 
IR3 
IR4 
I2 
I3 
I4 
I5 
0.93*** 
0.89*** 
0.77*** 
0.73*** 
0.88*** 
BI 
IBI1 
IBI2 
IBI3 
0.84*** 
0.82*** 
0.77*** 
0.85*** 
0.69*** 
0.71*** 
0.72*** 
0.06*** 
I6 
I1 
0.78*** 
0.86*** 
IR1 
IBI4 
0.77*** 
OI 
BI 
IBI2 
IBI3 
IBI4 
I2 
I3 
I4 
I5 
0.97*** 
0.73*** 
0.71*** 
0.54*** 
0.73*** 
BT 
IBT1 
IBT2 
IBT3 
0.83*** 
0.58*** 
0.72*** 
0.70*** 
0.68*** 
0.69*** 
0.71*** 
0.11*** 
I6 
I1 
0.68*** 
0.79*** 
IBI1 
IBT4 
0.73*** 
0.71*** 
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Table 35. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Instrumentality 
Dimension of Raises and Team Bonuses: Across-PFP Plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 36. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Instrumentality 
Dimension of Organizational Bonuses and Team Bonuses: Across-PFP Plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OI 
R 
IR2 
IR3 
IR4 
I2 
I3 
I4 
I5 
0.89*** 
0.70*** 
0.76*** 
0.72*** 
0.84*** 
BT 
IBT1 
IBT2 
IBT3 
0.76*** 
0.71*** 
0.84*** 
0.82*** 
0.74*** 
0.74*** 
0.73*** 
0.22*** 
I6 
I1 
0.80*** 
0.85*** 
IR1 
IBT4 
0.73*** 
0.83*** 
OI 
BO 
IBO2 
IBO3 
IBO4 
I2 
I3 
I4 
I5 
0.71*** 
0.80*** 
0.81*** 
0.74*** 
0.77*** 
BT 
IBT1 
IBT2 
IBT3 
0.81*** 
0.57*** 
0.60*** 
0.82*** 
0.62*** 
0.63*** 
0.71*** 
0.20*** 
I6 
I1 
0.55*** 
0.82*** 
IBO1 
IBT4 
0.77*** 
0.54*** 
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Table 37. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Instrumentality 
Dimension of Individual Bonuses and Organizational Bonuses: Across-PFP Plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 38. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Instrumentality 
Dimension of Raise and Organizational Bonuses: Across-PFP Plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OI 
BI 
IBI2 
IBI3 
IBI4 
I2 
I3 
I4 
I5 
0.85*** 
0.66*** 
0.58*** 
0.47*** 
0.81*** 
BO 
IBO1 
IBO2 
IBO3 
0.89*** 
0.73*** 
0.83*** 
0.87*** 
0.46*** 
0.78*** 
0.75*** 
0.27*** 
I6 
I1 
0.67*** 
0.84*** 
IBI1 
IBO4 
0.81*** 
0.86*** 
OI 
R 
IR2 
IR3 
IR4 
I2 
I3 
I4 
I5 
0.91*** 
0.66*** 
0.69*** 
0.79*** 
0.81*** 
BO 
IBO1 
IBO2 
IBO3 
0.86*** 
0.72*** 
0.86*** 
0.79*** 
0.77*** 
0.77*** 
0.57*** 
0.07*** 
I6 
I1 
0.69*** 
0.82*** 
IR1 
IBO4 
0.89*** 
0.82*** 
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Table 39. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Instrumentality Dimension of Raises, Individual 
Bonuses, and Team Bonuses: Across-PFP Plans 
 
0.79*** 
OI 
R 
IR2 
IR3 
IR4 
I2 
I3 
I4 
I5 
0.88*** 
0.99*** 
0.81*** 
0.78*** 
0.82*** 
BI 
IBI1 
IBI2 
IBI3 
0.61*** 
0.63*** 
0.72*** 
0.78*** 
0.75*** 
0.62*** 
0.74*** 
0.10*** 
I6 
I1 
0.73*** 
0.82*** 
IR1 
IBI4 
0.66*** 
BT 
IBT1 
IBT2 
IBT3 
0.78*** 
0.81*** 
0.81*** 
IBT4 
0.72*** 
0.63*** 
0.23*** 
0.21*** 
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Table 40. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Expectancy 
Dimension of Raises and Individual Bonuses: Across-PFP Plans 
 
 
 
Table 41. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Expectancy 
Dimension of Individual Bonuses and Team Bonuses: Across-PFP Plans 
 
 
 
 
OE 
R 
ER1 
ER2 
ER3 E2 
E3 
E4 
0.94*** 
0.85*** 
0.71*** 
0.78*** 
BI 
EBI1 
EBI2 
0.74*** 
0.77*** 
0.48*** 
0.71*** 
0.62*** 
0.12*** 
E1 0.65*** 
EBI3 
0.65*** 
0.65*** 
OE 
BI 
EBI1 
EBI2 
EBI3 E2 
E3 
E4 
0.74*** 
0.76*** 
0.79*** 
0.77*** 
BT 
EBT1 
EBT2 
0.78*** 
0.84*** 
0.51*** 
0.67*** 
0.68*** 
0.19*** 
E1 0.74*** 
EBT3 
0.75*** 
0.69*** 
  
153 
 
Table 42. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Expectancy 
Dimension of Raise and Team Bonuses: Across-PFP plans 
 
 
 
Table 43. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Expectancy 
Dimension of Organizational Bonuses and Team Bonuses: Across-PFP plans 
 
 
 
 
OE 
R 
ER1 
ER2 
ER3 E2 
E3 
E4 
0.75*** 
0.65*** 
0.77*** 
0.88*** 
BT 
EBT1 
EBT2 
0.80*** 
0.81*** 
0.59*** 
0.66*** 
0.55*** 
0.29*** 
E1 0.74*** 
EBT3 
0.78*** 
0.61*** 
OE 
BO 
EBO1 
EBO2 
EBO3 E2 
E3 
E4 
0.79*** 
0.77*** 
0.76*** 
0.78*** 
BT 
EBT1 
EBT2 
0.82*** 
0.76*** 
0.52*** 
0.63*** 
0.63*** 
-0.04*** 
E1 0.70*** 
EBT3 
0.67*** 
0.55*** 
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Table 44. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Expectancy 
Dimension of Individual Bonuses and Organizational Bonuses: Across-PFP Plans 
 
 
Table 45. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Expectancy 
Dimension of Raises and Organizational Bonuses: Across-PFP Plans 
 
 
 
 
OE 
BI 
EBI1 
EBI2 
EBI3 E2 
E3 
E4 
0.87*** 
0.68*** 
0.73*** 
0.81*** 
BO 
EBO1 
EBO2 
0.80*** 
0.84*** 
0.50*** 
0.57*** 
0.56*** 
0.08*** 
E1 0.78*** 
EBO3 
0.75*** 
0.49*** 
OE 
R 
ER1 
ER2 
ER3 E2 
E3 
E4 
0.99*** 
0.72*** 
0.69*** 
0.82*** 
BO 
EBO1 
EBO2 
0.82*** 
0.73*** 
0.33*** 
0.78*** 
0.65*** 
-0.05*** 
E1 0.55*** 
EBO3 
0.82*** 
0.63*** 
  
155 
 
Table 46. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Expectancy Dimension of Raises, Individual 
Bonuses, and Team Bonuses: Across-PFP Plans 
 
 
 
OE 
R 
ER1 
ER2 
ER3 
E2 
E3 
E4 
E5 
0.70*** 
0.69*** 
0.70*** 
0.74*** 
0.85*** 
BI 
EBI1 
EBI2 
EBI3 
0.75*** 
0.72*** 
0.72*** 
0.80*** 
0.53*** 
0.70*** 
0.56*** 
0.46*** 
BT 
EBT1 
EBT2 
EBT3 
0.79*** 
0.79*** 
0.87*** 
0.62*** 
0.22*** 
0.34** 
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Table 47. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Valence 
Dimension of Raises and Individual Bonuses: Across-PFP Plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 48. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Valence 
Dimension of Individual Bonuses and Team Bonuses: Across-PFP Plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OV 
R 
VR2 
VR3 
VR4 
V2 
V3 
V4 
V5 
0.97*** 
0.85*** 
0.77*** 
0.69*** 
0.55*** 
BI 
VBI1 
VBI2 
VBI3 
0.71*** 
0.77*** 
0.81*** 
0.58*** 
0.76*** 
0.64*** 
0.62*** 
0.11*** 
VR1 
VBI4 
0.79*** 
0.69*** 
0.76*** 
OV 
BI 
VBI2 
VBI3 
VBI4 
V2 
V3 
V4 
V5 
0.93*** 
0.66*** 
0.69*** 
0.66*** 
0.67*** 
BT 
VBT1 
VBT2 
VBT3 
0.78*** 
0.79*** 
0.70*** 
0.56*** 
0.84*** 
0.70*** 
0.66*** 
0.09*** 
VBI1 
VBT4 
0.78*** 
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Table 49. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Valence 
Dimension of Raises and Team Bonuses: Across-PFP Plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 50. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Valence 
Dimension of Organizational Bonuses and Team Bonuses: Across-PFP Plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OV 
R 
VR2 
VR3 
VR4 
V2 
V3 
V4 
V5 
0.95*** 
0.57*** 
0.62*** 
0.65*** 
0.71*** 
BT 
VBT1 
VBT2 
VBT3 
0.85*** 
0.84*** 
0.78*** 
0.43*** 
0.75*** 
0.62*** 
0.74*** 
0.09*** 
VR1 
VBT4 
0.85*** 
0.74*** 
OV 
BO 
VBO2 
VBO3 
VBO4 
V2 
V3 
V4 
V5 
0.80*** 
0.71*** 
0.81*** 
0.54*** 
0.77*** 
BT 
VBT1 
VBT2 
VBT3 
0.81*** 
0.57*** 
0.60*** 
0.39*** 
0.71*** 
0.62*** 
0.63*** 
0.20*** 
VBO1 
VBT4 
0.77*** 
0.74*** 
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Table 51. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Valence 
Dimension of Individual Bonuses and Organizational Bonuses: Across-PFP Plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 52. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Valence 
Dimension of Raises and Organizational Bonuses: Across-PFP Plans 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
OV 
BI 
VBI2 
VBI3 
VBI4 
V2 
V3 
V4 
V5 
0.91*** 
0.60*** 
0.59*** 
0.68*** 
0.65*** 
BO 
VBO1 
VBO2 
VBO3 
0.62*** 
0.65*** 
0.72*** 
0.50*** 
0.80*** 
0.58*** 
0.65*** 
0.05*** 
VBI1 
VBO4 
0.66*** 
0.63*** 
OV 
R 
VR2 
VR3 
VR4 
V2 
V3 
V4 
V5 
0.99*** 
0.49*** 
0.71*** 
0.72*** 
0.53*** 
BO 
VBO1 
VBO2 
VBO3 
0.56*** 
0.71*** 
0.92*** 
0.39*** 
0.57*** 
0.65*** 
0.55*** 
0.145*** 
VR1 
VBO4 
0.61*** 
0.62*** 
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Table 53. CFA Results of Second-Order Confirmatory Factor Analysis for Valence Dimension of Raises, Individual Bonuses, 
and Team Bonuses: Across-PFP Plans 
 
0.76*** 
OV 
R 
VR2 
VR3 
VR4 
V2 
V3 
V4 
V5 
0.87*** 
0.87*** 
0.65*** 
0.69 
0.79*** 
BI 
VBI1 
VBI2 
VBI3 
0.65*** 
0.70*** 
0.74*** 
0.52*** 
0.79*** 
0.68** 
0.77*** 
0.14*** 
VR1 
VBI4 
0.66*** 
BT 
VBT1 
VBT2 
VBT3 
0.84*** 
0.88*** 
0.76*** 
VBT4 
0.86*** 
0.50*** 
0.11*** 
0.09*** 
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Table 54. Paired T Tests Results of Comparisons between Dimensions: Across-PFP Plans 
 
Comparisons Mean (SD) df (p-value) 
Instrumentality:  
Raises vs. Individual Bonuses 5.33 (1.36) / 5.44 (1.28)      1864.44 (p=0.07)    
Individual Bonuses vs. Team Bonuses 5.59 (1.09) / 5.34 (1.17)    1432.12 (p<0.001) 
Raises vs. Team Bonuses 5.51 (1.20) / 5.33 (1.25) 1020.38 (p<0.05) 
Team Bonuses vs. Organization Bonuses 5.43 (1.13) / 5.31 (1.14) 773.93 (p=0.14) 
Individual Bonuses vs. Organization Bonuses 5.45 (1.23) / 5.12 (1.38) 1032.25 (p<0.001) 
Raises vs. Organization Bonuses 5.33 (1.28) / 5.07 (1.41) 837.86 (p<0.05) 
Expectancy:  
Raises vs. Individual Bonuses 5.57 (1.10) / 5.55 (1.01)     1391.91 (p=0.08)    
Individual Bonuses vs. Team Bonuses 5.59 (1.02) / 5.43 (1.08)   1074.95 (p<0.05) 
Raises vs. Team Bonuses 5.62 (1.07) / 5.46 (1.10) 765.59 (p<0.05) 
Team Bonuses vs. Organization Bonuses 5.55 (1.02) / 5.46 ( 1.07) 578.69 (p=0.34) 
Individual Bonuses vs. Organization Bonuses 5.59 (0.98) / 5.25 (1.23) 745.34 (p<0.001) 
Raises vs. Organization Bonuses 5.49 (1.11) / 5.25 (1.27) 622.66 (p<0.01) 
Valence:  
Raises vs. Individual Bonuses 5.76 (1.05) / 5.70 (1.04)     1869.99 (p=0.27)    
Individual Bonuses vs. Team Bonuses 5.67 (0.93) / 5.51 (1.06)   1414.41 (p<0.01) 
Raises vs. Team Bonuses 5.78 (1.05) / 5.49 (1.13) 1016.54 (p<0.001) 
Team Bonuses vs. Organization Bonuses 5.60 (0.96) / 5.46 (0.99) 773.08 (p=0.05) 
Individual Bonuses vs. Organization Bonuses 5.63 (0.96) / 5.37 (1.15) 1014.84 (p<0.001) 
Raises vs. Organization Bonuses 5.69 (1.04) / 5.37 (1.20) 828.49 (p<0.001) 
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Table 55. Regression Results: Criterion-Related Validity Testing (Overall PFP Perceptions) 
 
                                    PS              JS              OC              Trust (S)          Trust (M)            TI               Trust (S)            Trust (M)              TI 
Intercept                       0.39           0.02             0.32               -0.11                -0.04                0.42               -0.08                 -0.004                 0.25    
                                    (0.11)*      (0.11)          (0.11)*           (0.11)               (0.12)             (0.25)
 †
            (0.11)                (0.12)                (0.25) 
     
PFP Perceptions           0.52           0.30             0.12                0.09                 0.04               -0.12                0.14                   0.09                  -0.39 
(Overall)                      (0.05)**   (0.05)**       (0.05)*           (0.05)
†
             (0.06)              (0.12)             (0.05)*               (0.05)
†
              (0.11)* 
             
Pay Satisfaction                              0.05            0.16                0.08                 0.09               -0.47                            
                                                      (0.04)          (0.04)**         (0.04)*             (0.04)*           (0.09)**                    
 
Job Satisfaction            0.06                               0.34               0.22                  0.09               -0.51                0.22                   0.09                 -0.56    
                                     (0.05)                            (0.04)**        (0.04)**           (0.05)
 †
            (0.10)**         (0.04)**            (0.05)
†
              (0.10)** 
 
Org.commitment          0.17           0.30                                   0.13                  0.29               -0.02                0.14                   0.31                 -0.10 
                                     (0.04)**    (0.04)**                            (0.04)*             (0.04)**          (0.09)             (0.04)*              (0.04) **           (0.09) 
                                            
Trust                             0.09           0.20             0.13                                        0.32                0.19                                          0.33                   0.16 
(Supervisor)                (0.04)*       (0.04)**     (0.04)*                                    (0.04)**          (0.10)*                                     (0.04) **           (0.10)
†
 
    
Trust                             0.09           0.07             0.26               0.28                                         0.13                0.29                                             0.09 
(Top management)      (0.04)*      (0.04)
†
        (0.04)**         (0.04)**                                   (0.09)             (0.04)**                                       (0.09)  
                
Turnover Intention       -0.10         -0.09           -0.004             0.04                  0.03                                       0.03                   0.02 
                                    (0.02)**     (0.02)**       (0.02)           (0.02)               (0.02)                                   (0.02)
†
               (0.02) 
       
     
Gender                          0.05          -0.04           -0.02               0.03                  0.10                 0.04               0.03                   0.11                   0.02 
                                    (0.03)         (0.03)          (0.03)            (0.03)               (0.03)*             (0.07)            (0.03)                (0.03)*               (0.07) 
    
Age                               -0.12        -0.002         -0.11               -0.01                 0.01                -0.07              -0.02                   0.003                -0.02 
                                     (0.04)*      (0.03)         (0.04)*           (0.04)               (0.04)               (0.08)            (0.04)                 (0.04)                (0.08) 
          
Dyadic Tenure              -0.001       0.008         -0.04                0.04                 0.02                  0.04               0.04                   0.02                   0.04 
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                                     (0.02)         (0.01)        (0.02)*           (0.02)*             (0.02)               (0.03)            (0.02)*               (0.02)                (0.04) 
 
Job Tenure                    0.02           -0.01        -0.006              -0.005               0.01                  0.03             -0.004                 0.01                   0.03 
                                     (0.02)         (0.02)        (0.02)              (0.02)              (0.02)               (0.04)             (0.02)               (0.02)                 (0.04) 
  
Org Tenure                   -0.01          0.003         0.04                0.009               -0.02                 -0.08             0.008                -0.03                  -0.08 
                                     (0.01)       (0.01)        (0.01)*            (0.01)               (0.01)*             (0.02)*          (0.01)                (0.01)*               (0.02)* 
 
R-square                        0.59          0.62          0.62                 0.50                 0.49                   0.27              0.49                   0.49                   0.23 
Notes: N = 562. 
† 
p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01.  PS: Pay Satisfaction; JS: Job Satisfaction; OC: Affective Organizational 
Commitment; Trust (S): Trust in supervisor; Trust (M): Trust in Top Management; TI: Turnover Intention.  
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Table 56. Regression Results: Criterion-Related Validity Testing (Specific Plan PFP Perceptions) 
 
                                                                 RS                                 IBS                               TBS                               OBS  
       Intercept                                                 5.27                               5.10                              5.21                                5.21  
                     (0.15)**                        (0.13)**                        (0.13)**                         (0.20)**  
                                     
       Raises Perceptions                                   0.48                      
                                                                     (0.06)**                                                                       
 
       Individual Bonuses                                            0.48    
       Perceptions                                                                                  (0.06)**    
      
      Team Bonuses                                                                                  0.71                                              
      Perceptions                                                                                                                        (0.06)** 
 
      Organizational Bonuses                                                                                                                                            0.67        
      Perceptions                                                                                                                          (0.07)** 
           
      Pay Satisfaction                                      0.52                               0.57                               0.34                               0.37   
                                                                     (0.05)**                        (0.05)**                         (0.06)**                        (0.07)**   
     
      Job Satisfaction                                     -0.03                              -0.14                               0.02                              -0.07   
                                                                     (0.06)   (0.06)*                   (0.05)                            (0.09)   
                                          
      Org.commitment                                    0.05                              -0.04                              -0.05                              -0.06   
                                                                    (0.06)                             (0.05)                            (0.06)                             (0.09)   
                                           
      Trust                                                       0.08                               0.09                              -0.04                               0.01   
      (Supervisor)                                          (0.05)                             (0.05)
†
                          (0.06)                             (0.09)   
     
      Trust                                                       0.05                                0.05                              0.12                               0.22   
      (Top management)                                (0.05)                             (0.05)                            (0.06)*                          (0.08)*   
                
      Turnover Intention                                -0.01                              -0.06                               0.01                              -0.03   
                                                                    (0.03)                             (0.02)*                          (0.02)                             (0.04)     
 
     
      Gender                                                   -0.03                             -0.002                            0.0005                             0.08   
                                                                     (0.04)                            (0.04)                            (0.05)                             (0.06)                    
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      Age                                                        -0.09                              -0.03                             -0.03                              -0.12   
                                                                     (0.05)
 †
                          (0.04)                            (0.05)                             (0.07)
 †
   
                                      
      Dyadic Tenure                                        0.03                               0.03                              0.001                             -0.01     
                                                                     (0.02)                            (0.02)
 †
                          (0.02)                            (0.03)   
                
      Job Tenure                                              0.008                             0.003                            0.007                             0.05   
                                                                     (0.02)                             (0.02)                           (0.02)                            (0.03)   
 
      Org Tenure                                             -0.01                             -0.01                            -0.008                            -0.0008   
                                                                     (0.01)               (0.01)           (0.01)                            (0.02)              
      R-square                                                  0.69                               0.61                              0.72                               0.67                    
Notes: N = 562. 
† 
p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01. RS: Raise Satisfaction; IBS: Individual Bonus Satisfaction; TBS: Team Bonus 
Satisfaction; OBS: Organization Bonus Satisfaction. 
 
 
  
165 
 
REFERENCES 
Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in 
experimental social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 267-299). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Alfes, K., Shantz, A., & Truss, C. (2012). The link between perceived HRM practices, 
performance and well-being: the moderating effect of trust in the employer. Human 
Resource Management Journal, 22, 409-427. 
Allen, D. G., Shore, L. M., & Griffeth, R. W. (2003). The role of perceived organizational 
support and supportive human resource practices in the turnover process. Journal of 
Management, 29, 99-118. 
Allen, N. & Meyer, J. P. (1990). The measurement and antecedents of affective, continuance and 
normative commitment to the organization. Journal of occupational Psychology, 63, 1-
18. 
Bagozzi, R. P., Yi, Y., & Phillips, L. W. (1991). Assessing construct validity in organizational 
research. Administrative Science Quarterly, 36, 421-458. 
Baker, G. P., Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1988). Compensation and incentives: practice vs. 
theory. Journal of Finance, 43, 593-616. 
Bamberger, P., & Belogolovsky, E. (2010). The impact of pay secrecy on individual task 
performance. Personnel Psychology, 63, 965-996. 
Bandura, A. (1982). Self-efficacy mechanism in human agency. American Psychologist, 37, 122-
147. 
Banker, R. D., Lee, S. Y., Potter, G., & Srinivasan, D. (1996). Contextual analysis of 
performance impacts of outcome-based incentive compensation. Academy of 
Management Journal, 39, 920-948. 
  
166 
 
Banker, R. D., Lee, S.Y., Potter, G., & Srinivasan, D. (2001). An empirical analysis of 
continuing improvements following the implementation of a performance-based 
compensation plan. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 30, 315-350. 
Bartol, K. M., & Locke, E. A. (2000). Incentives and motivation. In Sara L. Rynes, and Barry A. 
Gerhart (Eds.), Compensation in organizations: current research and practice, pp. 273-
310. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.  
Beer, M., & Cannon, M. D. (2004). Promise and peril in implementing pay-for-performance. 
Human Resource Management, 43, 3-48. 
Belogolovsky, E., & Bamberger, P. A. (In press). Signaling in secret: pay for performance and 
the incentive and sorting effects of pay secrecy. Academy of Management Journal. 
Bentler, P. M., & Bonett, D. G. (1980). Significance tests and goodness of fit in the analysis of 
covariance structures. Psychological Bulletin, 88, 588-606. 
Bergmann, T. J., & Scarpello, V. G. (2002). Compensation decision making (4th ed.). Mason, 
Ohio: South-Western.  
Bhattacharya, M., Gibson, D. E., & Doty, D. H. (2005). The effects of flexibility in employee 
skills, employee behaviors, and human resource practices on firm performance. Journal 
of Management, 31, 622-640. 
Bloom, M. (2004). The ethics of compensation systems. Journal of Business Ethics, 52, 149-152. 
Bonner, S. E., & Sprinkle, G. B. (2002). The effects of monetary incentives on effort and task 
performance: theories, evidence, and a framework for research. Accounting, 
Organizations and Society, 27, 303-345. 
Boswell, W.R., & Boudreau, J.W. (2001). How leading companies create, measure, and achieve 
strategic results through "line of sight." Management Decision, 39, 851-859.  
  
167 
 
Brown, K. A., and Huber, V. L. (1992). Lowering floors and raising ceilings: a longitudinal 
assessment of the effects of an earnings-at-risk plan on pay satisfaction. Personnel 
Psychology, 45, 279-311. 
Browne, M. W., & Cudeck, R. (1993). Alternative Ways of Assessing Model Fit. In K. Bollen 
and J. Long. (Eds.), Testing Structural Equation Models, pp. 136-162. Newbury Park, 
CA: Sage. 
Buhrmester, M., Kwang, T., & Gosling, S. D. (2011). Amazon’s mechanical turk: a new source 
of inexpensive, yet high-quality, data? Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 3-5. 
Cable, D. M., & Judge, T. A. (1994). Pay preference and job search decisions: a person-
organization fit perspective. Personnel Psychology, 47, 317-348.  
Cadsby, C. B., Song, F., & Tapon, F. (2007). Sorting and incentive effects of pay for 
performance: an experimental investigation. Academy of Management Journal, 50, 387-
405. 
Campbell, D., & Fiske, D. (1959). Convergent and discriminant validation by the multitrait-
multimethod matrix. Psychological Bulletin, 56, 81-105. 
Chen, G., Ployhart, R. E., Cooper-Thomas, H., Anderson, N., & Bliese, P. D. (2011). The power 
of momentum: A new model of dynamic relationships between job satisfaction change 
and turnover intentions. Academy of Management Journal, 54,159-181. 
Chiang, F. F. T., & Birtch, T. A. (2010). Pay for performance and work attitudes: the mediating 
role of employee- organization service value congruence. International Journal of 
Hospitality Management, 29, 632-640. 
Cohen, K. (2011). Salary budget increases going for a slow ride: WorldatWork 2011-2012 
budget survey results. Work span, September, 30-37. 
  
168 
 
Colquitt, J. A., & Zapata-Phelan, C. P. (2007). Trends in theory building and theory testing: a 
five-decade study of the academy of management journal, Academy of Management 
Journal, 50, 1281-1303. 
Colquitt, J. A., Scott, B. A., & LePine, J. A. (2007). Trust, trustworthiness, and trust propensity: 
a meta-analytic test of their unique relationships with risk taking and job performance. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 92, 909-927. 
Cronbach, L. J., & Meehl, P. E. (1955). Construct validity in psychological tests. Psychological 
Bulletin, 52, 281-302. 
Currall, S. C., Towler, A. J., Judge, T. A., & Kohn, L. (2005). Pay satisfaction and organizational 
outcomes. Personnel Psychology, 58, 613-640. 
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human 
behavior. New York: Plenum. 
Deckop, J. R., Mangel, R., & Cirka, C. C. (1999). Getting more than you pay for: organizational 
citizenship behavior and pay-for-performance plans. Academy of Management Journal, 
42, 420-428. 
Deckop, J. R., Merriman, K .K., & Blau, G. (2004). Impact of variable risk preferences on the 
effectiveness of control by pay. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 
77, 63-80.  
Desmet, P. T. M., De Cremer, D., & Van Dijk, E. (2011). Trust recovery following voluntary or 
forced financial compensations in the trust game: the role of trait forgiveness. Personality 
and Individual Differences, 51, 267-273. 
Dollard, J., & Miller, N.E. (1950). Personality and psychotherapy: An analysis in terms of 
learning, thinking, and culture. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
  
169 
 
Dulebohn, J. H., & Martocchio, J. J. (1998). Employee perceptions of the fairness of work group 
incentive pay plans. Journal of Management, 24, 469-488. 
Dyer, L., & Theriault, R. (1976). The determinants of pay satisfaction. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 61, 596-604. 
Eisenberger, R., & Cameron, J. (1996). Detrimental effects of rewards: Reality or myth? 
American Psychologist, 51, 1153- 1166. 
Eisenberger, R., Huntington, R., Hutchison, S., & Sowa, D. (1986). Perceived organizational 
support. Journal of Applied Psychology, 71, 500-507. 
Eisenberger, R., Rhoades, L., & Cameron, J. (1999). Does pay for performance increase or 
decrease perceived self-determination and intrinsic motivation? Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 77, 1026–1040. 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989). Agency theory: an assessment and review. The Academy of 
Management Review, 14, 57-74.  
Erez, A., & Isen, A. M. (2002). The influence of positive affect on the components of expectancy 
motivation. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 1055-1067.  
Evans, W. A. (1970). Pay for performance: fact or fable. Personnel Journal, 49, 726-729. 
Fong, S. C. L., & Shaffer, M. A. (2003). The dimensionality and determinants of pay 
satisfaction: a cross-cultural investigation of a group incentive plan. International 
Journal of Human Resource Management, 14, 559-580. 
Fong, E. A. & Tosi, H. L. (2007). Effort, performance, and conscientiousness: an agency theory  
Perspective. Journal of Management, 33, 161-179. 
George, J. M., & Jones, G. R. (2000). The role of time in theory and theory building. Journal of 
Management, 26, 657-684.  
  
170 
 
Gerhart, B., Minkoff, H., & Olsen, R. (1995). Employee Compensation: Theory, Practice, and 
Evidence. In G.R. Ferris, S.D. Rosen, & D.T. Barnum (Eds.), Handbook of human 
resource management: 528-547. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. 
Gerhart, B., Rynes, S.L., & Fulmer, I. S. (2009). Pay and performance: individuals, groups, and 
executives. Academy of Management Annals, 3, 251-315.  
Gerhart, B., & Rynes, S. L. (2003). Compensation: theory, evidence, and strategic implications. 
Thousand oaks, CA: Sage. 
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & Balkin, D. B. (1989). Effectiveness of individual and aggregate 
compensation strategies. Industrial Relations, 28, 431-445. 
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & Balkin, D. B. (1992). Compensation, organizational strategy, and firm 
performance. Cincinnati, OH; South-Western. 
Green, C., & Heywood, J. S. (2008). Does performance pay increase job satisfaction? 
Economica, 75, 710-728. 
Greene, C. N. (1973). Causal connections among managers’ merit pay, job satisfaction, and 
performance.  Journal of Applied Psychology, 58, 95-100. 
Gupta, N. (1980). Performance-contingent rewards and satisfaction: an initial analysis. Human 
Relations, 33, 813.  
Guthrie, JP. (2007). Remuneration: Pay effects at work. In Boxall, P., Purcell, J., & Wright, P. 
(Eds). Oxford Handbook of Human Resource Management, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hackman, R. J., & Oldham, G. R. (1975). Development of the job diagnostic survey. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 60, 159–170. 
  
171 
 
Hamann, P. M., Schiemann, F., Bellora, L., & Guenther, T. W. (2013). Exploring the dimensions 
of organizational performance: a construct validity study. Organizational Research 
Methods, 67-87. 
Hansen, F. (2011). Currents in compensation and benefits. Compensation & Benefits Review, 43, 
135-145. 
Heneman, H. G. (1973). Impact of performance on managerial pay levels and pay changes. 
Journal of Applied Psychology, 58, 128-130. 
Heneman, H. G. (1985). Pay satisfaction. In Kendrith M. Rowland, and Gerald R. Ferris (Eds.), 
Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management, pp. 115-139.Connecticut, 
JAI Press. 
Heneman, H. G., & Judge, T. A. (2000). Compensation attitudes. In Sara L. Rynes, and Barry A. 
Gerhart (Eds.), Compensation in organizations: current research and practice, pp. 60-
103. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.  
Heneman, H. G., & Schwab, D. P. (1979). Work and rewards theory. In D. Yoder, H.G. Jr. 
Heneman (Eds.), Handbook of personnel and industrial relations, Vol. П: Motivation and 
commitment (pp. 6-22). Washington, DC: Bureau of National Affairs. 
Heneman, H. G., & Schwab, D. P. (1985). Pay satisfaction: its multidimensional nature and 
measurement. International Journal of Psychology, 20, 129-141. 
Heneman, R. L., Greenberger, D. B., & Strasser, S. (1988). The relationship between pay-for-
performance perceptions and pay satisfaction. Personnel Psychology, 41, 745-759. 
Heneman, R. L. (1984). Pay for performance: exploring the merit system. (work in American 
Institute Studies in Productivity No.38). New York: Pergamon Press. 
  
172 
 
Hinkin, T. R. (1995). A review of scale development practices in the study of organizations. 
Journal of Management, 21, 967-988. 
Hinkin, T. R. (1998). A brief tutorial on the development of measures for use in survey 
questionnaires. Organizational Research Methods, 1, 104-121. 
Hobfoll, S. E. (1989). Conservation of resources: A new attempt to at conceptualizing stress. 
American Psychologist, 44: 513–524. 
Hsee, C. K., & Abelson, R. P. (1991). Velocity relation: Satisfaction as a function of the first 
derivative of outcome over time. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60: 341–347. 
Ilgen, D. R., Nebeker, D. M. & Pritchard, R. D. (1981). Expectancy Theory Measures: An 
Empirical Comparison in an Experimental Simulation. Organizational Behavior and 
Human Performance, 28, 189-223. 
Igalens, J., & Roussel, P. (1999). A study of the relationships between compensation package, 
work motivation and job satisfaction. Journal of Organizational Behavior, 20, 1003-
1025. 
Isaac, R., Zerbe, W., & Pitt. D. (2001). Leadership and Motivation: The effective application of 
expectancy theory. Journal of Managerial Issues, 13, 212-226. 
Jenkins JR., G. D., Mitra, A., Gupta, N., & Shaw, J. (1998). Are financial incentives related to 
performance? A meta-analytic review of empirical research. Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 83, 777-787.  
Judge, T.A., Piccolo, R.P., Podsakoff, N.P., Shaw, J.C., & Rich, B.L. (2010). The relationship 
between pay and job satisfaction: A meta-analysis of the literature. Journal of Vocational 
Behavior, 77, 157-167.  
  
173 
 
Kahn, L. M., & Sherer, P. D. (1990). Contingent pay and managerial performance. Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, 43, 107S-120S. 
Kahneman , D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. 
Econometrica, 47, 263-292. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1984). Choices, values and frames, American Psychologist, 39, 
341–350. 
Kelloway, E. K., Gottlieb, B. H., & Barham, L. (1999). The source, nature, and direction of work 
and family conflict: A longitudinal investigation. Journal of Occupational Health 
Psychology, 4, 337-346. 
Kerr, S. (1975). On the folly of rewarding A, while hoping for B. Academy of Management 
Journal, 18, 769-783. 
Kline, R. B. (2011). Principles and practice of structural equation modeling. (3
rd
 ed.). New 
York: The Guilford Press. 
Kooij, D. T. A. M., Jansen, P. G. W., Dikkers, J. S. E., & Lange, A. H. D. (2010). The influence 
of age on the associations between HR practices and both affective commitment and job 
satisfaction: a meta-analysis.  Journal of Organizational Behavior, 31, 1111-1136. 
Kwong, J. Y. Y., & Wong, K. F. E. (In press). Fair or not fair? The effects of numerical framing 
on the perceived justice of outcomes. Journal of Management. 
Kuvaas, B. & Dysvik, A. (2010). Exploring alternative relationships between perceived 
investment in employee development, perceived supervisor support and employee 
outcomes. Human Resource Management Journal, 20, 138-156. 
Lawler, E. E.  (1981). Pay and organizational development. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
  
174 
 
Lawler, E. E. (1971). Pay and organizational effectiveness: A psychological view. New York: 
McGraw-Hill. 
Lazear, E.P. (1998). Personnel Economics for Managers. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Lazear, E. P. (2000). Performance pay and productivity. The American Economic Review, 90, 
1346- 1361. 
Leonard, N.H., Beauvais, L.L., & Scholl, R.W. (1999). Work Motivation: The incorporation of 
self concept-based processes. Human Relations, 52, 969-998. 
 
Lindsley, D. H., Brass, D. J., & Thomas, J. B. (1995). Efficacy-performance spirals: A multilevel 
perspective. Academy of Management Review, 20: 645–678. 
Locke, E. A. (1969). What is job satisfaction? Organizational Behavior and Human 
Performance, 4, 309-336. 
Louis, M. R. (1980). Surprise and sense making: What newcomer experience in entering 
unfamiliar organizational settings. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25: 226–251. 
Macey, W. H., & Schneider, B. (2008). The meaning of employee engagement. Industrial and 
Organizational Psychology: Perspectives on Science and Practice, 1, 3-30. 
Man, M., Modrak, V., Dima, I. C., & Pachura, P. (2011). A theoretical approach to the job 
satisfaction. Polish Journal of Management Studies, 4, 7-15. 
Mathieu, J. E., & Zajac, D. (1990). A review and meta-analysis of the antecedents, correlates, 
and consequences of organizational commitment. Psychological Bulletin, 108, 171–194. 
Mayer, R .C., & Davis, J. H. (1999). The effect of the performance appraisal system on trust for 
management: A field quasi-experiment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 84, 123–136. 
  
175 
 
Mayer, R. C., & Gavin, M. B. (2005). Trust in management and performance: Who minds the 
shop while the employees watch the boss? Academy of Management Journal, 48, 874 – 
888. 
Miceli, M. P., Jung, I., Near, J. P., & Greenberger, D. B. (1991). Predictors and outcomes of 
reactions to pay-for-performance plans. Journal of Applied psychology, 76, 508-521. 
Miceli, M. P., & Lane, M. C. (1991). Antecedents of pay satisfaction: A review and extension. In 
K. Rowland & G.R. Ferris (Eds.), Research in Personnel and Human Resources 
Management. (pp. 235-309). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.  
Milkovich, G. T., Newman, J. M., & Gerhart, B. (2011). Compensation. New York: McGraw-
Hill Irwin. 
Miller, S. (2012). Spending on performance-based awards remains strong. Society for Human 
Resource Management. Retrieved from 
http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/compensation/Articles/Pages/Performance-Based-
Awards-Spending.aspx 
Mizruchi, M. S., Stearns, L. B., & Fleischer, A. (2011). Getting a bonus: social networks, 
performance, and reward among commercial bankers. Organizational Science, 42-59. 
Morgeson, F. P., Johnson, M. D., Campion, M. A., Medsker, G. J., & Mumford, T. V. (2006).   
Understanding reactions to job redesign: A quasi-experimental investigation of the 
moderating effects of organizational context on perceptions of performance behavior. 
Personnel Psychology, 59, 333-363. 
Mowday, R. T., Steers, R. M., & Porter, L. W. (1979). The measurement of organizational 
commitment. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 14, 224-247. 
  
176 
 
Nawab, S., & Bhatti, K. K. (2011). Influence of employee compensation on organizational 
commitment and job satisfaction: a case study of educational sector of Pakistan. 
International Journal of Business and Social Science, 2, 25-32. 
Nifadkar, S., Tsui, A. S., & Ashforth, B. E. (2012). The way you make me feel and behave: 
Supervisor triggered newcomer affect and approach-avoidance behavior. Academy of 
Management Journal, 55, 1146-1168. 
Nishii, L. H., Lepak, D. P., & Schneider, B. (2008). Employee attributions of the “why” of HR 
practices: their effects on employee attitudes and behaviors, and customer satisfaction. 
Personnel Psychology, 61, 503-545. 
Nunnally, J. C., & Bernstein, I. H. (1994). Psychometric theory (3
rd
 ed.). New York: McGraw-
Hill. 
Nyberg, A. (2010). Retaining your high performers: moderators of the performance-job 
satisfaction-voluntary turnover relationship. Journal of Applied Psychology, 95, 440-453. 
Nyberg, A. J., Pieper, J. R., & Trevor, C. O. (In press). Pay-for-performance’s effect on future 
employee performance: integrating psychological and economic principles toward a 
contingency perspective. Journal of Management.  
O’Byrne, S., & Young, S. (2006). Why executive pay is failing. Harvard Business Review, 84, 
28. 
Park, S., & Sturman, M. C. (2012). How and what you pay matters: the relative effectiveness of 
merit pay, bonuses and long-term incentives on future job performance. Compensation & 
Benefits Review, 44, 80-85. 
  
177 
 
Park, S., & Sturman, M. C. (2013). Evaluating form and functionality of pay-for-performance 
plans: the relative incentive and sorting effects of merit pay, bonuses, and long-term 
incentives. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Pearce, J. L., Stevenson, W. B., & Perry, J. L. (1985). Managerial compensation based on 
organizational performance: A time series analysis of the effects of merit pay. Academy 
of Management Journal, 28, 261-278. 
Penner, F.D. (1966). A study of the causes and consequences of salary satisfaction. Crotonville, 
NY: General Electric Behavioral Research Service. 
Perry, J. L., & Pearce, J. L. (1983). Initial reactions to federal merit pay. Personnel Journal, 62, 
230-237. 
Pfeffer, J. (1998). Six dangerous myths about pay. Harvard Business Review, May-June, 109-
119. 
Peterson, S. J., & Luthans, F. (2006). The impact of financial and nonfinancial incentives on 
business-unit outcomes over time. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91, 156-165.  
Pekkarinen, T., & Riddell, C. (2008). Performance Pay and Earnings: Evidence from Personnel 
Records, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 61, 297-319. 
Porter, L. W., Steers, R. M., Mowday, R. T., & Boulian, P. V. (1974). Organizational 
commitment, job satisfaction, and turnover among psychiatric technicians. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 59, 603-609. 
R Development Core Team. (2014). R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. 
Vienna, Austria: the R Foundation for Statistical Computing. ISBN: 3-900051-07-0. 
Available online at http://www.R-project.org/. 
  
178 
 
Rhoades, L., & Eisenberger, R. (2002). Perceived organizational support: a review of the 
literature. Journal of Applied Psychology, 87, 698-714. 
Rynes, S. L., Gerhart, B., & Parks, L. (2005). Personnel psychology: performance evaluation and 
pay for performance. Annual Review of Psychology, 56, 571-600. 
Salamin, A., & Hom, P. W. (2005). In search of the elusive U-shaped performance-turnover 
relationship: are high performing Swiss bankers more liable to quit? Journal of Applied 
Psychology, 90, 1204-1216. 
SAS Institute Inc. (2009). JMP 8 user guide, Second Edition. Cary, NC: SAS Institute Inc. 
SAS Institute Inc. (2012). SAS Structural Equation Modeling 2 for JMP. Cary, NC: SAS Institute 
Inc. 
Schaubroeck, J., Shaw, J. D., Duffy, M. K. & Mitra, A. (2008). An under-met and over-met 
expectations model of employee reactions to merit raises. Journal of Applied Psychology, 
93, 424-434. 
Schwab, D. P. (1980). Construct validity in organizational behavior. Research in Organizational 
Behavior, 2, 3-43.  
Schwab D. P. (2005). Research methods for organizational studies (2
nd
 Eds.). Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates, Mahwah, NJ.   
Schwab, D. P., & Olson, C. A. (1990). Merit pay practices: implications for pay-performance 
relationships. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, 237S - 255S. 
Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and Human Behavior. New York: Macmillan. 
Solinger, O. N., Olffen, W., & Roe, R. A. (2008). Beyond the three-component model of 
organizational commitment. Journal of Applied Psychology, 93, 70-83.  
Spector, P. E. (1992). Summated rating scale construction: an introduction. SAGE Publications. 
  
179 
 
Steel, P., & Konig, C. J. (2006). Integrating theories of motivation. Academy of Management 
Review, 31, 889-913. 
Sturman, M. C., & Short, J. C. (2000). Lump-sum bonus satisfaction: testing the construct 
validity of a new pay satisfaction dimension. Personnel Psychology, 53, 673-700. 
Sturman, M. C., Trevor, C. O., Boudreau, J. W., & Gerhart, B. (2003). Is it worth it to win the 
talent war? Evaluating the utility of performance-based pay. Personnel Psychology, 56, 
997-1035. 
Tett, R. P., & Meyer, J. P. (1993). Job satisfaction, organizational commitment, turnover 
intention, and turnover: path analyses based on meta-analytic findings. Personnel 
Psychology, 46, 259-293. 
Toh, S. M., Morgeson, F. P., & Campion, M. A. (2008). Human resource configurations: 
Investigating fit with the organizational context. Journal of Applied Psychology, 93, 864-
882. 
Towerswatson (2010). 2011 Salary increase planning update. Retrieved from 
https://www.misoenergy.org/Library/Repository/Meeting%20Material/Stakeholder/BOD/
Human%20Resources%20Committee/2010/20101019/20101019%20BOD%20Human%
20Resources%20Committee%20Item%2005%202011%20Salary%20Planning%20Updat
e.pdf 
The National Center for Employee Ownership, updated February 2012. 
Tracey, J.B., & Tews, M.J. (2005). Construct validity of a general training climate scale. 
Organizational Research Methods, 8, 353-374. 
  
180 
 
Trevor, C. O., Gerhart, B., & Boudreau, J. W. (1997). Voluntary turnover and job performance: 
curvilinearity and the moderating influences of salary growth and promotions. Journal of 
Applied Psychology, 82, 44-61. 
Vroom, V.H. (1964). Work and motivation. New York: Wiley. 
Wayne, S. J., Shore, L. M., & Liden, R. C. (1997). Perceived organizational support and leader-
member exchange: a social exchange perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 40, 
82-111. 
Weathington, B. L., & Weathington, J. G. (2011). Psychology and money: pay, motivation, and 
financial decisions, In Weathington, B.L., Cunningham, C.J.L., O’Leary, B.J., and 
Biderman, M.D. (Eds.), Applied psychology in everyday life, pp. 125- 140. UK: 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing.  
Westen, D., & Rosenthal, R. (2003). Quantifying construct validity: two simple measures. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 608-618. 
Williams, M. L., McDaniel, M. A., & Nguyen, N. T. (2006). A meta-analysis of the antecedents 
and consequences of pay level satisfaction. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91, 392-413. 
Worldatwork (2011). Salary budget survey.  Retrieved from 
http://www.worldatwork.org/waw/adimLink?id=53234 
Worldatwork (2012). Private company incentive pay practices survey. WorkatWork: 
Washington.DC. 
Worldatwork (2013) salary budget survey. Retrieved from 
http://www.worldatwork.org/waw/adimLink?id=69466 
Wright, P. M., Gardner, T. M., Moynihan, L. M., & Allen, M. R. (2005). The relationship 
between HR practices and firm performance: Examining causal order. Personnel 
  
181 
 
Psychology, 58, 409-446. 
 
